El Salvador THE REFORMIST COUP OF 1979
Colonial church at Panchimalco, south of San Salvador
The tenure of President Romero was characterized by the
abandonment of any official pretense of reform and a precipitous
rise in politically motivated violence. The leftist guerrilla
groups stepped up their operations--assassinations, kidnappings,
and bombings--as a form of self-defense, as retaliation against
government forces, and as part of a larger strategy of impelling
the country further toward political anarchy, a state perceived
by the left as one of the "objective conditions" necessary for a
broad-based antigovernment insurrection. This process of extreme
polarization alarmed those political actors who saw the old
system of domination by the military and the elite as no longer
workable, but who feared the consequences of a successful
communist-led revolt. This loose coalition included young
military officers, Christian democratic and social democratic
politicians, and more progressive Salvadoran industrialists.
Many of these groups, with the exception of private sector
representatives, came together in August 1979 to establish a
political pressure group known as the Popular Forum (Foro
Popular). The Popular Forum issued a call for an end to official
and unofficial repression, the establishment of political
pluralism, short-term and long-term economic reforms (including
agrarian reform), and the incorporation of the mass organizations
into the government. This last demand, coupled with the
participation in the Popular Forum of the 28 of February Popular
Leagues (Ligas Populares 28 febrero--LP-28), the most radical of
the mass organizations (it was affiliated with the ERP),
convinced many young military officers that some action was
necessary to head off a leftist political victory in El Salvador.
The government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua had
fallen only the month before, and, from the point of view of the
Salvadoran military, the Popular Forum bore a suspicious
resemblance to the Broad Opposition Front that had brought the
FSLN to power in that country. Although the final form and nature
of the new Nicaraguan government was not yet in evidence, the
dissolution of Somoza's National Guard was seen in El Salvador as
a precedent and a direct threat to the military institution.
Thus, in a climate of extreme violence, sharp political
polarization, and potential revolution, yet another generation of
young officers staged a coup in an effort to restore order and
address popular frustrations. This new Military Youth deposed
President Romero on October 15, 1979, issuing a proclamation
decrying the violent, corrupt, and exclusionary nature of the
regime. Beyond their concern with preventing "another Nicaragua,"
the young officers also were motivated by a desire to address the
country's critical economic situation. Their vague aspirations in
this regard apparently revolved around the achievement of an
acceptable level of political stability that would staunch the
flight of capital out of the country and restore to some degree
the smooth functioning of the economy. In this regard, the 1979
coup resembled those of 1948 and 1960. Where it differed,
however, was in the realization that effective and radical (by
Salvadoran standards) reforms would have to be included in their
program even at the risk of alienating the economic elite.
The first junta established by the coup leaders included the
officer who headed the reformist faction within the officer
corps, Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano Ramos, along with another
officer of more uncertain political inclinations, Colonel Jaime
Abdul Gutierrez. The other junta members were Ungo from the MNR,
Roman Mayorga (a former president of the Jesuit-run Central
American University Jose Simeon Canas), and Mario Andino, a
representative of the private sector. This junta wasted little
time in announcing and attempting to implement a reformist
program. It enacted decrees to freeze landholdings over ninety-
eight hectares and to nationalize the coffee export trade. It did
not move immediately to effect agrarian reform, but it promised
that such a reform would be forthcoming. Another decree
officially disbanded Orden. The implementation of that decree,
like that of many others during the period of the reformist
juntas, was hampered seriously by the limited influence of the
reformist faction over the more conservative security force
apparatus. Perhaps the best indication of this limitation was the
fact that the level of violence carried out by the security
forces against members of the mass organizations increased after
the installation of the junta.
The upswing in repression against the left reflected not only
the resistance of conservative military and security force
commanders but also the outrage expressed by elite landowners and
the majority of the private sector over the reform decrees and
the prospect of even more wide-ranging actions to come. Some
observers have alleged that the campaign of terror waged by the
death squads was organized and coordinated by conservative
officers under the leadership of Major Roberto D'Aubuisson
Arrieta, a member of the country's executive intelligence agency,
with the financial backing of the oligarchy. Although the
evidence for this sort of sweeping conspiratorial concept is
inconclusive, the existence of ties between the economic elite
and security force personnel seems undeniable.
