Uruguay CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Welcome banner in Montevideo's Independence Plaza in honor of the
1983 state visit by King Juan Carlos I and Queen Sofia of Spain
Courtesy Charles Guy Gillespie
Since achieving independence in 1828, Uruguay has
promulgated
five constitutions: in 1830, 1917, 1934, 1952, and 1967.
When it
became independent on August 27, 1828, the Oriental
Republic of
Uruguay (República Oriental del Uruguay) drew up its first
constitution, which was promulgated on July 18, 1830.
The 1830 constitution has been regarded as Uruguay's
most
technically perfect charter. Heavily influenced by the
thinking
of the French and American revolutions, it divided the
government
among the executive, legislative, and judicial powers and
established Uruguay as a unitary republic with a
centralized form
of government. The bicameral General Assembly (Asamblea
General)
was empowered to elect a president with considerable
powers to
head the executive branch for a four-year term. The
president was
given control over all of his ministers of government and
was
empowered to make decisions with the agreement of at least
one of
the three ministers recognized by the 1830 constitution.
Like all of Uruguay's charters since then, the 1830
constitution provided for a General Assembly composed of a
Chamber of Senators (Cámara de Senadores), or Senate
(Senado),
elected nationally, and a Chamber of Representatives
(Cámara de
Representantes), elected from the departments. Members of
the
General Assembly were empowered to pass laws but lacked
the
authority to dismiss the president or his ministers or to
issue
votes of no confidence. An 1834 amendment, however,
provided for
juicio político, or impeachment, of the ministers
for
"unacceptable conduct."
As established by the 1830 constitution, the Supreme
Court of
Justice (Corte Suprema de Justicia), and lesser courts,
exercised
the judicial power. The General Assembly appointed the
members of
the high court. The latter--with the consent of the Senate
in the
case of the appellate courts--appointed the members of the
lesser
courts. The constitution also divided the country into
departments, each headed by a governor appointed by the
president
and each having an advisory body called a Neighbors'
Council
(Consejo de Vecinos).
Although the 1830 constitution remained in effect for
eighty-
seven years, de facto governments violated it repeatedly.
In the
1878-90 period, the Blancos and Colorados initiated the
framework
for a more stable system through understandings called
"pacts
between the parties." This governing principle, called
coparticipation (coparticipación), meaning the
sharing of
formal political and informal bureaucratic power, has been
formally practiced since 1872.
In 1913 President José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903-07,
1911-15),
the father of modern Uruguay, proposed a constitutional
reform
involving the creation of a Swiss-style collegial
executive
system to be called the colegiado. A strong
opponent of
the one-person, powerful presidency, Batlle y Ordóñez
believed
that a collective executive power would neutralize the
dictatorial intentions of political leaders. It met
intense
opposition, however, not only from the Blancos but also
from
members of his own Colorado Party. The proposal was
defeated in
1916, but Batlle y Ordóñez worked out a deal with a
faction of
the Blancos whereby a compromise system was provided for
in the
second constitution, which was approved by plebiscite on
November
25, 1917.
In addition to separating church and state, the new
charter,
which did not become effective until 1919, introduced
substantial
changes in the powers of the presidency. The executive
power
consisted of the president, who controlled foreign
relations,
national security, and agriculture, and the National
Council of
Administration (Consejo Nacional de Administración), or
colegiado, which administered all other executive
governmental functions (industrial relations, health,
public
works, industry and labor, livestock and agriculture,
education,
and the preparation of the budget). The colegiado,
embodying the political mechanism of coparticipation,
consisted
of nine members: six from the majority party and three
from the
minority party. The first colegiado (1919-33) was
thereby
established without eliminating the office of president.
The history of successive constitutions is one of a
lengthy
struggle between advocates of the collegial system and
those of
the presidential system. Although the 1917 constitution
worked
well during the prosperous time after World War I,
recurring
conflicts between the president and the colegiado
members
made the executive power ineffective in coping with the
economic
and social crises wracking the country. These conflicts
eventually led to the presidential coup of 1933. The ad
hoc
government suspended the constitution and appointed a
constituent
assembly to draw up a new one.
The 1934 constitution abolished the colegiado
and
transferred its power to the president. Nevertheless,
presidential powers remained somewhat limited. The
executive
power once again was exercised by a president who had to
make
decisions together with the ministers. The 1934 charter
established the Council of Ministers (Consejo de
Ministros) as
the body in which these decisions were to be made. This
council
consisted of the president and the cabinet ministers. The
constitution required the chief executive to appoint three
of the
nine cabinet ministers from among the members of the
political
party that received the second largest number of votes in
the
presidential election. The General Assembly, for its part,
could
issue votes of no confidence in cabinet ministers, with
the
approval of two-thirds of its members.
