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Vietnam Peace Negotiations
With negotiations making little progress, the United States
military commander in Saigon, General Creighton W. Abrams, who
had held that post since mid-1968, requested and was given
permission by President Richard M. Nixon to launch secret bombing
attacks, beginning March 18, 1970, on what were described as
Vietnamese communist sanctuaries and supply routes inside
Cambodia. In late March, Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia was
ousted as chief of state in a military coup led by Premier and
Defense Minister, General Lon Nol. Shortly thereafter, the Lon
Nol government cancelled an agreement that had allowed North
Vietnam to use the port at Sihanoukville. Hanoi reacted by
increasing support to the Khmer (Kampuchean) Communist Party, by
then under the leadership of the radical Pol Pot. In April, Nixon
authorized the invasion of Cambodia by a joint United States-ARVN
force of 30,000 troops for the purpose of destroying Communist
bases across the border. Little more than short-term gains were
accomplished by the invasion, which resulted in massive protests
in the United States, leading to the passage of legislation by
Congress requiring the removal of United States troops from
Cambodia by the end of June.
In 1971 and 1972, the communists faced some serious problems
unrelated to United States offensive operations. The Saigon
government began to gain some support in the Mekong Delta because
of the implementation of a "land-to-the-tiller" reform program
pressed on the Thieu government by Washington in 1970. Almost
400,000 farmers received a total of 600,000 hectares, and by 1972
tenancy reportedly had declined from about 60 percent to 34
percent in some rural areas. In addition, a People's Self-Defense
Force Program begun about this time had some success in freeing
ARVN troops for combat duty, as United States forces were
gradually withdrawn. Although it wasn't clear at the time whether
the withdrawal of United States troops would cause the ARVN to
crumble instantly, as predicted by the communists, the decisive
defeat of an ARVN operation mounted against the Ho Chi Minh Trail
in Laos in March 1971 was an early indication. At the time of the
ARVN defeat, however, the communists were coping with
deteriorating morale and with dwindling numbers of troops; a
rising desertion rate and falling recruitment levels had reduced
PLAF strength from 250,000 in 1968 to less than 200,000 in 1971.
Both on the battlefield and at the conference table, a
stalemate of sorts was reached by mid-1971. In negotiations there
was some flexibility, as Washington offered a unilateral
withdrawal of United States forces provided Hanoi stopped its
infiltration of the South; and Hanoi countered by agreeing to a
coalition government in Saigon along with a United States troop
withdrawal and to a cease-fire following the formation of a new
government. The main point of debate was the retention of
President Thieu as head of the South Vietnamese government, which
Washington demanded and Hanoi rejected. To break the deadlock,
the party leadership in Hanoi turned again to the strategy of a
general offensive and uprising. Accordingly, the so-called Easter
offensive was launched beginning on March 30, 1972, with a threepronged attack across the DMZ through the A Shau Valley. The
following day the communists attacked the city of Kontum and the
provinces of Binh Dinh and Phuoc Tuy, threatening to cut South
Vietnam in two. A few days later, three PAVN divisions attacked
Binh Long Province along the Cambodian border, placing the
capital, An Loc, under siege. In May the communists captured
Quang Tri Province, including the capital, which was not
recaptured by the ARVN until September. By that time, Quang Tri
city had been virtually leveled by United States airstrikes.
Although the Easter offensive did not result in the fall of the
Saigon government, as the communists had hoped, it did further
destabilize the government and reveal the ARVN's weaknesses. The
costs were great on both sides, however, and by October both
Hanoi and Washington were more inclined to negotiate. By then
Hanoi had agreed to accept Thieu as president of a future Saigon
government in exchange for the removal of United States forces
without a corresponding removal of PAVN troops. Thieu's
objections to the failure to require the removal of North
Vietnamese forces was in the end ignored, and the Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris
on January 27, 1973.
Data as of December 1987
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