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Czechoslovakia Introduction
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AS THE NAME IMPLIES, is a state uniting two
separate nationalities, the Czechs and the Slovaks. Emerging as
one of several multinational states in eastern and Central Europe
after World War I, the Czechoslovak Republic of 1918 was the
fruition of an ideal espoused by both Czech and Slovak
intellectuals since the late nineteenth century. This union had
the blessing of the victorious Allies, who hoped that the
democratic ideals and principles for which so many lives had been
sacrificed would inspire the many nationalities inhabiting that
region to overcome age-old animosities. President Woodrow Wilson,
in particular, viewed the newly established states as microcosms
of the United States, where people of different backgrounds and
creeds could live peacefully together. Of all the newly created
multinational political entities, Czechoslovakia came the closest
to fulfilling this dream.
The ancestors of the Czechs and Slovaks were first noted in
recorded history in the fifth century, when the ancient Czech
tribes settled in Bohemia and Moravia and when Slovak tribes
settled in what was to become Slovakia. In the ninth century, the
two peoples were united for the first time in the Great Moravian
Empire. Positioned between two great civilizations, the Germans
in the West and the Byzantine Empire in the East, the Czechs and
Slovaks henceforth would play a unique and important role in
linking the two worlds. Although both peoples belong to the
family of Slavs, they were drawn early in their history into the
western European, Roman Catholic orbit
(see First Political Units
, ch. 1). The folk culture of the Czechs and Slovaks
remained close to that of their fellow Slavs in the East, but
their intellectual and political development was profoundly
influenced by western Europe. Today, Czechoslovakia is firmly
within the political and economic sphere of the Warsaw Pact
alliance, but it still looks to the West for intellectual and
spiritual nourishment
(see Appendix C).
The unity of the Czech and Slovak people in the Great
Moravian Empire was brief. From the beginning of the tenth
century and for almost a millennium, the two peoples followed
separate courses. Although no independent Czech state existed
prior to 1918, the Bohemian Kingdom that emerged in the tenth
century and lasted well into the sixteenth century had many of
the aspects of a national state. Early in its history, the
Bohemian Kingdom became part of the Holy Roman Empire, and the
Czech people were subjected to strong German and Roman Catholic
influence
(see Bohemian Kingdom
, ch. 1). Nevertheless, the
Czechs, first under the Holy Roman Empire and later under
Hapsburg rule, experienced a considerable degree of political,
cultural, and religious autonomy. By the nineteenth century, the
Czechs had developed a distinct national identity and culture, as
well as a differentiated society made up of a landowning
nobility, an urban middle class, an intellectual elite, and
workers and peasants
(see Hapsburg Rule, 1526-1867
, ch. 1).
Unlike the Czechs, the Slovaks did not attain a high level of
political, economic, and cultural development prior to the
nineteenth century; their Hungarian overlords proved to be far
less enlightened masters than the Germans and Austrians. At the
beginning of the century, the Slovaks remained, for the most
part, an agrarian society, with only a small number of
intellectuals. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century
did Slovakia undergo large and rapid urbanization
(see Urbanization and Migration
, ch. 2). National consciousness among
the Slovaks also lagged behind that of the Czechs and grew
largely as a result of increased contacts with the politically
and culturally more advanced Czechs.
The Czechoslovak Republic formed in 1918 contained, in
addition to Czechs and Slovaks, numerous Hungarians, Germans,
Ukrainians, and Poles. Each minority, however, was granted
freedom to develop its own culture and language. The republic
also served as a haven for the minorities of the neighboring
states fleeing the oppression of the ruling majority
(see Czechoslovak Democracy
, ch. 1). In spite of the tolerant and
libertarian policies of the Czechoslovak government toward the
German and other minorities within the republic's borders, Hitler
used the pretext of dissatisfied minorities to dismember
Czechoslovakia in 1938 as a prelude to his attack on Poland
(see Second Republic, 1938-39
, ch. 1).
The Third Republic, which was established after World War II,
differs markedly from the First Republic of the interwar period.
