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Albania
Ground Forces
The ground forces had about 35,000 men, or about threequarters
of all armed forces personnel. Because the strength of the ground
forces was sufficient to man only about two divisions, brigades
of approximately 3,000 soldiers became the largest army formation.
In 1991 four infantry brigades constituted the bulk of combat
units in the ground forces. During the 1980s, Albania had reduced
the number of infantry brigades from eight to four. It had shifted
to fully manned units from its prior reliance on the mobilization
of reserve soldiers to flesh out a larger number of units manned
at a lower level. Each brigade had three infantry battalions and
one lightly equipped artillery battalion. Armored forces consisted
of one tank brigade. Artillery forces were increased from one
to three regiments during the 1980s, and six battalions of coastal
artillery were maintained at strategic points along the Adriatic
Sea littoral.
Most equipment used by the ground forces was old, and its effectiveness
was questionable. In addition, shortages of spare parts for Soviet
and Chinese equipment reduced combat readiness. The infantry brigades
lacked mechanization, operating only about 130 armored personnel
carriers. They included Soviet BTR-40, BTR50 , BTR-152, and BRDM-1
vehicles produced in the 1950s and Chinese Type-531 armored vehicles.
Armored forces were equipped with 200 Soviet-made T-34 and T-54
tanks. The T-34 was a World War II model, and the more recent
T-54 was introduced during the late 1950s. Soviet and Chinese
artillery in the ground forces inventory was towed rather than
self-propelled. It included Soviet M-1937 and D-1 howitzers and
Chinese Type-66 152mm guns, Chinese Type-59 130mm guns, Soviet
M-1931/37 and M-1938 guns of 122mm, and Chinese Type-60 guns of
122mm. The ground forces also operated Chinese Type-63 107mm multiple
rocket launchers and a large number of Soviet and Chinese mortars,
recoilless rifles, and antitank guns. Organic air defense equipment
for protecting ground forces units consisted of several types
of Soviet towed antiaircraft guns, including the 23mm ZU-23-2,
37mm M-1939, 57mm S-60, and 85mm KS-12.
The lack of modern equipment was a major deficiency in the ground
forces. The infantry lacked mobility and antitank guided missiles.
Moreover, without mobile surface-to-air missiles or radar-controlled
antiaircraft guns, army units would be vulnerable to attack by
modern fighter-bombers or ground-attack aircraft. Yet the obsolescent
weapons of the ground forces were suited to the relatively low
technical skill of the country's soldiers as well as its rugged
terrain (see fig. 3). The tactical skill of the officers might
make it possible to deploy this older equipment successfully for
a short period in a static defensive posture. A defensive operation
that prevented an enemy from rapidly neutralizing Albanian opposition
would enable Albania to seek international diplomatic or military
assistance against an aggressor. Alternatively, it would gain
time and retain the military equipment needed to establish a long-term
guerrilla force capable of resisting a better armed conventional
occupation army. The logistical support required to resupply and
maintain such a defense, however, was either lacking or nearly
impossible to achieve over much of the terrain.
Data as of April 1992
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