The military's reaction in general to the junta's reformism
was mixed. The reformists sought to incorporate new sectors into
the political system but stopped short of including the mass
organizations in that effort because of the radical ties of those
organizations. Conservative officers, led by the defense
minister, Colonel Guillermo Garcia, saw the reformists as playing
into the hands of the left, weakening the military institution,
and increasing the likelihood of a seizure of power by
"extremist" elements. Garcia, abetted by Gutierrez, worked to
undermine the reformists by excluding Majano's followers from key
commands and positions through transfer or denial of promotion.
The majority of Salvadoran officers seemed to fall into neither
the reformist nor the conservative camp. Although they shared a
generalized anticommunism and a strong commitment to the military
institution, they were not sufficiently convinced that the kind
of radical reform advocated by the junta was necessary. They
opted for a sort of concerned neutrality and inaction that
ultimately worked in favor of the aggressive conservative
faction.
The first reformist junta eventually failed because of its
inability to curb the increasing violence against the left. It
was replaced on January 10, 1980, by a second junta. Majano and
Gutierrez remained as the military representatives, but the
civilian members now included two prominent Christian Democrats--
the party's 1977 vice presidential candidate, Morales, and Hector
Dada. Jose Avalos was the third civilian, replacing Andino, whose
departure left the government without significant ties to the
private sector. Direct participation in the government by the
Christian Democrats was by no means universally accepted among
the party membership. It was viewed as a bad precedent by those
who still clung idealistically to their commitment to the
democratic process. Moreover, the actual commitment of the
government to effective reform was still questioned by the more
progressive members of the party. On a practical political level,
some felt that casting the lot of the PDC with that of the junta
represented too great a risk of the party's prestige (admittedly
somewhat eroded at that point anyway) for too little possible
gain. On the other side of the ledger, however, proponents of
participation (including Duarte, who had by this time returned
from Venezuela) saw it as an opportunity to effect the kind of
reforms that the party had long advocated, to establish a
political center in El Salvador, and to make a transition to a
genuinely democratic system.
The second junta was dogged by the human rights issue no less
than its predecessor. The continued high level of political
violence was attributable not only to the actions of the death
squads and the security forces but also to the decision by the
left to shun cooperation with the junta in favor of a call for
armed insurrection. The three major mass organizations, along
with the UDN, issued such a call on January 11, 1980. They
established an umbrella front designated the National
Coordinator, subsequently amended to Revolutionary Coordinator of
the Masses (Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas--CRM), to
advance "the struggle." The MNR endorsed the manifesto of the
CRM, further undermining the legitimacy of the junta government.
The heightened militancy of the CRM was manifested in stepped-up
demonstrations, occupations of churches and buildings, and
strikes. On January 22, a mass rally held in San Salvador was
fired on by the police, and twenty-four demonstrators were
killed. On February 25, PDC activist Mario Zamora and others were
murdered, apparently because they had been denounced publicly as
subversives by now ex-Major D'Aubuisson. Zamora's killing led
directly to the resignation of his brother, Ruben, from the
government. Ruben Zamora established his own political party, the
Popular Social Christian Movement (Movimiento Popular Social
Cristiano--MPSC), taking a number of other disillusioned
Christian Democrats with him. Reflecting the intense renewed
debate within the PDC over participation in the government, Dada
resigned from the junta. His place was taken in a third junta by
Duarte, who finally decided to take a direct role in the process
that he had supported previously from behind the scenes.
In an effort to display its commitment to change and to exert
its authority within the country, the third junta decreed the
most sweeping reforms enacted to that time, expropriating
landholdings above 500 hectares and nationalizing commercial
banks and savings and loan institutions. At the same time, it
declared a state of siege in an apparent effort to back up its
reforms with a show of force against the insurrectionist left.
