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Georgia Russia
Of all countries, Georgia's relations with Russia were both
the most important and the most ambivalent. Russia (and
previously the Soviet Union) was deeply involved at many levels
in the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in 1993
Ajarian leaders also declared Russia the protector of their
national interests. Thus Russia seemingly holds the key to a
resolution of those conflicts in a way that would avoid the
fragmentation of Georgia. Trade ties with Russia, disrupted by
Gamsakhurdia's struggle with Gorbachev and by ethnic conflicts on
Georgia's borders with Russia, also are critical to reviving the
Georgian economy.
Russia finally recognized Georgia's independence in mid-1992
and appointed an ambassador in October. In 1993 Russia's official
position was that a stable, independent Georgia was necessary for
security along Russia's southern border. The conditions behind
that position were Russia's need for access to the Black Sea,
which was endangered by shaky relations with Ukraine, the need
for a buffer between Russia and Islamic extremist movements
Russia feared in Turkey and Iran, the need to protect the 370,000
ethnic Russians in Georgia, and the refugee influx and violence
in the Russian Caucasus caused by turmoil across the mountains in
Georgia. Although Shevardnadze was officially well regarded,
Russian nationalists, many of them in the Russian army, wished to
depose him as punishment for his initial refusal to bring Georgia
into the CIS and for his role as the Soviet foreign minister who
"lost" the former Soviet republics in 1991.
In pursuing its official goals, Russia offered mediation of
Georgia's conflicts with the Abkhazian, Ajarian, and Ossetian
minorities, encouraging Georgia to increase the autonomy of those
groups for the sake of national stability. At the same time,
Russian military policy makers openly declared Georgia's
strategic importance to Russian national security. Such
statements raised suspicions that, as in 1801 and 1921, Russia
would take advantage of Georgia's weakened position and sweep the
little republic back into the empire.
Despite the misgivings of his fellow Georgians, in 1993
Shevardnadze pursued talks toward a comprehensive bilateral
Georgian-Russian treaty of friendship. Discussions were
interrupted by surges of fighting in Abkhazia, however, and
relations were cooled by Shevardnadze's claim that Russia was
aiding the secessionist campaign that had begun in August.
In September 1993, the fall of Sukhumi to Abkhazian forces
signaled the crumbling of the Georgian army, and the return of
Gamsakhurdia threatened to split Georgia into several parts.
Shevardnadze, recognizing the necessity of outside military help
to maintain his government, agreed to join the CIS on terms
dictated by Russia in return for protection of government supply
lines by Russian troops. Meanwhile, despite denials by the
Yeltsin government, an unknown number of Russians still gave
"unofficial" military advice and matériel to the Abkhazian
forces, which experts believed would not have posed a major
threat to Tbilisi without such assistance. Shevardnadze defended
CIS membership at home as an absolute necessity for Georgia's
survival as well as a stimulant to increased trade with Russia.
Data as of March 1994
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