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East Germany Public Attitudes on National Identity
The extent to which East German citizens have developed a
separate national identity is difficult to determine. Generally
proof for and against an emerging East German national
consciousness is based on the impressions of journalists or
scholars who have traveled to East Germany and on a handful of
opinion polls and survey samples of questionable reliability.
Those who believe that a new national consciousness has
developed or is developing argue that the building of the Berlin
Wall forced East Germans to come to terms with political
realities and either passively accept the regime or actively seek
a place within the system. Meanwhile the economic success of the
1960s and early 1970s gave the people a sense of pride in certain
socialist accomplishments. These included an educational system
considered to be one of the finest in the world, a package of
social services and programs that was relatively impressive, job
security, and a standard of living that topped that of other East
European countries. Given the acute shortage of labor, many
opportunities were available for the person with the "proper"
socialist credentials, and those who proved their political
loyalty were amply rewarded. Most important, a new generation of
East Germans had gradually replaced the older generation. Close
to half the population in the mid-1980s had been born since 1945
and close to a quarter since 1960. These young East Germans have
been exposed only to communist rule. They have not been allowed
to interact extensively with their counterparts in West Germany.
And they have been the object of an intensive socialization
campaign beginning in the schools and youth groups and continuing
through the work organizations.
Opinion polls and surveys to some extent have supported the
impressionistic accounts of an emerging national consciousness.
Many of the polls from the 1960s revealed that the population
showed growing support or loyalty to the regime. Many people felt
that they were materially better off since the construction of
the Wall. Those under forty years of age were most likely to
consider East Germany an independent state and to favor
recognition by West Germany.
An equally compelling case can be built, however, against the
emergence of a distinctive national consciousness among the East
Germans. Proponents of this view refer to the fragility of a
loyalty based solely on material well-being. Any worsening of the
economic outlook is likely to have a negative impact on popular
attitudes toward the regime. Despite official encouragement to
measure its own well-being against that of other socialist bloc
countries, the population continues to compare its standard of
living with that of the people of West Germany, where the quality
of life continues to be noticeably higher.
In addition, East Germans have no freedom to choose the
political system under which they must live, a fact that
undoubtedly colors many citizens' view of the regime. Every year
hundreds of persons risk their lives in attempts to escape to the
West. The presence of Soviet troops is a constant reminder of
dependence on the Soviet Union. Although travel restrictions
eased in the 1970s, East German students and the economically
active were in the mid-1980s, for all intents and purposes,
denied travel to the West except under the strictest of controls,
and internal restrictions were placed on citizen contacts with
visitors from the West.
In the mid-1980s, common influences on national consciousness
continued to exist. East Germans have easy access to Western
media, particularly West German television, and the influx of
Western visitors since the early 1970s has ensured that at least
some sense of a common German identity would be preserved.
Public opinion polls and surveys can be cited to support the
arguments of those who believe that as of the mid-1980s a
distinct East German national consciousness has not yet been
achieved. A study from the late 1970s, for example, found that
about 80 percent of the citizens considered themselves part of an
all-German nation. Another poll found that over one-half
supported eventual unification and that such support was
strongest among the young. A poll from 1975 refuted earlier
surveys from the 1960s that claimed East Germans were beginning
to evince a growing loyalty toward the regime. Like the earlier
polls, the 1975 study found that just over 60 percent considered
themselves loyal citizens; moreover, only a quarter of the sample
claimed to be strongly loyal, while just over a third claimed
they had merely accommodated prevailing conditions. The remainder
were either opposed or indifferent to the regime. Another poll
revealed that some three-fourths of the population supported
closer contacts between East Germany and West Germany.
In the mid-1980s, the debate over the deployment of
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe led to the
reinforcement of an all-German sentiment in East Germany. This
debate led citizens of East Germany and West Germany to feel that
they had a special role to play in preventing the outbreak of
war. However, this feeling of pan-German sentiment was
essentially reactive in nature, that is, it was bound up with the
specific circumstances of the missile deployment. In general the
evidence suggested that East Germans recognized that they were
citizens of a separate state but also considered themselves part
of a larger German community that included those living in both
Germanies.
Data as of July 1987
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