|
Soviet Union [USSR] General Secretary: Power and Authority
That certain policies throughout Soviet history have been so
clearly identified with the general secretary of the CPSU
demonstrated the importance of that position as well as of the
stakes in the succession struggle upon a general secretary's death
or removal from office. As general secretary, Stalin determined the
party's policies in the economy and foreign affairs and thus gave
his name to a whole era in Soviet history. Khrushchev put his stamp
on a variety of policies, including peaceful coexistence with the
West and the virgin land campaign
(see Soviet Union USSR - Khrushchev's Reforms and Fall
, ch. 2). Soviet and Western observers identified Brezhnev with
détente and the Soviet military buildup
(see Soviet Union USSR - The Brezhnev Era
, ch.
2). In the late 1980s, Gorbachev associated his name with the
policies of openness, restructuring, and democratization.
The general secretary possessed many powers. As chairman of the
Politburo, the general secretary decided the agenda and timing of
its deliberations. The general secretary acted as chief executive
of the party apparatus and thus supervised the nomenklatura.
The general secretary also chaired the Defense Council, which
managed the Soviet military-industrial complex
(see Soviet Union USSR - Defense Council
, ch. 18). Finally, through attendance at summit meetings
with world heads of state, the general secretary acquired symbolic
legitimation as the Soviet Union's top ruler.
Once selected for this position by other members of the
Politburo and confirmed by the Central Committee, the general
secretary had to proceed to build a base of power and strengthen
his authority. Officials considered eligible for the position of
general secretary held a great amount of power to begin with; they
always occupied seats on the Politburo and Secretariat, and they
developed a large number of clients throughout the party and
government bureaucracies. The general secretary's efforts to extend
this power base involved placing loyal clients in strategic
positions throughout party and government hierarchies. One measure
of the success of the general secretary's efforts in this regard
was turnover in the Central Committee at the first party congress
following the secretary's accession to the position
(see Soviet Union USSR - Central Committee
, this ch.). The general secretary used these clients to
promote desired policies at all levels of the party and government
bureaucracies and to ensure accurate transmission of information
about policy problems up the hierarchy
(see Soviet Union USSR - Nomenklatura
, this
ch.).
To secure his rule and advance his policies, the general
secretary also had to increase his authority. American
Sovietologist George Breslauer has written that efforts to build
authority involved legitimation of the general secretary's policies
and programs and demonstration of his competence or
indispensability as a leader. The general secretary strove to show
that his policies derived from Lenin's teachings and that these
policies have led to successes in socialist construction. Moreover,
the general secretary strove to demonstrate a unique insight into
the teachings of Marx and Lenin and into the current stage of world
development. The general secretary also emphasized personal ties to
the people and a leadership motivated by the interests of the
workers and peasants
(see Soviet Union USSR - Party Legitimacy
, this ch.). One further
means to strengthen the legitimacy of the general secretary's power
has been the acquisition of high government offices. Thus in
October 1988, Gorbachev became chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet, which was the title for head of the Soviet state.
He retained his position as head of state when in May 1989 the
newly elected Congress of People's Deputies close a new Supreme
Soviet and elected Gorbachev to the just created position of
chairman of the Supreme Soviet. In the past, the head of the Soviet
state sometimes had been referred to as "president" in Soviet and
Western media, although such a position was not identified in the
Constitution.
Another means that Soviet general secretaries have used to
ensure their authority is the cult of the leader. The cult of the
leader has several intended audiences. For example, the general
secretary used the cult of the leader to intimidate actual or
potential rivals and thus force them to accept and follow his
policies. In addition, the cult of the leader reassured those
members of the party and government hierarchies whose careers
depended upon the success of the general secretary's policies. The
cult of the leader provided inspiration to those who wished to
identify with a patriarchal figure.
Breslauer has written that Soviet general secretaries since
Stalin have attempted to build their authority by creating a sense
of national élan. For example, Iurii V. Andropov, general secretary
from November 1982 to February 1984, sought to rouse Soviet society
with his campaign against alcoholism and corruption. The general
secretary has also sought to play the role of problem solver. For
example, in the mid- and late 1980s, Gorbachev sought to reverse a
decline in economic efficiency by promoting economic policies
designed to curb the ministries' role in Soviet economic life and
thereby encourage enterprise initiative
(see Soviet Union USSR - Reforming the Planning System
, ch. 11).
Since the death of Lenin, the party elite has been unable to
institute regulations governing the transfer of office from one
general secretary to the next. The Nineteenth Party Conference
called for limiting party officeholders to two five-year terms.
However, it was unclear whether this proviso would apply to the
general secretary and other top leaders. The party leadership has
yet to devise procedures by which the general secretary may
relinquish the office. The powers of the office were not set;
neither were its rights and duties. These factors combined to
generate a high degree of unpredictability in selecting a new
leader and a period of uncertainty while the new general secretary
consolidates power.
Three stages have characterized the efforts of various general
secretaries to consolidate their power and authority. The first
stage begins while the incumbent leader is in power and lasts
through his death or ouster. Potential successors seek to place
themselves in more powerful positions relative to their rivals. For
example, under Konstantin U. Chernenko (general secretary from
February 1984 to March 1985) Gorbachev chaired Politburo meetings
in the general secretary's absence and also assumed
responsibilities for cadre policy. These responsibilities enabled
Gorbachev to set the agenda for Politburo meetings and to place
persons loyal to him in important positions throughout the regime.
Gorbachev's unsuccessful rivals for power, Grigorii V. Romanov and
Viktor V. Grishin, had fewer such opportunities to influence the
outcome of the struggle to succeed Chernenko.
The second stage occurs with the transfer of authority to the
new leader and both the accumulation of positions and the authority
that goes with them. This stage can occur over a prolonged period
of time and coincide with the next stage. For example, only in 1977
did Brezhnev, named general secretary in 1964, become chairman of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and thus de facto head of
state. The third stage involves two steps: consolidation of the new
leader's power through the removal of his predecessor's clients and
those of his actual and potential rivals for power; and the
installation of the new leader's clients in key positions. This
stage probably lasts for the duration of the general secretary's
tenure.
A succession struggle entails opportunities and problems for
the new party leader and for the Soviet leadership as a whole.
Transfer of office from one general secretary to another can
improve the possibilities for change. Seweryn Bialer has written
that "ambition, power, and the desire for innovation all meet in a
succession struggle and so prepare the ground for change."
Succession disrupts the normal pattern of business. Also, policy
initiatives are a critical means of consolidating a new leader's
position. Khrushchev's condemnation of Stalin represented an appeal
to party officials dissatisfied with Stalinism and an effort to
define and control a new program that would better meet the needs
of the party and society. Similarly, in the late 1980s Gorbachev's
initiatives appealed to officials and citizens who were
dissatisfied with the inertia of the late Brezhnev period and who
sought to modernize the Soviet economy.
Yet, a succession struggle can also occasion serious
difficulties for the leadership. A succession struggle increases
the probability for personal and policy conflicts. In turn, these
conflicts can lead to political passivity as the rivals for power
turn their attention to that struggle rather than to policy
development and execution. When the general secretary lacks the
influence necessary to promote desired policies, a sense of inertia
can debilitate the political system at the intermediate and lower
levels. This factor partially explains the resistance that
Khrushchev and, in the late 1980s, Gorbachev met in their
respective efforts to alter the policies of their predecessors.
Data as of May 1989
|
