Spain Labor Relations in the Post-Franco Period
The Franco regime ended amidst a wave of worker ferment
and
considerable strike activity. By 1975, brutal repression
no
longer sufficed to snuff out social discontent, as worker
militancy overwhelmed an increasingly dysfunctional OSE
and
forced employers to negotiate directly with
representatives of
the semilegal independent unions. The strike waves that
crested
between 1974 and 1976 coincided with the huge oil price
increases
that began in 1973. The country's political elite, because
it was
engrossed with the transition to parliamentary democracy,
gave
only passing attention to labor unrest and to the
increasing
deterioration of the economy. The institutional changes of
this
period had not yet established channels for collective
bargaining, nor did consultative machinery exist to
negotiate
general wage guidelines.
Industrial workers, having inadequately partaken of the
growing prosperity of earlier years, resented rising
inflation
and sought to make up for lost time despite mounting
economic
difficulties. A virtual wage explosion took place as
workers and
their semilegal spokesmen extracted large pay increases
from
their employers. From 1974 to 1976, wages rose much more
rapidly
than did the cost of living. Analysts estimated that wage
increases in those years averaged 20 to 30 percent per
annum.
Price controls managed to keep inflation well below these
levels,
at least for a time. Profits declined sharply, while the
wage
component of Spain's national income rose steeply--by four
percentage points between 1974 and 1975. Output was
maintained at
fairly normal levels, as increased wage levels led to
rapid
growth in consumption, but depressive factors soon had an
adverse
effect on the economy. Unemployment rose from an
insignificant
2.5 percent in 1973 to 8.5 percent in 1979, and thereafter
it
continued to rise steadily.
Free trade unions were formally legalized on April 28,
1977,
and the first post-Franco parliamentary elections, which
were
held the following June, saw Suarez and his center-right
Union of
the Democratic Center (Union de Centro Democratico--UCD)
emerge
victorious, but with only a plurality of the parliamentary
seats.
In October 1977, government and opposition parties agreed
on an
economic package, the Moncloa Pacts. The pact were
designed to
prevent further economic deterioration and to buy time
while the
country awaited the October referendum on the new 1978
Constitution. The pacts called for a 22-percent wage
increase
ceiling. This figure was below the rate of inflation, and
it
signified a reduction in popular purchasing power. In
1979,
however, the government-labor consensus came to an end;
partisan
politics resumed, as unions sought wage adjustments that
were at
least equal to increases in the cost of living.
The Workers' Statute, adopted in March 1980,
articulated
trade union rights as guaranteed by the Constitution. The
statute
eliminated direct government intervention in labor
relations. It
also included provisions for minimum wage standards, for
access
to social security funds, and for a delineation of the
contractual nature of wage accords. Democratically elected
works
councils (comites de empresa) were established as
spokesmen for employees, and unions were given
responsibility for
arriving at industry-wide, and at local wage agreements.
During the 1970s, Spain's economic recession and the
critical
situation confronting many firms led to the establishment
of
implicit or explicit social contracts in which government,
employers, and unions participated. Unions tended to
accept wage
restraint, and they increased productivity in exchange for
improved job security and for promises to create more job
opportunities. In 1980 the UGT and the Spanish
Confederation of
Employers' Organizations (Confederacion Espanola de
Organizaciones Empresariales--CEOE) negotiated a pact
called the
Inter-Confederation Framework Agreement (Acuerdo Marco
Interconfederal--AMI), embodying these features. The
agreement
set the pattern for 800,000 companies. These companies had
an
aggregate work force of 6 million persons, or half of the
country's economically active population.
Since the death of Franco, the UGT and the CCOO have
been
engaged in a fierce rivalry for hegemony in the labor
movement.
The struggle has had strong political ramifications
because the
UGT served as the trade union arm of the governing PSOE,
and the
CCOO was controlled by the Communist Party of Spain
(Partido
Comunista de Espana--PCE) and by other communist splinter
groups.
In the 1978 elections for members of the works councils,
the CCOO
elected 34 percent of their candidates, compared with the
UGT's
20 percent. By 1980, however, the tide began to turn, and
the UGT
succeeded in electing close to 30 percent of its
supporters,
having made inroads into CCOO voting strongholds. The
decision of
a large number of USO affiliates to merge with the UGT
also
enhanced its strength. In 1982 the UGT managed to edge out
the
CCOO by a 36 percent to 33 percent margin, and in the
succeeding
election, held in October-December 1986, it gained a
further 4
percentage points, garnering a total of 41 percent, while
the
CCOO advanced only slightly to 34 percent. The UGT's
strength was
concentrated in smaller enterprises, whereas the CCOO's
popularity advanced in public-sector companies and in the
banking
sector. In the late 1980s, the CCOO dominated the works
councils
in all the leading companies of INI, except for the
tobacco
monopoly. The ELA-STV continued to maintain its position
as the
single largest labor organization in the Basque region,
but it
was closely followed by the UGT.
Not long after coming to power in late 1982, the
Socialist
government became increasingly embroiled in an acrimonious
relationship with the equally socialist UGT. To advance
its
program for industrial restructuring and for the
revitalization
of the economy, in order to prepare for integration into
the EC,
the government considered it necessary to enforce wage
restraint,
to carry out large-scale personnel cutbacks in a number of
public-sector companies, to limit social spending, and to
permit
employers greater latitude in hiring, firing, and laying
off
workers. In exchange for docility and low wages, workers
during
the Franco era received virtual lifetime job security,
making it
practically impossible for employers to engage in
personnel
retrenchment; however, a free-market economy, especially
one
linked to the EC, required the elimination of this rigid
employment status--a goal toward which the Gonzalez
government
was gradually moving. Though such measures contributed to
the
economic boom of the late 1980s, they seriously undercut
the
standing of trade unions. Furthermore, labor militants
were
incensed to find that in 1987 company profits greatly
increased--
an average of 40 percent--while the government continued
to
insist on wage restraint. The two-year Economic and Social
Agreement, which covered wages and related matters and was
signed
by the government, employers, and workers, expired at the
end of
1986. Thereafter, government efforts to persuade unions to
accept
a social compact failed because of union insistence on
wage
increases appreciably higher than those proposed by the
government and because of union opposition to further
personnel
reductions in state enterprises that operated at a loss.
The
result was that union contract renewals in early 1987 led
to a
resurgence of labor disputes and to an increase in the
number of
work stoppages.
Trade unions entered the post-Franco era with great
prestige
and large memberships. According to the unions, their
combined
membership totalled 3 million workers. Since then,
however,
organized labor has steadily lost strength because of
rising
unemployment and limitations on wage increases. As a
consequence,
most workers professed sympathy and regard for the unions,
but
few bothered to pay dues. In the late 1980s, probably
fewer than
15 percent of all workers possessed union cards.
Nonetheless, a
much larger proportion heeded union calls during
negotiations for
economic agreements and participated in strikes and other
jobrelated actions.
Data as of December 1988
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