|
Georgia National Security
Military forces have played a critical role in Georgian
politics since 1989. In 1991 Georgia's president was overthrown
by military force, and the Shevardnadze regime relied heavily on
the armed forces to stay in power. Warfare in the autonomous
regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as armed
resistance by Gamsakhurdia supporters in western Georgia, have
further emphasized the military's major role in national
security.
The Military Establishment
Almost from its inception, the National Guard became directly
involved in Georgian politics. By 1992 repeated human rights
offenses against Gamsakhurdia supporters brought calls to change
this role. At the same time, the political rivalry between
Ioseliani and Kitovani, the leaders of the Mkhedrioni (horsemen)
and the National Guard, respectively, became one of the key
conflicts in the Georgian government hierarchy, and many
political parties continued to retain private armies in the guise
of armed bodyguards or security teams. Discipline problems in the
ranks of both the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni and their
ineffectiveness as fighting forces led the Georgian government to
plan for a professional army. In April 1992, the State Council
adopted a resolution to form a unified armed force of up to
20,000 soldiers.
At the time the government announced its plans for a
professional army, however, neither existing military group had
sufficient internal discipline to carry out major restructuring.
Efforts to disband the National Guard and Mkhedrioni were delayed
by continued violence in western Georgia, by an attempted coup in
Tbilisi by Gamsakhurdia supporters, and by the political
ambitions of Kitovani and Ioseliani. In May 1992, Kitovani was
designated minister of defense in an effort to bring the National
Guard under central control. Instead, during the following year
Kitovani turned his position into a power center rivaling
Shevardnadze's. In May 1993, Shevardnadze induced Kitovani and
Ioseliani to resign from their powerful positions on the Council
for National Security and Defense, depriving both men of
influence over national security policy and enhancing the stature
of the head of government.
Shevardnadze complained in early 1993 that a unified army had
still not been created. In May the National Guard was abolished
as a separate force, and individual distinguished units received
guard status. In the second half of 1993, however, outside
threats to national security caused Shevardnadze to rely once
again on Ioseliani's paramilitary Mkhedrioni, delaying
consolidation of a national military force. In September
Shevardnadze's control over the military improved when parliament
declared a two-month state of emergency that had the effect of
weakening the Mkhedrioni.
Data as of March 1994
|
