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Czechoslovakia Intervention
Soviet leader Brezhnev hesitated to intervene militarily in
Czechoslovakia. Dubcek's Action Program proposed a "new model of
socialism"--"democratic" and "national." Significantly, however,
Dubcek did not challenge Czechoslovak commitment to the Warsaw
Pact. In the early spring of 1968, the Soviet leadership adopted
a wait-and-see attitude. By midsummer, however, two camps had
formed: advocates and opponents of military intervention.
The pro-interventionist coalition viewed the situation in
Czechoslovakia as "counterrevolutionary" and favored the defeat
of Dubcek and his supporters. This coalition was headed by the
Ukrainian party leader Pyotr Shelest and included communist
bureaucrats from Belorussia and from the non-Russian national
republics of the western part of the Soviet Union (the Baltic
republics). The coalition members feared the awakening of
nationalism within their respective republics and the influence
of the Ukrainian minority in Czechoslovakia on Ukrainians in the
Soviet Union. Bureaucrats responsible for political stability in
Soviet cities and for the ideological supervision of the
intellectual community also favored a military solution. Within
the Warsaw Pact, only the German Democratic Republic (East
Germany) and Poland were strongly interventionist. Walter
Ulbricht and Wladyslaw Gomulka--party leaders of East Germany and
Poland, respectively--viewed liberalism as threatening to their
own positions.
The Soviet Union agreed to bilateral talks with
Czechoslovakia to be held in July at Cierna nad Tisou, Slovakia.
At the meeting, Dubcek defended the program of the reformist wing
of the KSC while pledging commitment to the Warsaw Pact and
Comecon. The KSC leadership, however, was divided. Vigorous
reformers--Josef Smrkovsky, Oldrich Cernik, and Frantisek
Kriegel--supported Dubcek. Conservatives--Vasil Bil'ak, Drahomir
Kolder, and Oldrich Svestka--adopted an anti-reformist stance.
Brezhnev decided on compromise. The KSC delegates reaffirmed
their loyalty to the Warsaw Pact and promised to curb
"antisocialist" tendencies, prevent the revival of the
Czechoslovaka Social Democratic Party, and control the press more
effectively. The Soviets agreed to withdraw their troops
(stationed in Czechoslovakia since the June maneuvers) and permit
the September 9 party congress.
On August 3, representatives from the Soviet Union, East
Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia met in
Bratislava and signed the Bratislava Declaration. The declaration
affirmed unshakable fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
internationalism and declared an implacable struggle against
"bourgeois" ideology and all "antisocialist" forces. The Soviet
Union expressed its intention to intervene in a Warsaw Pact
country if a "bourgeois" system--a pluralist system of several
political parties--was ever established. After the Bratislava
conference, Soviet troops left Czechoslovak territory but
remained along Czechoslovak borders. Dubcek made no attempt to
mobilize the Czechoslovak army to resist an invasion.
The KSC party congress remained scheduled for September 9. In
the week following the Bratislava conference, it became an open
secret in Prague that most of Dubcek's opponents would be removed
from the Central Committee. The Prague municipal party
organization prepared and circulated a blacklist. The antireformist coalition could hope to stay in power only with Soviet
assistance.
KSC anti-reformists, therefore, made efforts to convince the
Soviets that the danger of political instability and
"counterrevolution" did indeed exist. They used the Kaspar
Report, prepared by the Central Committee's Information
Department, headed by Jan Kaspar, to achieve this end. The report
provided an extensive review of the general political situation
in Czechoslovakia as it might relate to the forthcoming party
congress. It predicted that a stable Central Committee and a firm
leadership could not necessarily be expected as the outcome of
the congress. The report was received by the party Presidium on
August 12. Two Presidium members, Kolder and Alois Indra, were
instructed to evaluate the report for the August 20 meeting of
the Presidium.
Kolder and Indra viewed the Kaspar Report with alarm and,
some observers think, communicated their conclusions to the
Soviet ambassador, Stepan V. Chervonenko. These actions are
thought to have precipitated the Warsaw Pact invasion of
Czechoslovakia. As the KSC Presidium convened on August 20, the
anti-reformists planned to make a bid for power, pointing to the
imminent danger of counterrevolution. Kolder and Indra presented
a resolution declaring a state of emergency and calling for
"fraternal assistance." The resolution was never voted on: Warsaw
Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia that same day.
KSC conservatives had misinformed Moscow regarding the
strength of the reform movement. The KSC Presidium met during the
night of August 20-21; it rejected the option of armed resistance
but condemned the invasion. Two-thirds of the KSC Central
Committee opposed the Soviet intervention. A KSC party congress,
convened secretly on August 22, passed a resolution affirming its
loyalty to Dubcek's Action Program and denouncing the Soviet
aggression. President Svoboda repeatedly resisted Soviet pressure
to form a new government under Indra. The Czechoslovak population
was virtually unanimous in its repudiation of the Soviet action.
In compliance with Svoboda's caution against acts that might
provoke violence, they avoided mass demonstrations and strikes
but observed a symbolic one-hour general work stoppage on August
23. Popular opposition was expressed in numerous spontaneous acts
of nonviolent resistance. In Prague and other cities throughout
the republic, Czechs and Slovaks greeted Warsaw Pact soldiers
with arguments and reproaches. Every form of assistance,
including the provision of food and water, was denied the
invaders. Signs, placards, and graffiti drawn on walls and
pavements denounced the invaders, the Soviet leaders, and
suspected collaborators. Pictures of Dubcek and Svoboda appeared
everywhere.
The generalized resistance caused the Soviet Union to abandon
its original plan to oust Dubcek. The KSC leader, who had been
arrested on the night of August 20, was taken to Moscow for
negotiations. The outcome was the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited
sovereignty, which provided for the strengthening of the KSC,
strict party control of the media, and the suppression of the
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party. It was agreed that Dubcek
would remain in office and that a program of moderate reform
would continue.
Data as of August 1987
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