Czechoslovakia A Climate of Orthodoxy
The objectives of normalization were the restoration of firm
KSC rule and the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia's position in
the socialist bloc. Its result, however, was a political
environment that placed primary emphasis on the maintenance of a
stable party leadership and its strict control over the
population.
A remarkable feature of the KSC leadership under Husak has
been the absence of significant changes in personnel. The
stability of the leadership during the late 1970s and the first
half of the 1980s could be attributed not to unanimity in
political opinion but rather to practical compromise among
different factions vying to retain their leadership positions.
Husak's leadership, then, was based not on any ability he may
have had to rally opinion but rather on his skill in securing
consensuses that were in the mutual interest of a coalition of
party leaders.
Husak led the conservative (sometimes called the "moderate"
or "pragmatic") wing of the KSC leadership. An important Slovak
communist party functionary from 1943 to 1950, Husak was arrested
in 1951 and sentenced to three years--later to life imprisonment-
-for "bourgeois nationalism" during the Stalinist purges of the
era. Released in 1960 and rehabilitated in 1963, Husak rose to be
a deputy prime minister under Dubcek, whom he later denounced,
and was named KSC first secretary in April 1969 and president of
the republic in July 1975. Above all, Husak has been a survivor
who learned to accommodate the powerful political forces
surrounding him.
Other prominent conservatives who remained in power in 1987
included Lubomir Strougal, premier of Czechoslovakia; Peter
Colotka, premier of the Slovak Socialist Republic; Jozef Lenart,
first secretary of the KSS; and Josef Kempny, chairman of the
Czech National Council. These leaders generally supported the
reforms instituted under Dubcek during the late 1960s but
successfully made the transition to orthodox party rule following
the invasion and Dubcek's decline from power. Subsequently, they
adopted a more flexible stance regarding economic reform and
dissident activity.
Opposed to the conservatives within the KSC leadership were
the
so-called hard-liners. Their leader was Vasil Bil'ak, a Ukrainian
from Slovakia who had been a member of the Presidium since 1968
and was chairman of the party's Ideological Commission. Other
hard-liners in the top party leadership included Karel Hoffman, a
Central Committee secretary and Presidium member; Antonin Kapek,
Presidium member; Jan Fojtik, secretary; Alois Indra, Presidium
member and chairman of the Federal Assembly (replaced the
National Assembly under 1968 federation law); and, on most
issues, Milos Jakes, chairman of the Economic Commission and
Presidium member. These hard-liners opposed economic and
political reforms and took a harsh stand on dissent.
After the 1968 invasion, Husak successfully ruled over what
was essentially a coalition of the conservative and hard-line
factions within the top party leadership. The method by which he
ruled was commonly summed up as "reluctant terror." It involved
careful adherence to the Soviet Union's policy objectives and the
use of what was perceived as the minimum amount of repression at
home necessary to fulfill these objectives and prevent a return
to Dubcek-style reformism. As one result, the membership of the
KSC leadership has changed very little since 1971. The Sixteenth
Party Congress in 1981 reelected the incumbent members of the
Presidium and Secretariat and elevated one candidate member,
Jakes, to full membership in the Presidium. The Seventeenth Party
Congress in 1986 retained the incumbent Secretariat and Presidium
and added three new candidate members to the Presidium. In March
1987, Josef Korcak retired from the Presidium and was replaced by
Ladislav Adamec. At the same time, Hoffman, a Presidium member,
was also appointed a Central Committee secretary.
Popular control during the era of orthodoxy was maintained
through various means. Repeated arrests and imprisonment of
persons opposing the regime, such as members of Charter 77 and
religious activists, continued throughout the 1970s and into the
1980s
(see Dissent and Independent Activity
, ch. 1). Less
coercive controls, such as punishment through job loss, demotion,
denial of employment, denial of educational opportunities,
housing restrictions, and refusal to grant travel requests, also
prevailed.
Another means by which the Husak regime maintained control
was to offer considerable consumer gains as a substitute for the
loss of personal freedom. Government policies in the first half
of the 1970s resulted in high economic growth and large increases
in personal consumption. The widespread availability of material
goods placated the general populace and promoted overall
acceptance of Husak's stringent political controls. During the
late 1970s, however, Czechoslovakia's economy began to stagnate,
and the regime's ability to appease the population by providing
material benefits diminished.
Although the Husak regime succeeded in preserving the status
quo in Czechoslovakia for nearly two decades, it faced in the
1980s both internal and external pressures to reform.
Domestically, poor economic performance hindered the government's
ability to produce the goods needed to satisfy consumer demands
(see Economic Policy and Performance
, ch. 3). Pressure for
political change continued from activists representing, for
example, the Roman Catholic Church and the Charter 77 movement.
Externally, Czechoslovakia struggled to find a suitable response
to the changes introduced by the new leadership in Moscow. The
1985 election of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the
CPSU precipitated a wave of personnel changes in the Soviet party
apparatus and a strong emphasis on exploring new ways to
stimulate economic growth. Czechoslovakia's initial response to
the reformist trends in the Soviet Union focused on voicing
public support for Gorbachev's new programs while steadfastly
avoiding introducing similar programs within Czechoslovakia.
However, in early 1987, on the eve of Gorbachev's visit to
Prague, Husak announced that Czechoslovakia was preparing to
implement widespread reforms patterned after the Soviet
"restructuring" (perestroika) campaign. The Czechoslovak
leader did not specify what the reforms might include, but his
announcement suggested a significant departure from previous
policy and represented an apparent victory for the pro-reform,
"pragmatic" wing of the KSC.
Data as of August 1987
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