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Syria Role of Government in Agriculture
Government involvement in agriculture was minimal prior to
Syria's union with Egypt. Although state intervention in the
agricultural sector increased following the union, the government
avoided playing a direct role in cultivation. In 1984, private
farmers tilled 74 percent of the cultivated land, cooperatives 25
percent, and public organizations (essentially state farms) 1
percent.
Government involvement arose indirectly from socialist
transformation measures in various parts of the economy and
directly from government efforts to fill the void in the
countryside caused by land reform. As an example of the former,
the Agricultural Cooperative Bank, a private bank established in
the eighteenth century but inherited by the socialist regime, in
the mid-1960s became the single source for direct production
credits to farmers
(see Banking and Monetary Policy
, this ch.).
The bank had limited funds and confined itself almost completely
to short-term financing, the bulk of which went to cotton
growers. Part of its lending was in kind--primarily seeds,
pesticides, and fertilizers at subsidized prices. Although the
bank appeared effective, there was insufficient credit through
the 1960s and early 1970s for farmers who did not grow cotton and
for long-term loans for such needs as machinery or capital
improvements. In the mid-1970s, the flow of funds to the bank
increased, thus allowing it to expand its lending to the
agricultural sector. The bank became an important influence in
shaping farmers' production decisions, particularly in cotton.
In the 1960s, government marketing organizations for the
major agricultural commodities were established. The Cotton
Marketing Organization, as noted, had a complete monopoly.
Organizations for tobacco and sugar beets had purchasing
monopolies, set the farm purchase prices, and supervised the
processing and marketing of their respective commodities. An
organization for grains set prices, purchased some of the
farmers' surplus, and supervised the marketing of the remainder
through private dealers. The government also set prices for
several other agricultural commodities, most imports, and many
consumer items.
Some economists attributed part of the stagnation in
agriculture to the government's pricing of farm produce. Farm
prices remained unchanged over long periods and by the 1970s and
1980s were quite low relative to world prices. Some smuggling out
of farm products for sale in Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon resulted
as well as some black marketing in controlled commodities.
Pricing also was not coordinated to achieve agricultural goals.
Although the Ministry of Agriculture attempted to get farmers to
increase wheat production, the government's desire to keep basic
food costs low for urban consumers imposed low grain prices for
farmers. The ministry also urged farmers to shift irrigated areas
from cotton to wheat at the same time that the farm price of
cotton was raised relative to that of wheat.
Aware of the problems, officials made efforts to improve
pricing policy. By 1977 prices paid to farmers had risen
substantially and favored grains and some industrial crops over
cotton. In fact, the 1977 prices (when converted to dollars at
the official exchange rate) paid to farmers for wheat, soybeans,
and sugar beets were substantially higher (more than 100 percent
for wheat) than the prices paid to American farmers for those
products. In 1985 the government again raised procurement prices
for a variety of crops. Prices for hard wheat rose by 9 percent,
soft wheat by 14 percent, red lentils by 13 percent, white
lentils by 18 percent, and barley by 22 percent from the
preceding year.
When land reform was introduced, those receiving expropriated
or government land were required to join farm cooperatives.
Cooperatives were expected to furnish the organization,
techniques, credit, and joint use of machinery to replace and
expand the functions supplied by the landowners and managers of
the large estates. Syrian farmers' individualism and aversion to
cooperatives may explain their apparent preference for renting
land from the government rather than buying the land and having
to join a cooperative. Whether the cause was aversion by farmers
or an inability by the government to organize and staff
cooperatives, as some economists suggest, the cooperative
movement grew slowly until the early 1970s, but accelerated
thereafter. In 1976 there were 3,385 agricultural cooperatives
with 256,000 members--more than double the number and membership
in 1972. By 1984 there were 4,050 agricultural cooperatives with
440,347 members. Statistics do not distinguish between
cooperatives for farmers receiving expropriated or government
land and voluntary cooperatives of established landowners.
Officials expected cooperatives eventually to mitigate, if
not eliminate, two serious agricultural problems. First, farmers
tended to specialize in certain crops without practicing crop
rotation. Second, substantial amounts of arable land were left
fallow each year. In the 1970s, government extension workers and
cooperatives strongly urged farmers to rotate cropping in a
pattern that would maintain the fertility of the soil and avoid
having cultivable fields left fallow. Cooperatives were also
expected to facilitate the use of machinery after land reform
reduced the average size of farms, partly by cooperative
ownership of equipment and partly by pooling small plots into an
economically sized bloc that would then be cultivated as a single
unit in the cropping rotation. By 1986 it was not clear how much
success cooperatives had achieved in crop rotation or
mechanization, but statistics showed an accelerated use of farm
equipment by the agricultural sector after the October 1973 War.
Data as of April 1987
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