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East Germany Party Congresses
According to SED statutes, the party congress is the supreme
organ of the SED. Since 1971 congresses have been held every five
years, the most recent being the Eleventh Party Congress in April
1986. In theory the party congress sets policy and elects the
leadership, provides a forum for discussing the leadership's
policies, and undertakes activities that serve to legitimize the
party as a mass movement. It is formally empowered to pass both
the Party Program and the Statute, to establish the general party
line, to elect the members of the Central Committee and the
members of the Central Auditing Commission, and to approve the
Central Committee report. Between congresses the Central
Committee may convene a party conference to resolve policy and
personnel issues.
In the spring of 1971, the Eighth Party Congress rolled back
some of the programs associated with the Ulbricht era and
emphasized short-term social and economic problems. The SED used
the occasion to announce its willingness to cooperate with West
Germany and the Soviet Union in helping to solve a variety of
international problems, particularly the future political status
of Berlin. Another major development initiated at the congress
was a strengthening of the Council of Ministers at the expense of
the Council of State; this shift subsequently played an important
role in administering the Main Task program. The SED further
proclaimed that greater emphasis would be devoted to the
development of a "socialist nationalist culture" in which the
role of artists and writers would be increasingly important.
Honecker was more specific about the SED's position toward the
intelligentsia at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee,
where he stated: "As long as one proceeds from the firm position
of socialism, there can in my opinion be no taboos in the field
of art and literature. This applies to questions of content as
well as of style, in short to those questions which constitute
what one calls artistic mastery."
The Ninth Party Congress in May 1976 can be viewed as a
midpoint in the development of SED policy and programs. Most of
the social and economic goals announced at the Eighth Party
Congress had been reached; however, the absence of a definitive
statement on further efforts to improve the working and living
conditions of the population proved to be a source of concern.
The SED sought to redress these issues by announcing, along with
the Council of Ministers and the leadership of the FDGB, a
specific program to increase living standards. The Ninth Party
Congress initiated a hard line in the cultural sphere, which
contrasted with the policy of openness and tolerance enunciated
at the previous congress. Six months after the Ninth Party
Congress, for example, the East German government withdrew
permission for the singer Wolf Biermann to live in East Germany.
The congress also highlighted the fact that East Germany had
achieved international recognition in the intervening years. East
Germany's growing involvement in both the East European economic
system and the global economy reflected its new international
status. This international status and the country's improved
diplomatic and political standing were the major areas stressed
by this congress. The Ninth Party Congress also served as a forum
for examining the future challenges facing the party in domestic
and foreign policy. On the foreign policy front, the major events
were various speeches delivered by representatives of West
European Marxist-Leninist parties, particularly the Italian,
Spanish, and French, all of which expressed in varying ways
ideological differences with the Soviet Union. At the same time,
although allowing different views to be heard, the SED rejected
many of these criticisms in light of its effort to maintain the
special relationship with the Soviet Union emphasized by
Honecker. Another major point of emphasis at the congress was the
issue of inter-German détente. From the East German side, the
benefits were mixed. The East German regime considered economic
benefits as a major advantage, but the party viewed with
misgivings the rapid increase in travel by West Germans to and
through East Germany. Additional problems growing out of the
expanding relationship with West Germany included conflict
between Bonn and East Berlin on the rights and privileges of West
German news correspondents in East Germany; the social unrest
generated by the "two-currency" system, in which East German
citizens who possessed West German D-marks were given the
privilege of purchasing scarce luxury goods at special currency
stores (Intershops); and the ongoing arguments over the issue of
separate citizenship for the two German states, which the SED has
proclaimed but which Bonn as of 1987 had refused to recognize.
During the Ninth Party Congress, the SED also responded to
some of the public excitement and unrest that had emerged in the
aftermath of the signing of the Helsinki Accords, the human
rights documents issued at the meetings of the 1975 Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. Before the congress was
convened, the SED had conducted a "People's Discussion" in order
openly to air public concerns related to East Germany's
responsibility in honoring the final document of the Helsinki
conference.
