Haiti Foreign Assistance
Foreign assistance played a critical role in the
economy. As
the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, Haiti was
the
recipient of economic assistance from numerous
multilateral and
bilateral development agencies and more than 300
nongovernmental
foreign organizations. Some analysts went so far as to
call the
development community in Haiti a shadow government because
overseas funding contributed as much as 70 percent of
spending on
economic and social development and 40 percent of the
national
budget. This situation was largely a legacy of the
Duvalier
governments, which conserved spending on development
projects by
soliciting generous foreign-aid commitments. Nevertheless,
per
capita foreign economic assistance to Haiti continued to
be well
below the level of assistance in most other Caribbean and
Central
American nations, as a consequence of the government's
weak
commitment, minimal counterpart funding, ineffectual
public
institutions, and history of corruption.
The United States was the most important source of
bilateral
economic assistance, and it was the only country that
maintained
a resident aid mission. United States economic assistance
to
Haiti began in 1944, only three years after the last
economic
advisers of the occupation departed. This assistance ended
when
United States president John F. Kennedy terminated all but
humanitarian aid to the François Duvalier government in
1963.
Consequently, Haiti did not participate in the Alliance
for
Progress (the Latin American development program initiated
under
the Kennedy administration and continued under the
administration
of Lyndon B. Johnson). United State assistance resumed in
1973
under Jean-Claude Duvalier, and it continued until January
1986,
a month before the end of the Duvalier era. The United
States
restored aid in unprecedented amounts three weeks after
Duvalier's exile, but the administration of President
Ronald
Reagan again severed nonhumanitarian aid flows after the
electoral violence of November 1987. Development
assistance was
resumed in the late 1980s, but it continued to be tied to
progress toward fair elections.
AID's major goals in Haiti were to improve rural
conditions
through soil conversion, agro-forestry, and watershed
management;
to augment the country's human resources through increased
nutrition, family planning, and educational opportunities;
and to
foster economic policy reform aimed at private-sector
development
and export promotion. AID also pursued narcotics
interdiction,
migration control, and political reform. In 1982 AID began
to
channel an increasing percentage of its assistance through
nongovernmental organizations rather than through
Haitianministries. The United States had legislated this
policy
shift through the 1981 Foreign Assistance Act. Canada,
West
Germany and other foreign donors also decided to
circumvent
government agencies in favor of nongovernmental
organizations.
This approach proved so much more efficient and effective
that,
by the late 1980s, AID distributed all of its humanitarian
aid
through a network of nongovernmental institutions.
The Inter-American Foundation and the Peace Corps also
supported the United States development effort in Haiti.
The
Peace Corps entered the country in 1983, after more than a
decade
of negotiations. Political instability in 1988 and 1989,
however,
led to the dismissal of the Corps' volunteers. Other
foreign
donors included Belgium, Canada, France, Israel, Italy,
Japan,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, West Germany, and Taiwan.
Multilateral development agencies underwrote most major
infrastructural projects, and they financed most payment
shortfalls during the 1970s and the 1980s. The IMF was the
most
influential multilateral agency in the country. Since the
early
1950s, Haiti had signed more than twenty standby
agreements--more
than any other member country--with the IMF. The IMF in
1988 made
Haiti a test case for its Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility, a special financing arrangement reserved for
only the
poorest countries. The World Bank, the supplier of
one-quarter of
multilateral aid in the late 1980s, lent extensively for
highways, electricity, education, institution building,
and
policy reform. Beginning in the early 1960s, the IDB
approved
more than US$300 million for improved irrigation, rural
water
systems, public health, and road construction. Other
multilaterals included several other United Nations (UN)
agencies, the European Economic Community, the
Organization of
American States, and the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting
Countries.
A 1985 survey of nongovernmental organizations in Haiti
revealed that one-third of these organizations had arrived
in the
country before 1960. Many had come in response to
Hurricane Hazel
in 1954. Nongovernmental organizations reportedly donated
as much
as US$65 million in annual assistance, food aid, other
goods, and
project financing.
Some Haitian officials complained about the lack of
coordination among nongovernmental organizations.
Partially in
response to this criticism, AID in 1981 financed the
creation of
an umbrella nongovernmental organization, the Haitian
Association
of Voluntary Agencies (HAVA), to share ideas, technology,
and
lessons learned. By 1989 HAVA included over 100 members.
The case for supporting Haiti's economic development
was
indisputable. Haiti had the potential for development. The
government and the urban elite had failed, however, to tap
the
strengths of the nation's hard-working people, except in
an
exploitive fashion. Development problems in Haiti were, in
many
ways, political rather than economic. Politics exacerbated
the
country's economic and ecological problems, but the
resourcefulness of the people and the prospect of
political
change provided some hope. The many small successes of the
hundreds of nongovernmental organizations that worked with
rural
residents to improve their status was proof that better
economic
management and determined efforts could make a difference.
***
Compared with research on Haiti's history, politics,
and
security, the volume of literature on the nation's economy
is
modest. Nonetheless, the small group of scholars that
concentrate
on Haiti are dedicated and well-informed. Many of the most
important studies on the economy in recent years have been
funded
by AID in Port-au-Prince, notably Agriculture Sector
Assessment: Haiti, by Marguerite Blemur, et al.; "Land
Tenure
Issues in Rural Haiti," by Peter Bloch, et al.; and
Haiti:
Country Environmental Profile, by Marko Ehrlich, et
al. Other
major works on agriculture include Mats Lundahl's The
Haitian
Economy: Man, Land, and Markets, which previously
appeared in
French. "Foreign Assembly in Haiti," by Joseph Grunwald,
et al.,
and Le Système Bancaire Haïtien: Fonctionnement et
Perspectives, by Charles A. Beaulieu, are the
definitive
works on their respective topics. More general
publications that
merit recognition are Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal's
Haiti:
Political Failures, Cultural Successes and Simon
Fass's
Political Economy in Haiti. Haiti's Future,
edited
by Richard M. Morse, reveals the views of twelve Haitian
leaders
on the post-Duvalier era. The Bank of the Republic of
Haiti
publishes the most current available statistics through
its
annual reports and monthly bulletins. The Ministry of
Economy and
Finance's Haitian Institute for Statistics and Information
(République d'Haïti, Ministére del l'Economic et Des
Finances)
provides the most comprehensive data by means of
Recueil des
Statistiques de Base and other publications. The World
Bank,
the IMF, AID, and the IDB compile the best data on Haiti
outside
the island. (For further information and complete
citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of December 1989
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