The constitution divided the Senate between the Blancos
and
the Colorados or, as political scientist Martin Weinstein
has
pointed out, between the Herrerist faction of the Blancos
(named
after Luis Alberto de Herrera) and the Terrist wing of the
Colorados (named after Gabriel Terra; president, 1931-38).
The
party that garnered the second largest number of votes
automatically received 50 percent of the Senate seats. In
addition, the 1934 charter empowered the Supreme Court of
Justice
to rule on the constitutionality of the laws. This system,
which
lasted eighteen years, further limited the power of the
president
and his government.
Although Uruguay returned to a more democratic system
in
1942, the failure of political sectors to reach an
agreement on
the proposed constitution drafted that year resulted in
the
postponement of constitutional reform. On July 31, 1951, a
formal
pact between the rightist Batllist faction of the
Colorados--the
Colorado and Batllist Union (Unión Colorada y
Batllista--UCB)--
and the Herrerist Movement (Movimiento Herrerista) of the
Blancos
called for a plebiscite on constitutional reform. The
plebiscite
the following December 16 drew less than half of the 1.1
million
voters to the polls, but the collegial system was approved
by a
small margin.
As the culmination of an effort to reestablish the
colegiado and the plural executive power, a fourth
constitution was promulgated on January 25, 1952. It
readopted
Batlle y Ordóñez's original proposal for coparticipation
by
creating a nine-member colegiado, this time called
the
National Council of Government (Consejo Nacional de
Gobierno),
with six majority-party seats and three minority-party
seats. The
presidency of the council rotated among the six members of
the
majority party. The chief executive could nominate only
four of
the nine ministers from his own party faction; the General
Assembly selected the other five through separate votes in
both
chambers. An absolute majority (more than two-thirds),
however,
of the full membership of the two legislative chambers had
to
support the appointments. It thereby ensured that either
the
Colorados or the Blancos would get the minority seats on
the
colegiado. The 1952 constitution also provided for
impeachment of the president by the General Assembly.
This nine-member colegiado, which headed the
executive
branch from 1954 to 1967, was ineffective because the
president
lacked control over the ministers and because the majority
was
seldom united. During most of this period, the National
Party
held power, having been elected in 1958 for the first time
in
over ninety years and again in 1962 when a different
faction of
the party was elected. The ineffectiveness of these
governments
caused the public to turn against the colegiado
arrangement.
In the elections of November 27, 1966, nearly 59
percent of
Uruguayans voted to amend the 1952 constitution and to
reestablish a presidential system of government, thus
ending a
fifteen-year experiment with the colegiado. The new
constitution, which became operative on February 15, 1967,
and
has remained in effect since then, created a strong
one-person
presidency, subject to legislative and judicial checks. In
free
and fair elections held in 1968, Uruguayans approved the
new
charter and elected the Colorado Party to power again.
The 1967 constitution contained many of the provisions
of the
1952 charter. However, it removed some of the General
Assembly's
power to initiate legislation and provided for automatic
approval
of bills under certain conditions if the legislature
failed to
act. If, on receiving a bill, the president had objections
or
comments to make, the bill had to be returned to the
General
Assembly within ten days. If sixty days elapsed without a
decision by the General Assembly, the president's
objections had
to be considered as accepted. The 1967 document also
established
the Permanent Commission, composed of four senators and
seven
representatives, which exercised certain legislative
functions
while the General Assembly was in recess.
The 1967 charter could be amended by any of four
different
methods. First, 10 percent of the citizens who were
registered to
vote could initiate an amendment if they presented a
detailed
proposal to the president of the General Assembly. Second,
two-
fifths of the full membership of the General Assembly
could
approve a proposal presented to the president of the
General
Assembly and submitted to a plebiscite at the next
election (a
yes vote of an absolute majority of the full membership of
the
General Assembly was required, and this majority had to
represent
at least 35 percent of all registered voters). Third,
senators,
representatives, and the president of the republic could
present
proposed amendments, which had to be approved by an
absolute
majority of the full membership of the General Assembly.
And
finally, amendments could be made by constitutional laws
requiring the approval of two-thirds of the full
membership of
each chamber of the General Assembly in the same
legislative
period.
In 1976, however, the military government issued a
series of
constitutional decrees that amended the 1967 constitution
by
creating the Council of the Nation (Consejo de la Nación)
to
serve as the supreme governmental body, with executive and
legislative functions. It consisted of the thirty members
of the
Council of State (Consejo de Estado, the body created by
the
regime in June 1973 to act in lieu of the General
Assembly, which
was dissolved by the regime and the twenty-eight senior
officers
of the armed forces (sixteen from the army, six from the
navy,
and six from the air force). The Council of the Nation
appointed
the president of the republic and the members of the
Council of
State, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Tribunal of
Administrative Claims, which was later dissolved in 1985.
