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Soviet Union [USSR] Patron-Client Relations
An official in the party or government bureaucracy could not
advance in the nomenklatura without the assistance of a
patron. In return for this assistance in promoting his career, the
client carried out the policies of the patron. Patron-client
relations thus help to explain the ability of party leaders to
generate support for their policies. The presence of patron-client
relations between party officials and officials in other
bureaucracies also helped to account for the control the party
exercised over Soviet society. All of the 2 million members of the
nomenklatura system understood that they held their
positions as a result of a favor bestowed on them by a superior
official in the party and that they could be replaced if they
manifested disloyalty to their patron. Self-interest dictated that
members of the nomenklatura submit to the control of their
patrons in the party.
Clients sometimes could attempt to supplant their overlord. For
example, Khrushchev, one of Lazar M. Kaganovich's former protégés,
helped to oust the latter in 1957. Seven years later, Brezhnev, a
client of Khrushchev, helped to remove his boss from power. The
power of the general secretary was consolidated to the extent that
he placed his clients in positions of power and influence
(see Soviet Union USSR - General Secretary: Power and Authority
, this ch.). The ideal for
the general secretary, writes Soviet émigré observer Michael
Voslensky, "is to be overlord of vassals selected by oneself."
Several factors explain the entrenchment of patron-client
relations. First, in a centralized nondemocratic government system,
promotion in the bureaucratic-political hierarchy was the only path
to power. Second, the most important criterion for promotion in
this hierarchy was not merit but approval from one's supervisors,
who evaluated their subordinates on the basis of political criteria
and their ability to contribute to the fulfillment of the economic
plan. Third, political rivalries were present at all levels of the
party and state bureaucracies but were especially prevalent at the
top. Power and influence decided the outcomes of these struggles,
and the number and positions of one's clients were critical
components of that power and influence. Fourth, because fulfillment
of the economic plan was decisive, systemic pressures led officials
to conspire together and use their ties to achieve that goal.
The faction led by Brezhnev provides a good case study of
patron-client relations in the Soviet system. Many members of the
Brezhnev faction came from Dnepropetrovsk, where Brezhnev had
served as first secretary of the provincial party organization.
Andrei P. Kirilenko, a Politburo member and Central Committee
secretary under Brezhnev, was first secretary of the regional
committee of Dnepropetrovsk. Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyy, named as
first secretary of the Ukrainian apparatus under Brezhnev,
succeeded Kirilenko in that position. Nikolai A. Tikhonov,
appointed by Brezhnev as first deputy chairman of the Soviet
Union's Council of Ministers, graduated from the Dnepropetrovsk
College of Metallurgy and presided over the economic council of
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast. Finally, Nikolai A. Shchelokov, minister of
internal affairs under Brezhnev, was a former chairman of the
Dnepropetrovsk soviet.
Patron-client relations had implications for policy making in
the party and government bureaucracies. Promotion of trusted
subordinates into influential positions facilitated policy
formation and policy execution. A network of clients helped to
ensure that a patron's policies could be carried out. In addition,
patrons relied on their clients to provide an accurate flow of
information on events throughout the country. This information
assisted policymakers in ensuring that their programs were being
implemented.
Data as of May 1989
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