The Czechoslovakia of the 1980s was predominantly a nation of
Czechs and Slovaks; ethnic communities of Hungarians, Germans,
Ukrainians, Poles, Gypsies, and Jews made up only about 5 percent
of the total population
(see Ethnic Groups
, ch. 2). The postwar
nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture
had also simplified the once complex and diverse Czechoslovak
society. The Czechoslovak social structure in the 1980s consisted
mainly of workers and collective farmers, a small class of
intelligentsia, and, at the top of the hierarchy, the communist
party elite
(see Social Groups
, ch. 2). In the 1980s,
Czechoslovakia remained one of the most highly industrialized and
prosperous countries in Eastern Europe and had a comparatively
high standard of living. Its citizens did not experience extreme
poverty, nor was there a conspicuously wealthy elite. The country
still possessed considerable, if dwindling, coal deposits and
relatively fertile soil
(see Economic Sectors, ch. 3).
According to the 1960 Constitution, the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic is a federative state composed of "two equal
fraternal nations," the Czechs and the Slovaks. The Czech
Socialist Republic and the Slovak Socialist Republic share with
the federal government many of the functions and responsibilities
of government; the federal government in Prague, however, has
exclusive jurisdiction for the most important responsibilities of
state, such as foreign affairs, defense, economic policy, and
federal justice. As in all communist states, however, real power
in Czechoslovakia rests with the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska--KSC). The
government branches of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as
well as those of the Czech and Slovak socialist republics, simply
implement the policies and decisions of the party
(see
The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia;
Government Structure; ch. 4).
The defense of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic rests with
the Czechoslovak People's Army. Since 1968, however, five Soviet
ground divisions and two air divisions have been stationed in
Czechoslovakia as part of the Soviet Union's Central Group of
Forces. The Ministry of National Defense, which supervises the
Czechoslovak armed forces, has no control over the Soviet
military presence on Czechoslovak soil. On the contrary, as part
of the Warsaw Pact alliance, Czechoslovak armed forces are part
of the Soviet bloc's military might. Czechoslovak soldiers are
strongly influenced by fraternization with other "socialist"
armies. In addition, they employ Soviet military training and
political indoctrination procedures and are taught to adopt
Soviet concepts of military doctrine, strategy and tactics, and
command structure
(see Armed Forces
, ch. 5). Internal national
security in Czechoslovakia is maintained by the Border Guard,
which is responsible for securing the country's frontiers; the
National Security Corps, made up of uniformed police and the
plainclothes State Security force; and a part-time People's
Militia. The internal national security forces are under the
supervision of the Ministry of Interior
(see Internal Security and Public Order
, ch. 5).
The Third Republic was created as a result of a compromise
between pre-war Czechoslovak Republic leaders and the KSC.
Following World War II, Czechoslovak nationalist leaders Eduard
Benes and Tomas Masaryk hoped to re-establish a republic with the
liberal, democratic principles and institutions of pre-war
Czechoslovakia. Their hopes were subverted by the KSC, which at
the time had considerable popular support and the backing of the
Soviet Union. The KSC steadily expanded its influence over key
ministries and in 1948 delivered the final blow to Czechoslovak
democracy by seizing all power
(see Third Republic and the Communist Takeover
, ch. 1). After 1948 Czechoslovakia moved
completely into the Soviet sphere of influence and was
transformed into a Stalinist state. The party became the only
political force in the country, the state apparatus became highly
centralized, and cultural and intellectual life became pedestrian
and dull in line with the tenets of socialist realism. All
manifestations of dissidence, whether political, religious, or
artistic, were repressed; elements within the Czechoslovak
society found to be the least bit nonconformist were removed from
important positions, arrested, and incarcerated; and workers and
peasants, left without a voice, passively submitted to their lot.
A widespread political, economic, and cultural malaise prevailed
in Czechoslovakia well into the late 1960s
(see Stalinization
, ch. 1).
