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Ethiopia Government and Politics
by Edmond J. Keller (Professor of Political Science and
Director of the James S. Coleman African Studies Center at the
University of California at Los Angeles)
Main gate of Jubilee Palace, Addis Ababa
THE FINAL CONGRESS of Ethiopia's Provisional Military
Administrative Council marked a watershed in modern
Ethiopian history. The congress, held in the capital city of
Addis Ababa, was the prelude to the inauguration, in 1987,
of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which would
be guided by a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party and regime.
At least nominally, thirteen years of rule by the military
regime were at an end. When the Provisional Military
Administrative Council had assumed power in 1974, there were
no clear signs that it was committed to a Marxist-Leninist
model of social transformation; neither was there any
indication that it was sincere about its pledge to return
Ethiopia to civilian rule. In fact, within months of seizing
power, the new regime began systematically to buttress the
already preeminent role of the military as the vanguard of
the revolution.
Until its collapse in 1974, the Ethiopian imperial state
had attempted to construct an absolutist but modernizing
autocracy, a regime committed to preserving tradition while
carefully guiding society into the twentieth century.
Emperor Haile Selassie I, who ruled the country from 1930 to
1974, portrayed himself as a strong but compassionate
leader, a model for all African statesmen. However, at a
very fundamental level, the imperial state constructed by
Haile Selassie was tenuously held together by a top-heavy,
secularized bureaucracy and an imperial myth. Once the myth
that the emperor was unassailable had been broken, the new
regime began the process of reconstituting state
institutions. This process was slow but methodical, and by
1989 the fruits of this institutional transformation were
definitely in evidence.
The tasks of social, political, and economic reconstruction
facing the new regime in 1974 were formidable. To meet these
challenges, the regime attempted to fashion a new
ideological foundation for society. The Provisional Military
Administrative Council favored a Marxist-Leninist
development model because of the organizational power it
promised. The approach taken was statist and based on the
principles of scientific socialism as interpreted in the
Soviet Union from the time of Joseph Stalin to that of
Leonid Brezhnev. At an operational level, this choice
required the state's reorganization and reconstitution, the
redistribution of wealth and property, the creation of a
capacity for central planning, the pursuit of a state
socialist development strategy under the guidance of a
vanguard party of "revolutionary democrats," and the
establishment of a constitutionally based "people's
republic."
Ethiopia's turn toward Marxism-Leninism first became
evident in early 1976 with the enunciation of the Program
for the National Democratic Revolution. This document, which
reflected the views of those regime members who espoused
Marxism-Leninism long before they seized power, committed
the regime to a noncapitalist approach to development based
on the principles of scientific socialism. For the next
decade, the ruling group used ideology and new socialist
institutions to implement and legitimize its policies. Even
when particular economic strategies were chosen, the regime
seemed to be motivated by political objectives rather than
driven by ideological zeal. Chief among the objectives were
establishing the regime's political control and securing
popular legitimacy.
By 1989 it was evident that the government had failed to
consolidate its rule. Natural catastrophes such as drought
and famine had taken a heavy toll. Furthermore, the regime
not only was unable to control the general population, but
also dozens of top-ranking officials had defected to the
West, where they bitterly denounced the government. With
military morale at its lowest point since 1974, disaffected
senior officers attempted a coup d'état in May 1989. In
addition, numerous opposition groups waged military
campaigns against the government. Most notable among these
were the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigray
People's Liberation Front, the latter operating with several
other antigovernment groups in an umbrella organization
known as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic
Front. By early 1991, these groups controlled large
stretches of territory in north-central Ethiopia and were
poised to seize even more.
Moreover, by this time the Soviet Union, in the spirit of
Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost (openness), had abandoned its
uncritical support of Ethiopia's revolution. The winds of
democracy that were sweeping across much of the communist
world also meant that Ethiopia could no longer rely on its
Soviet and East European allies for military and economic
assistance. These developments forced the government to
reconsider its efforts to deal with its opponents through
military rather than political means. However, by early 1991
the government had failed to reach a negotiated settlement
with the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the
Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front.
Thereafter, both groups launched renewed attacks that by
late May brought the insurgents to power. The leaders of
both insurgencies disavowed the state socialism of the
military government and pledged themselves to democratic
principles and free-market economics. Eritrea was also
expected to become an independent country.
Data as of 1991
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