|
Ecuador INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
With the exception of García Moreno, the most powerful
Ecuadorian political figures of the nineteenth century arose from
the military. Chronically threatened by revolts and insurrection,
leaders employed force to defend their authority. The distinction
between civilian and military spheres of action was blurred, and
the institutional identity of the military had not become wholly
established.
Reformist Liberal governments of the early part of the
twentieth century codified military law, regularized promotions,
and banned soldiers from joining political parties or clubs. The
establishment of a military academy in Quito in 1901 helped
professionalize the armed forces. In addition, the military
recruited an increasing proportion of its officer corps from the
middle rather than the upper class. By 1916 officers had begun to
regard themselves increasingly in institutional terms.
In 1925 the army as an institution intervened in national
politics. A group of young officers, objecting to the political
domination of the Guayaquil business oligarchy, revolted against
civilian rule
(see The Rule of the Liberals, 1895-1925
, ch. 1).
Ambivalent over imposing direct military rule, the officers
appointed a civilian-dominated junta, followed, in 1926, by a
civilian as provisional president. The army continued to intervene
in political affairs until 1948, removing numerous presidents. Yet
the military refrained from governing directly.
In 1963 the army high command deposed President Carlos Julio
Arosemena Monroy, perceiving him to be overly tolerant of the
communist threat against Latin America and a national embarrassment
because of his reported public drunkenness
(see Instability and Military Dominance, 1960-72
, ch. 1). In contrast to previous
patterns, however, the army assumed direct control, claiming the
need to "end the chaos and rectify mistaken paths" and promising to
introduce a new socioeconomic structure. Over the next three years,
the military junta adopted a moderate program of fiscal, agrarian,
and industrial reforms aimed at eliminating structural obstacles to
development. The military failed to mobilize support from the
intended beneficiaries of its reforms, however, and stirred strong
opposition from elite groups, especially Guayaquil business
interests. Shaken by the lack of popular backing and an economic
downturn and fearful of damage to military prestige, the armed
forces relinquished power to a civilian interim president in 1966.
The longest period of direct control by the armed forces
occurred between 1972 and 1979. In 1970 President José María
Velasco Ibarra, unable to win congressional approval for his
budget, had assumed dictatorial power with agreement of the
military. Concerned over Velasco's cumulative political
misjudgments and his interference in military promotions and
assignments, however, the armed forces seized power in 1972
(see Direct Military Rule, 1972-79
, ch. 1). General Guillermo Rodríguez
Lara launched an era of military authoritarianism with a program of
state-led development more ambitious than any during previous
interventions by the armed forces. Ranking officers held many
cabinet posts or became deputies in ministries and agencies headed
by civilians. In spite of being divided into reformist and
traditionalist elements, the military government brought banking,
basic industries, agriculture, and fisheries under public-sector
control. The government also nationalized several large
unprofitable enterprises. The government also created new
mixed-ownership firms and public enterprises, notably the
Ecuadorian State Petroleum Corporation (Corporación Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana--CEPE). Some enterprises served the
military's own equipment requirements and brought revenue to the
armed forces. After powerful large landholders diluted an ambitious
effort to recast agriculture by redistributing income to the
peasantry, however, the military's reformist thrust gradually lost
momentum.
Although key capital garrisons successfully foiled a coup
attempt against Rodríguez Lara by the chief of staff of the armed
forces in 1975, discontent simmered among senior military and
influential civilian political elements. Early the following year,
a Supreme Council of Government composed of the commanders of the
army, navy, and air force replaced Rodríguez Lara. The triumvirate
disagreed as to the advisability of an early restoration of
civilian government, but the commitment to gradual military
withdrawal espoused by its head, Admiral Afredo Poveda Burbano,
prevailed, and constitutional rule was restored in 1979. The
incoming civilian government inherited serious economic problems,
however, because of the Supreme Council's unwillingness to make
unpopular decisions on wages and consumption.
The military attempted to limit its withdrawal by retaining a
veto power over undesirable candidates, parties, and coalitions.
Outmaneuvered by civilian politicians, however, the armed forces
could not prevent the electoral victory of a left-leaning coalition
that it found distasteful. Nonetheless, the seven years of military
rule had strengthened the position of the armed forces. They
controlled the membership of the boards of major state
corporations; operated air and sea transportation lines; became
major industrial shareholders through investments made by the
Directorate of Army Industries (Dirección de Industrias del
Ejército--Dine); and received a portion of petroleum revenues for
military requirements. The armed forces reportedly controlled at
least fourteen major business enterprises, ranging from an
automotive assembly plant and a profitable shrimp-farming project
owned by the army to a dredging company owned by the navy, and a
domestic airline operated by the air force. In addition, several
prominent retired officers had turned to politics or management
positions in private or government-owned businesses.
During the 1980s, the military as a whole remained loyal to the
constitutional system. Nonetheless, civilian politicians could
never safely ignore the reactions of the military to their proposed
actions and accepted a degree of military autonomy in matters of
national defense. Indeed, the outbreak of hostilities with Peru in
1981 was fundamentally a military affair; the elected civilian
government had little choice but to support the initiatives taken
by the high command.
During the conservative administration of President León Febres
Cordero Ribadeneyra (1984-88), a series of episodes inflamed
relations between the military and the executive branch. Matters
reached a crisis point in March 1986 when Lieutenant General Frank
Vargas Pazzos, the air force commander and chief of the Joint
Command of the armed forces, accused the minister of national
defense and an army commander of corruption and demanded their
dismissal. When the president reneged on his commitment to remove
the two officers and bring them to trial, Vargas and his supporters
took control of the Quito air force base. The brief rebellion was
put down at the cost of several lives, and Vargas was
court-martialed and put under house arrest at an army base. In
January 1987, air force paratroop commandos loyal to Vargas seized
Febres Cordero at the Taura Air Base near Guayaquil. In return for
his freedom, the president pledged that no reprisals would be taken
against his kidnappers and agreed to Vargas's release. Vargas later
presented himself as a candidate for president and came in fourth
in the first-round election in January 1988, winning over 12
percent of the vote
(see Political Dynamics
, ch. 4).
When the Congress initiated moves to impeach Febres Cordero,
the military warned congressional leaders that it would shut down
the legislature if a formal impeachment action were brought against
the president. Military authorities also backed Febres Cordero in
proceeding with the court-martialing of the rebellious paratroopers
in spite of his promise of immunity. Nevertheless, the episode
shook military unity and tarnished its prestige as an institution
(see Political Forces and Interest Groups
, ch. 4).
Data as of 1989
|