The Czechoslovak economy, which had been nationalized almost
totally by 1952, began to stagnate in the late 1950s. The
continued poor economic performance throughout the 1960s led to
political instability and demands for reform
(see Economic Policy and Performance
, ch. 3). The period called the "Prague Spring"
began as an attempt by party and government leaders to bolster
the faltering economy and to overcome the increasingly evident
constraints on economic growth. Reformers, both in the party in
and the state bureaucracy, blamed in particular the central
planning system and sought to replace it with a "market
socialist" system. Initial calls for reforms, however, did not
challenge the paramount role of the KSC, nor did they include any
proposals for liberalizing Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, even the
modest proposals for reform met with strong conservative
opposition. In fact, the developing political crisis was the
result of a broad conflict between the liberal economic and
conservative elites in the party and the government
(see The Reform Movement
, ch. 1).
In January 1968, Alexander Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny as
the first secretary of the KSC, and from that point the Prague
Spring movement was transformed into a mass movement for
political reform, led by a coalition of intellectuals and party
officials. The KSC itself became an agent of reform. A consensus
on the need for reform seemed to have developed very quickly on
the part of Czechoslovak citizens, who disagreed only on the
reform's scope and pace. In April 1968, the KSC Presidium adopted
the Action Program, calling for a federalized Czechoslovakia and
a "democratic" and "national" model of socialism. At the same
time, however, the Presidium reaffirmed Czechoslovakia'
allegiance to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
(see The Prague Spring, 1968
, ch. 1).
The pace of reforms in Czechoslovakia--and particularly the
degree of penetration of all levels of the KSC apparatus by the
reformers--was a matter of increasing concern to the Soviet
Union. The Soviets became especially alarmed when in June 1968
Ludvik Vaculik, a candidate member of the Central Committee of
the KSC, issued a manifesto entitled "Two Thousand Words,"
calling for the immediate implementation of the reform program.
The Soviet Union was confronted with the prospect of full-scale
democratization and political alienation by an integral member of
the Soviet bloc. The Soviet response at first consisted of a
series of warnings. Warsaw Pact forces held military maneuvers on
Czechoslovak soil in the summer of 1968, a letter of castigation
signed by Warsaw Pact member states was sent to the KSC, and
Soviet Politburo members met with KSC leadership in an attempt to
push back the reform movement. When all these steps failed, the
Warsaw Pact forces, with the exception of Romania, invaded
Czechoslovakia. Remarkably, in spite of the exuberance of the
spring and summer, Czechoslovak citizens heeded the call of the
KSC Presidium not to shed blood and offered only passive
resistance to the invaders. The reform movement collapsed
overnight without a shot being fired
(see Intervention
, ch. 1).
The refusal of Czechoslovak citizens to resist with arms the
Warsaw Pact invasion of their country did not come as a total
surprise. After all, Czechoslovaks had displayed similar behavior
when Hitler dismantled their country in 1938 and when the
communists forcibly imposed their rule in 1948. Passive
resistance when confronted with overwhelming odds and pacifism in
general are viewed by many observers as a long-standing
Czechoslovak national characteristic. Such pacifism is
exemplified, if not glorified, in the popular World War I novel
The Good Soldier Svejk by the Czech writer Jaroslav Hasek.
In the novel, the Czech soldier Svejk, a seemingly slow-witted
and submissive provincial bumpkin, uses gile and obtuseness,
disguised as passive compliance, to outwit the Austrian
bureaucracy and military establishment
(see Czechs
, ch. 2). A
more convincing explanation for the lack of armed resistance on
the part of Czechoslovak citizens in times of grave crisis is
perhaps the dualistic nature of their society.
Throughout its existence, Czechoslovakia has lacked the
demographic homogeneity of present-day Poland or Hungary. Despite
the government's considerable success in the 1950s and 1960s in
removing many of the most pronounced economic imbalances between
the Czech lands and Slovakia, social and political tensions
between the Czechs and the Slovaks persisted. The two peoples
consistently pursued different concepts of a Czechoslovak state.
