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El Salvador THE CIVIL CONFLICT BEGINS
The early reaction of the Salvadoran radical left to the
progression of reformist junta governments was characteristically
fractious. The PCES expressed initial support for the first
junta. Other groups, such as the ERP, condemned such impulses as
collaborationist and renewed their call for an insurrection.
Although some dialogue apparently took place between Colonel
Majano and his supporters and some members of the radical left,
the erosion of Majano's position within the military and the
inability of the junta governments to stem the tide of right-wing
violence, not to mention a certain suspicion among the Majanists
themselves of the leftists' ultimate goals, worked against any
effort to incorporate them into the governmental structure. Some
observers have noted this failure to bring the left into the
political process as a major shortcoming of the reformist juntas.
It appears, however, that the political will to do so was lacking
on both sides. This was particularly true of the Marxist
guerrilla groups that had expanded their membership and their
aspirations since their establishment as urban terrorist cells in
the mid-1970s.
Foreign influences on these Salvadoran guerrilla groups
served in large part to convince their leadership of the need to
sublimate old ideological quarrels in favor of a coordinated and
cooperative effort to arouse the Salvadoran masses. The example
of the Nicaraguan revolution served as both an inspiration and a
loose blueprint for the Salvadorans. Nicaragua demonstrated the
importance of incorporating as many sectors of society as
possible into a revolutionary movement while still ensuring the
predominance of a Marxist-Leninist "vanguard" group within the
coalition. In Nicaragua the vanguard role was played by the FSLN,
a group that had represented singlehandedly the pro-Cuban
insurrectionist left in that country since the early 1960s. In El
Salvador, the situation was more complicated. Clearly, several
ideologically diverse (Maoist, pro-Soviet, and pro-Cuban)
guerrilla groups could not fulfill simultaneously the role of
revolutionary vanguard. Salvadorans recognized a need for unity
that was not achieved until Cuba's Fidel Castro took a direct
hand in the matter. The negotiating process began in Havana in
December 1979, some two months after the reformist coup in El
Salvador, and was concluded by May 1980, when the major guerrilla
groups announced their unity under the banner of the Unified
Revolutionary Directorate (Direccion Revolucionario Unificada--
DRU). Despite some continued infighting, the DRU succeeded in
coordinating the groups' efforts to organize and equip their
forces.
While the military strategy of the left was proceeding along
one path, some opposition parties and the mass organizations were
following a similar and eventually convergent course. On April 1,
1980, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Democratico
Revolucionario--FDR) was established by the CRM, the umbrella
group of the mass organizations. It brought together all five of
the mass organizations associated with the DRU guerrilla groups
as well as Ungo's MNR, Zamora's MPSC, another party known as the
Popular Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberacion Popular--
MLP), forty-nine labor unions, and several student groups. FDR
political leaders such as Ungo and Zamora began to travel abroad,
where they found political and moral support, particularly in
Mexico and among the social democratic parties of Western Europe.
Meanwhile, the mass organizations began a campaign of general
strikes in an effort to pave the way for a full or partial
leftist assumption of power, either through insurrection or
through negotiations.
In November 1980, the FDR was struck a traumatic blow when
one of its leaders, Enrique Alvarez, was killed along with five
other members of the front by a right-wing death squad. This
incident underscored the danger of the FDR's strategy of open
organization and opposition and contributed to its formal
unification with the DRU. Although the leadership of the mass
organizations had long been cooperating with the guerrilla
groups, the politicians of the MNR and MPSC had sought to steer a
slightly more independent path. After the Alvarez murder,
however, they felt compelled to make common cause with the DRU;
they took this action not only for their own protection but also
because they believed that the prevailing level of violence in
the country legitimized a violent response. By 1981 the FDR had
been united formally with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional--FMLN), the
successor organization to the DRU. The first public announcement
of the FMLN-FDR was made in Mexico City in January 1981, some
four days after the FMLN guerrollas initiated an operation that
they dubbed, prematurely and inaccurately, the "final offensive."
The guerrilla offensive began on January 10, 1981. From the
perspective of the FMLN, its timing proved to be premature in a
number of respects. The guerrillas' logistics network was not
prepared to support an operation on an almost countrywide level;
the rebels generally were not well armed and clearly were not
well trained. The Salvadoran armed forces, although initially
taken by surprise, were sufficiently cohesive to rally and beat
back the guerrilla attacks. The FMLN hoped to establish
operational control over Morazan Department and to declare it a
"liberated territory." This major objective never was achieved.
On a basic level, the final offensive demonstrated the limited
extent of the guerrillas' support among the Salvadoran
population. The anticipated countrywide insurrection on which the
FMLN had staked so much of its hopes for victory never
materialized.
The final offensive was not a total loss for the FMLN,
however. It retained military strongholds, especially in
Chalatenango Department, where its forces settled in for a
protracted guerrilla conflict. The offensive focused further
international attention on El Salvador and established the FMLNFDR as a formidable force both politically and militarily; in
August 1981, the governments of France and Mexico recognized the
front as a "representative political force" and called for a
negotiated settlement between the rebels and the government.
Seeking to capitalize on such support, FDR representatives
carried on a "political offensive" abroad while the FMLN forces
dug in, resupplied, and continued their organizational and
operational efforts in the field
(see Left-Wing Extremism
, ch.
5).
On the down side for the guerrillas, however, the armed
forces continued to repulse their assaults with relative ease,
even without the benefit of United States military aid. The
timing of the final offensive had in large part reflected the
desire of the FMLN to take power before the inauguration of
United States president Ronald Reagan. Although it failed
militarily, the offensive still drew considerable attention from
observers and policymakers in Washington.
Data as of November 1988
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