Eight
institutional acts substituted for many of the functional
provisions and guarantees of the 1967 constitution. For
example,
in addition to giving the Council of the Nation the power
to
appoint the president of the republic and to set general
policy
for the country, institutional acts deprived previous
officeholders and candidates of their political rights and
permitted the arbitrary dismissal of public employees.
Under the 1976 constitutional amendments, the president
exercised executive power, acting with the concurrence of
one or
more ministers as appropriate or with the National
Security
Council (Consejo de Seguridad Nacional--Cosena). The
Cosena was
formed in 1973 and consisted of the commanders of the
army, navy,
and air force, plus an additional senior military officer,
and
the ministers of national defense, interior, and foreign
affairs.
It participated in any decision related to the "national
security" or in any formulation of overall plans or
objectives.
The constitutional decrees declared generally that the
maintenance of the national security was of "exclusive
competence," i.e., the sole prerogative, of the armed
forces.
These decrees deprived local governments of all budgetary
powers.
The Council of State continued to pass laws that the
executive
normally would have submitted for approval. Only the
executive
could initiate the procedure for approval of legislation
on
budgetary or other matters that could be related in any
way to
national security. The decrees also created the Ministry
of
Justice, responsible for relations between the executive
and
judicial powers.
In 1980 the military regime drew up a charter that
would have
provided for a strong, continuing role for the military
along the
lines of the 1976 constitutional decrees, including
legitimizing
the Cosena's new role. The document also would have
greatly
reduced the roles of the General Assembly and political
parties.
In a plebiscite held November 30, 1980, however,
Uruguayans, by a
margin of 57 percent to 43 percent of the popular vote,
rejected
the new military-drafted constitution. Nevertheless, a new
thirty-five-member Council of State was installed on
August 20,
1981, before President Gregorio Alvarez Armelino (1981-85)
took
office. Its powers were expanded to include responsibility
for
calling a constitutional assembly, a plebiscite, and
general
elections.
In discussions held during 1983, the military
commanders and
the leaders of the Colorado and National parties prepared
a new
text of the 1967 constitution. Accords negotiated by the
military, the Colorados (but not the Blancos), and most of
the
Broad Front in July and August 1984 provided for a return
to
democracy without the Cosena.
Following the return to civilian rule in 1985,
Uruguay's
human rights record quickly improved. One of the
Sanguinetti
government's first acts in this area was--with the
approval of
the newly restored General Assembly--to grant amnesty to
all
political prisoners, who consisted chiefly of members of
the
National Liberation Movement-Tupamaros (Movimiento de
Liberación
Nacional-Tupamaros--MLN-T). In the late 1980s, there were
no
credible reports of human rights violations, according to
the
United States Department of State.
Since 1985 Uruguay's democratic governments have
respected
the sixty-five articles in the 1967 constitution concerned
primarily with the rights of citizens. The document
provided for
freedom of religion, thought, speech and press, peaceful
assembly
and association, collective bargaining, movement within
the
country, foreign travel, emigration and repatriation,
respect for
political rights, and the inviolability of property and
privacy.
The constitution did not provide for a state religion,
although
Roman Catholicism predominated, or for capital punishment
(that
was abolished during Batlle y Ordóñez's second term).
There were
two forms of citizenship: natural (persons born in Uruguay
or
those who were of Uruguayan parents and were registered
residents) and legal (individuals established in Uruguay
with at
least three years' residence in the case of those with
family in
Uruguay or five years' residence for those without family
there).
Primary and secondary education was both free and
compulsory.
Every citizen eighteen years of age or older had the right
and
obligation to vote, which was compulsory
(see The Electoral Process
, this ch.).
Uruguay has long been one of the most egalitarian
countries
in the world. Women's suffrage was enacted in 1932. In
1946 a
statute was passed repealing all laws that established
legal
differences in the rights of women. Uruguayan women, who
constituted one-third of the work force in the 1980s,
enjoyed
complete equality under the law. Nevertheless, some
barriers
still existed in practice because of traditional social
patterns
and restricted employment opportunities. Women often
received
less pay than men, especially in less skilled jobs. By
early
1990, very few women held high political positions, but
women had
served in the cabinet, the Supreme Court of Justice, and
the
diplomatic corps, including at the ambassadorial level,
and a few
had served as alternates in the General Assembly.
Data as of December 1990
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