The Czechs, who outnumbered the Slovaks two to one, wanted in
1968, as they had in the past, a single Czechoslovak state. The
Slovaks, resentful of what they perceived as Czech domination of
administrative and educational posts in Slovakia, sought a
federative political system in which they would exercise greater
political autonomy. Czechoslovakia lacked the kind of unifying
forces that were present in Poland, for example. The Roman
Catholic Church did not exert a powerful unifying influence, nor
was there a strong labor union that represented the interests of
all the Czechoslovak workers. The various nationalities and
interest groups were united in 1968 only in their efforts to free
themselves from the oppressive domination of the party and the
state. The reformers themselves assumed that an essential
ingredient of the reform movement was the right of the various
nationalities and interest groups to pursue their own specific
and different aims. These factors made Czechoslovak society ready
for democracy in 1968 but incapable of standing up to a
totalitarian challenge.
The process of "normalization" following the Warsaw Pact
invasion of Czechoslovakia was carried out under the leadership
of Gustav Husak, elected the new first secretary of the KSC in
April 1969. Husak had been purged in 1951 for "nationalist"
tendencies and imprisoned until 1960. Rehabilitated in 1963,
Husak occupied a centrist position in the debates over reforms
during the Prague Spring. It was now his task to restore the
country to the pre-reform period, to cleanse the party of
reformist elements, and to reinstall ideological conformity.
A sense of defeat and alienation permeated Czechoslovak
society in the 1970s as hopes for political and economic reforms
were dashed. Materialism and consumerism became the main pursuit
of most citizens. At first, the country's economy was strong
enough to allow for a rise in the standard of living and to
satisfy the public's aroused passion for material goods. In the
mid-1970s, however, the economy took another turn for the worse,
and a prolonged economic decline followed. In response,
antisocial behavior became more pronounced. Criminal activity,
alcoholism, and absenteeism from work increased alarmingly; labor
productivity declined; and more and more Czechoslovak citizens
sought escape from their bleak lives through emigration
(see Reaction to Normalization
, ch. 4). A highly developed sense of
humor, as manifested in popular political satire, served as
another avenue of escape from everyday doldrums. In his book
Rowboat to Prague, Alan Levy illustrates the cynical view
of life under the socialist system by citing what the people of
Czechoslovakia refer to as the "four paradoxes of applied
socialism": everybody works, but nothing gets produced; nothing
gets produced, but quotas are met; production quotas are met, but
stores have nothing to sell; stores have nothing to sell, but the
standard of living continues to rise.
Another aspect of normalization was Czechoslovakia's
increased dependence on the Soviet Union. In the late 1960s,
Moscow had initiated a process of integration to make countries
like Czechoslovakia increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union.
Czechoslovakia, in particular, acquiesced to Soviet pressure in
Eastern Europe, almost totally submitting to Soviet control.
Indeed, in its desire to preserve the status quo, at times it
seemed a more orthodox communist state than the Soviet Union
itself. Not surprisingly, Czechoslovakia was one of the
staunchest opponents of the 1980-81 reforms and the Solidarity
movement in Poland. Since 1968 the ties between the armed forces
of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia have been especially
strong
(see Soviet Influence
, ch. 5).
The voices of dissent and reform were not completely stilled,
however. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a few individuals
continued to call for greater personal freedom. The most
prominent of these individual organized themselves around Charter
77, a manifesto issued in January 1977 and originally signed by
243 leading Czechoslovak intellectuals. The manifesto called upon
the government to respect the civil and human rights enumerated
in the 1960 Constitution and in several international agreements,
in particular the 1975 Helsinlu Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe's Final Act (also known as the Helsinki
Accords), signed by Czechoslovakia
(see Charter 77
, ch. 4). The
response of the Husak regime to the Charter 77 movement was
reminiscent of the Stalinist era in Czechoslovakia. The
signatories of the charter were viciously attacked in the
official press, fired from their jobs, arrested, and imprisoned.
Nevertheless, the Charter 77 movement continued to grow. By the
mid-1980s, the number of signatories had reached 12,000 and
included representatives from almost every segment of society
(see Police Repression
, ch. 5). Another manifestation of dissent
in the 1980s was growing religious activism, especially among the
young
(see Religion
, ch. 2).
