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Ethiopia The Tigrayan Movement
Tigrayan opposition to the Ethiopian government started
during Emperor Menelik's reign. In 1896 Menelik, who opposed
Italy's territorial designs on Ethiopia, deployed an 80,000-
man army into Tigray without adequate provisions, thereby
forcing the soldiers to live off the land. According to
Tigrayan nationalists, the Tigray who died protecting their
homes against Menelik's troops outnumbered the defeated
Italians who died at the Battle of Adwa that year. Forty
years later, when fascist Italy's forces invaded Ethiopia,
the main battlefield was again in Tigray, and once again the
inhabitants suffered. In 1943, after the Allied Powers had
defeated Italy and Haile Selassie had returned to Ethiopia,
Tigrayan peasants revolted against the imperial regime (see
Discontent in Tigray, ch. 1). Government forces, supported
by British units, suppressed the revolt. The emperor then
imposed a harsh peace on Tigray.
The first sign of open resistance to the Mengistu regime in
Tigray (where the rebellion became known as the Weyane, the
same as the 1943 revolt) occurred in October 1974. At that
time, the Derg ordered Ras Mengesha Seyoum--governor general
of Tigray, member of the Tigrayan royal family, and
grandson-in-law of the emperor--to relinquish his office and
surrender to the authorities. Rather than submit, he fled to
the bush and organized the Tigray Liberation Organization
(TLO). The TLO operated in clandestine political cells and
engaged in a program of systematic agitation. During the
tumultuous mid-1970s, the TLO established cells in various
parts of the country. In early 1975, Mengesha left Tigray
and, with other aristocrats, formed the Ethiopian Democratic
Union (EDU). Members of the TLO who remained in Tigray and
who came under the influence of the EPLF formed the Tigray
People's Liberation Front (TPLF), whose goals included the
overthrow of the Mengistu regime, the establishment of a
"more democratic" government, and the removal of all foreign
military bases from Ethiopia (see
The Tigray, ch. 5). The
TPLF also condemned Mengesha, accepted Marxism-Leninism, and
argued for an independent Eritrean-Tigrayan federation.
Eventually, the TPLF neutralized the TLO by killing many of
its leaders and by jailing and executing others.
At the time, the TPLF shared the field with the more
conservative Tigray-based EDU and the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Party (EPRP). However, the Red Terror had
decimated both of these organizations, and by 1978 they had
ceased to be a factor. The TPLF was also severely weakened
but, with the assistance of the EPLF, developed into an
effective fighting force. Its ranks were expanded initially
by the absorption of former EPRP members.
Beginning in 1980, the TPLF sought to establish local selfadministration in areas under its control. The basic
administrative unit was the people's council (baito), which
was typically introduced in two stages. In the first stage,
representatives from mass associations were elected to form
the provisional administrative council. The second stage
involved the establishment of a full-fledged people's
council. Council members were elected to two-year terms.
All members of a number of mass associations who were at
least sixteen years of age had the right to vote and to
stand for election to a people's council. People's councils
were responsible for local administrative, economic, and
social affairs. By late 1989, however, this structure had
not grown much beyond the pilot stage in most of Tigray.
In the 1980s, the TPLF drew almost exclusively from among
the Tigrayan population of north-central Ethiopia for its
support, although it claimed to be dedicated toward building
a united national front representing all groups and
nationalities struggling against the Mengistu regime. On May
8, 1984, the TPLF issued a proposal calling for the
formation of a united front based on a "minimum program,"
whose sole objective was the overthrow of the Mengistu
regime. By 1984 the TPLF was active throughout Tigray and in
parts of Welo and Gojam. Although its political program
continued to have a populist orientation, the dominant
ideologues within the organization claimed to be dedicated
to constructing the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray.
Observers likened this group's strident rhetoric to that of
Albania's Stalinist ideologues.
On the eve of its thirteenth anniversary in February 1988,
the TPLF was engaged in its largest offensive against
Ethiopian forces. Over the next year and a half, the TPLF
captured all of Tigray, including urban centers such as
Aksum, Inda Silase, and Mekele. By May 1989, the Ethiopian
army had withdrawn completely from Tigray.
The TPLF's efforts to develop a united front began to bear
fruit just as its major offensive was unfolding. In January
1989, it entered into an alliance with the Ethiopian
People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), an organization
composed mainly of Amhara from Welo, Gonder, and the
northern part of Shewa, many of whom had once belonged to
the EPRP. The two groups had cooperated in military
activities for several years, but they had not had a formal
alliance. It was estimated that by the fall of 1989, there
were 2.5 million people in EPDM-controlled areas. The EPDM,
like the TPLF, supported the right of all nationalities to
self-determination and the formation of a democratic state
once the Mengestu regime had been overthrown.
The TPLF and EPDM called their alliance the Ethiopian
People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The EPRDF's
charter borrowed from the TPLF charter. It called for the
establishment of a democratic government, the elimination of
the last vestiges of feudalism and imperialism, the
formation of a genuine people's government based on people's
councils, the guarantee of basic human and civil rights, and
self-determination for all oppressed nationalities.
Subsequently, several other dissident groups, some created
specifically by the EPRDF, also joined the alliance.
By the fall of 1989, the EPRDF had moved from its
strongholds in Tigray, Welo, and Gonder and threatened parts
of northern Shewa. At the time, the force seemed more
capable of pushing back the beleaguered Ethiopian troops
than of setting up any type of permanent political
structures. During a six-week period beginning in August
1989, the EPRDF wounded or captured an estimated 20,000
government soldiers, seized vast stocks of military
hardware, and pushed the battle line between the two sides
down to northern Shewa. In part, these advances were
facilitated by the demoralization of the Ethiopian military
following the abortive coup of May 1989 (see
Regime
Stability and Peace Negotiations, this ch.). Some Ethiopian
troops defected to the opposition, significantly improving
the military capabilities of the EPRDF.
Data as of 1991
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