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East Germany Determinants of Policy Toward the Soviet Union
In the mid-1980s, close working relations between the Soviet
Union and East Germany were based less on personality factors (as
had been the case during the Ulbricht era) and more on structural
considerations that increasingly linked the two countries
together. The emergence of East Germany as a diplomatic and
political force was in large measure an outcome of Soviet détente
policies toward the West. However, these same détente policies,
at least toward West Germany, found allies in the very highest
circles of the SED elite, who wished to continue them despite the
cooling of superpower relations in the early and mid-1980s. East
Germany has demonstrated an ability to collaborate effectively
with its larger partner across a range of issues. Several basic
determinants will play crucial roles in defining the potential as
well as the limitations of this relationship.
In the mid-1980s, a potential source of trouble in the East
German-Soviet relationship lay in the SED leadership's
unwillingness to emulate Gorbachev's economic and political
reform program. The East German regime treats Gorbachev's reform
program with caution and argues that because of East Germany's
economic successes of the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet economic
reforms are not relevant to its own situation. In a February 1987
meeting with Soviet foreign minister Edward Shevardnadze,
Honecker was reported to have said that "the good [economic]
balance of the year 1986 presents a solid basis for the further
dynamic development of the [East German] economy." The East
German regime fears that Soviet political reforms, which include
Gorbachev's calls for glasnost,' or openness, and the use
of the secret ballot and nomination of rival candidates for party
elections, will lead to social unrest if applied in East Germany.
The relationship between East Germany and the Soviet Union
will be influenced by the evolution of inter-German relations. In
the mid-1980s, inter-German ties created strains in the East
German-Soviet relationship. In the early and mid-1980s, despite
the decline in superpower détente because of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, the declaration of martial law in Poland, and the
stationing of United States intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs) in West Germany, the Honecker regime sought to maintain
good relations with the Bonn government. The Soviet Union was
particularly upset with the West German decision to allow
deployment of Pershing II missiles on its soil. The Soviet
Union's inability to dissuade West Germany from stationing
American missiles led to a deterioration of Soviet-West German
relations. Yet, for economic and political reasons, the Honecker
regime sought to insulate inter-German relations from this
broader international conflict. Economically, in the 1980s East
Germany's average annual intake of West German hard currency visa
fees, minimum exchange rate revenues, and private transfers
amounted to US$1 billion per year. Politically, the East Germans
argued that the smaller powers could play a role in building
bridges between NATO and the Warsaw Pact when the superpowers
found themselves in conflict. The discord between East Berlin and
Moscow led to open disagreements. The traditionally maverick
Hungarians backed East Germany, while East Berlin's nominal
hardline ally in Warsaw Pact affairs, Czechoslovakia, along with
Poland, supported the Soviet Union. In September 1984, the
disagreement culminated in Honecker's indefinite postponement of
a planned visit to West Germany.
East Germany's active presence in the Third World will
continue to make the prospect of cooperation with the Soviet
Union an attractive one for both partners. Indeed, the value of
that presence in this turbulent arena was consistently
demonstrated throughout the early and mid-1980s. Because
especially close working relationships with a number of MarxistLeninist countries in Africa have been established, the potential
for increased Soviet-East German, as well as Cuban, collaboration
in the late 1980s was substantial. The result could be a greater
degree of operational independence in the global arena than East
Germany has enjoyed in the past.
Finally, the economic intercourse between the Soviet Union
and East Germany represents another important sphere of activity
with long-run implications for the overall relationship. It
should be emphasized that the magnitude of the economic links
binding the two systems is impressive and clearly dwarfs anything
achieved by the two German states in their commercial dealings
with each other.
East Germany and the Soviet Union are bound together in a
vast network of bilateral and multilateral agreements to share
technology and industrial production. A trade agreement between
the two countries, signed in 1985, calls for trade turnover to
increase 28 percent over the 1986-90 plan period
(see Foreign Trade
, ch. 3). However, higher energy costs represent a potential
source of friction between the two partners. The Soviet Union has
imposed artificially low prices on imports from its Comecon
partners and has demanded premium prices for the energy products
that it exports to them
(see Comecon, Appendix B).
In light of
the significant dependence on the Soviet Union for raw materials,
such practices are undoubtedly troublesome for East German
leaders.
Data as of July 1987
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