In late 1987, Czechoslovakia once again faced the challenge
of reform. Paradoxically, the winds of change were blowing, this
time not from the West but from the East, from the Soviet Union
itself. Glasnost' and perestroika, the cornerstones
of Mikhail Gorbachev's ambitious program to invigorate the
moribund Soviet economy and society, caused the KSC considerable
consternation. The KSC was under increasing pressure from the
Soviet Union to follow its example and institute reforms in
Czechoslovakia. Within the KSC, reformist elements, encouraged by
the Gorbachev program and frustrated by the stagnation and
inertia in their own country, also pressed for reform.
Conservative opposition to reform remained strong, however.
Under the leadership of Husak, the KSC seemed determined to avoid
the excesses of the reform movement of 1968. Although in March
1987 Husak nominally committed Czechoslovakia to follow the
program of perestroika, he nevertheless cautioned the
party in October 1987 not to "hasten solutions too quickly" so as
to "minimize the risks that could occur."
December 1, 1987
* * *
On December 17, 1987, some two month after research and
writing of this book were completed, Prague announced that Husak,
who was one month away from his seventieth birthday, had resigned
as head of the KSC. He retained, however, his post of president
of Czechoslovakia and his full membership on the Presidium of the
KSC. Husak's retention of these positions and the fact that the
man who replaced him could hardly be called a reformer suggested
to most observers that Husak's resignation was caused by failing
health rather than by any fundamental shift in the KSC policies
toward reform.
Milos Jakes, who replaced Husak as first secretary of the
KSC, was sixty-five years of age at the time of his assumption of
the most powerful post in the country. Other than the age
difference and the fact that Jakes is a Czech whereas Husak is a
Slovak, there was little to distinguish the new leader from his
predecessor, and most observers expected Jakes to continue
Husak's policies.
Jakes was born August 17, 1922, in Bohemia. He joined the KSC
1945 and ten years later became the head of it's youth
organization, the Czechoslovak Union of Youth. Subsequently he
spent some time in Moscow. Between 1968 and 1977, he served as
the head of the KSC's Central Control and Auditing Commission and
in this capacity supervised the purge of the KSC following the
Soviet invasion of 1968. In 1977 he was elected to the party's
Secretariat and assumed responsibilities for Czechoslovak
agriculture. In 1981 he was made a full member of the Presidium,
overseeing the party's supervision of economic policy and
management. Considered a firm supporter of Husak, Jakes was
viewed as having neither strong reformist nor conservative
tendencies.
In his first pronouncements as the head of the KSC, Jakes
assured the KSC's Central Committee that he would continue the
cautious and moderate path of reform set forth by Husak. He
called for a large-scale introduction of new technology as the
means to "fundamentally increase the efficiency of the
Czechoslovak economy." But he also warned that there would be no
"retreat from the fundamental principles of socialism," adding
that the party had learned well the "lesson from 1968-69 and
know[s] where such a retreat leads." At the same time, Jakes
acknowledged Soviet pressure for reform by pledging to pursue
economic restructuring, stating that "just as Soviet Communists,
we too must observe the principle that more democracy means more
socialism."
Taking the cue from its new leader, the Czechoslovak Central
Committee in its plenary meeting of December 18, 1987, failed to
make a decision on a very modest proposal for reform. The
Czechoslovak version of perestroika, which had slowly
taken shape during the last months of Husak's rule under the
guidance of the reformist and pro-Gorbachev Czechoslovak leader
Premier Lubomir Strougal, called for a modest decentralization of
state economic administration but postponed any concrete action
until the end of the decade. This reform proposal had been
publicly debated and was expected to be approved. The Central
Committee returned it to the government for "further work,"
however, an action which suggesting that committee members
disagreed even on this minor reform. The only positive aspect of
the whole affair was an unprecedented news conference held by the
Central Committee to announce its failure to act.
According to some Western observers, the slow pace of the
Czechoslovak reform movement was an irritant to the Soviet
leadership. In a congratulatory message to Jakes, Gorbachev urged
the latter to "set forth restructuring of the Czechoslovak
economy and democratization of public and political life." "We
are confidant," Gorbachev added, that "the Central Committee
under your leadership will ensure the fulfillment of extensive
tasks facing the party." In late 1987, observers were reluctant
to predict which course of action the KSC would follow under its
new leader.
January 18, 1988
Ihor Y. Gawdiak
Data as of August 1987
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