There were some paradoxical aspects to this policy of coupling
reform with a hard military line toward the mass organizations
and incipient guerrilla forces. For one thing, it strengthened
the hand of military conservatives led by Garcia and undercut
efforts by Majano and others to reach an accommodation with
wavering non-Marxist labor and peasant groups. It also helped
frustrate the implementation of the agrarian reform program by
facilitating reprisals by security force personnel or
paramilitary groups (the now "unofficial" remnants of Orden)
against the recipients of the expropriated acreage, much of which
was distributed on a cooperative basis. Ultimately, the policies
of the third junta seemed to do little to expand its popular base
or enhance its legitimacy. As was the case with its predecessors,
it also failed to rein in political violence, official or
unofficial, originating from either side of the political
spectrum.
That violence reached a dramatic apex in March 1980 with the
murder of the archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Arnulfo Romero y
Galdamez, on March 24, 1980. Romero, who had been selected as
archbishop in part because of his moderate political views, was
influenced strongly by the
liberation theology (see Glossary)
movement, and he was appalled by the brutality employed with
increasing frequency by government forces against the populace
and particularly against the clergy. In his weekly radio
homilies, he related statistics on political assassination and
excesses committed by the military. He frequently urged soldiers
to refuse to carry out what he characterized as immoral orders.
His high profile made him an important political figure, and he
had used his influence to urge the PDC to pull out of the junta
and to argue against United States military aid to El Salvador.
Despite his stature as the country's Catholic primate, he was
targeted for assassination; all indications are that the killing
was carried out by the right wing.
Romero's funeral on March 30 produced a dramatic clash
between demonstrators and security forces. The BPR, seeking to
capitalize politically on the archbishop's assassination,
organized an antigovernment rally in San Salvador's Plaza of the
Cathedral. What had been billed as a peaceful protest, however,
turned violent. Responsibility for the melee that followed never
has been firmly placed. Shooting erupted, apparently from both
sides, and the police opened fire on the crowd. The resultant
news footage of unarmed demonstrators being gunned down on the
steps of the National Cathedral had a strong impact abroad,
especially in the United States. El Salvador became almost
overnight a focus of international debate and scrutiny.
Another high-impact incident was the murder of four
churchwomen from the United States in December 1980. The murders
themselves drew the ire of the United States government and
public and prompted the administration of Jimmy Carter to suspend
a program of limited military aid it had granted to the junta
government (United States military aid had been rejected by the
Romero government in 1977 when the Carter administration sought
to link disbursement to human rights compliance). The subsequent
investigation frustrated United States officials, angered the
American public, and enhanced the suspicion that high-ranking
officers in the security forces were orchestrating a cover-up of
the affair.
The violent incidents that drew foreign attention to the
chaotic situation in El Salvador were played out against a
backdrop of a continuing power struggle within the military.
While Garcia continued to undermine the position of the reformist
faction led by Majano from within the institution, other
conservative commanders were plotting to stage a coup to force
out the Majanistas once and for all. What at first appeared to be
a preemptive strike against these conspirators on May 7, 1980,
later proved to be the last nail in Majano's political coffin. A
number of plotters, including D'Aubuisson, were captured by
Majano loyalists during a planning session; incriminating
documents also were seized at the site. The Majanistas, backed by
the PDC members of the junta, demanded that D'Aubuisson and the
others be tried for treason. The ex-major's release on May 13 and
the subsequent failure of efforts to bring him to trial
demonstrated the power shift within the military and the almost
complete lack of PDC influence outside the reformist faction.
Majano's personal fall from power began with the announcement
by Colonel Garcia on May 10 that Colonel Gutierrez was to
function as sole commander in chief of the armed forces, a
responsibility previously shared with Majano. The reassignment of
Majanist officers, usually to foreign diplomatic positions,
continued until September, when almost all remaining reformist
officers were removed from their posts. Colonel Majano himself
survived an assassination attempt by right-wing gunmen in
November, only to be ousted from the junta on December 6 while on
a visit to Panama. Majano returned in a vain effort to shore up
his support among the ranks. By this time, however, he was
practically bereft of support within the officer corps, the focus
of real power in El Salvador at the time. Majano eventually fled
into foreign exile rather than risk further attempts on his life.
Many observers believed at the time that he took with him the
last hopes of averting a major civil conflict through effective
social and economic reform.
Data as of November 1988
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