The Tenth Party Congress, which took place in April l981,
celebrated the status quo; the meeting unanimously re-elected
Honecker to the office of general secretary, and there were no
electoral surprises, as all incumbents except the ailing seventy-
six-year-old Albert Norden were returned to the Politburo and the
Secretariat. The congress highlighted the importance of policies
that had been introduced or stressed at the two previous
congresses and that had dominated East German life during the
1970s. As in the past, Honecker stressed the importance of the
ties to the Soviet Union. In his closing remarks, he stated: "Our
party, the SED, is linked forever with the party of Lenin, [the
CPSU]." A delegation led by Mikhail Suslov, a member of the
Politburo of the CPSU and his party's leading ideologue,
represented the CPSU at the SED congress. Honecker reiterated
earlier positions on the relationship between the two Germanies,
stressing that they are two sovereign states that have developed
along different lines since World War II and that their
differences must be respected by both sides as they continue
efforts toward peaceful coexistence despite membership in
antagonistic alliances. In his speeches, Honecker, along with
other SED officials, devoted greater attention to Third World
countries than he had done in the past. Honecker mentioned the
continually increasing numbers of young people from African,
Asian, and Latin American countries who receive their higher
education in East Germany, and he referred to many thousands of
people in those countries who have been trained as apprentices,
skilled workers, and instructors by teams from East Germany.
The bulk of the Central Committee report delivered at the
opening session of the congress by the general secretary
discussed the economic and social progress made during the five
years since the Ninth Party Congress. Honecker detailed the
increased agricultural and industrial production of the period
and the resultant social progress as, in his words, the country
continued "on the path to socialism and communism." Honecker
called for even greater productivity in the next five years, and
he sought to spur individual initiative and productivity by
recommending a labor policy that would reward the most
meritorious and productive members of society.
The Eleventh Party Congress, held April 17-21, 1986,
unequivocally endorsed the SED and Honecker, whom it confirmed
for another term as party head. The SED celebrated its
achievements as the "most successful party on German soil,"
praised East Germany as a "politically stable and economically
efficient socialist state," and declared its intention to
maintain its present policy course. East Germany's successes,
presented as a personal triumph for Honecker, marked a crowning
point in his political career. Gorbachev's presence at the
congress endorsed Honecker's policy course, which was also
strengthened by some reshuffling of the party leadership.
Overall, the Eleventh Party Congress exhibited confidence in East
Germany's role as the strongest economy and the most stable
country in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev praised the East German
experience as proof that central planning can be effective and
workable in the 1980s.
Official statements on the subject of foreign policy were
mixed, particularly with respect to East Germany's relations with
West Germany and the rest of Western Europe. Honecker's defense
of his policy of "constructive dialogue" appeared in tune with
Gorbachev's own calls for disarmament and détente in Europe.
However, the SED leadership made it unequivocally clear that its
foreign policy, including relations with West Germany, would
remain closely coordinated with Moscow's. Although Honecker's
criticism of West Germany was low key, Gorbachev's was sharp,
attacking Bonn's participation in the United States Strategic
Defense Initiative and the alleged "revanchism" in West Germany.
However, after a final round of talks with Gorbachev, Honecker
signed a hard-line communiqué that openly attacked the policies
of the West German government. Overall, Gorbachev's statements
suggested that the foreign policy emphasis would be on a common
foreign policy adhered to by all members of the Warsaw Pact under
Soviet direction. Until the Eleventh Party Congress, East German
leaders had maintained that small and medium states had a
significant role to play in international affairs. As a result of
Soviet pressure, such statements have disappeared from East
German commentary on foreign policy.
Günther Tschacher, an official in the Academy of Social
Sciences of the SED Central Committee, echoed the new thinking on
domestic policy in a West German interview, when he remarked that
although the SED is enthusiastic about Gorbachev's reforms in the
Soviet Union, it does not necessarily consider these applicable
to East Germany. Tschacher flatly rejected the notion that the
Soviet Union's new course is necessarily relevant for East
Germany, stating that this would "run counter to the independent
policy of each party." He claimed it had become an established
fact that "each party develops its policy independently."
Data as of July 1987
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