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Haiti Army Politics: Force and Counterforce
The Haitian army has traditionally played the role of
political arbiter. The precedent for this role can be
traced to
eighteenth-century colonial Saint-Domingue. The early
leaders of
Haiti established strong military rule during the
revolutionary
period (1791-1804). The leading general of the revolution,
François-Dominique Toussaint Louverture, declared himself
the
French governor-for-life in the preindependence
constitution of
1801
(see Toussaint Louverture
, ch. 6;
The Military in Haitian History
, ch. 10). The French Revolution also affected
events in
Haiti. At the time that Haiti achieved independence,
France was
ruled by Napoléon Bonaparte, a preeminent military figure
who
eventually declared himself emperor. Jean-Jacques
Dessalines, the
first Haitian head of state, was also a victorious general
who
declared himself emperor. From 1804 to 1913, almost all
Haitian
heads of state were military officers. Military occupation
by the
United States (1915-34) served to reinforce the central
role of
military power in society
(see The United States Occupation, 1915-34
, ch. 6).
The army clearly exercised its power, as the supreme
arbiter
of political destinies, during the political succession of
François Duvalier in 1957. At that point, however, history
took a
different turn. By 1962, Duvalier had effectively
undermined the
authority of the regular army by legitimizing the
tonton
makouts as a paramilitary counterforce, the VSN. The
VSN,
devoted to maintaining power and repressing political
opposition,
was considerably larger than the army; it consisted
primarily of
rural dwellers.
Duvalier's ability to maintain power can be attributed
largely to his neutralization of the military as an
independent
political force. The idea of a paramilitary counterforce
also had
historical precedent. Soulouque made effective use of the
zinglins, precursors to the tonton makouts.
During
his presidential campaign, François Duvalier organized a
private
paramilitary group known as cagoulards (hooded
men).
For years the VSN has had a strong base of support in
rural
Haiti; from the same segments of the population that
filled the
ranks of the irregular military forces known as
cacos and
piquets during the pre-occupation era
(see Decades of Instability, 1843-1915
, ch. 6). Duvalier's decision to
legitimize
the VSN was clever, partly because it co-opted
disenfranchised
groups into the established political system at relatively
little
cost to the regime. Militia members were volunteers who
were even
willing to pay fees to local VSN commanders for permission
to
join the force. Volunteers were familiar with the VSN's
opportunities for personal gain through corruption. To
raise
money, local VSN commanders periodically disbanded their
units
and recruited new members who would pay to join the force.
Forces that countered military power were set up within
the
military itself at certain points in Haiti's history.
President
Sténio Vincent (1930-41) first created a presidential
guard in
the 1930s, and he had heavy weapons brought into the
presidential
palace. This guard helped Vincent maintain power for
eleven
years; it played a key role in the political fates of all
of
Vincent's successors. The Leopards Corps, created by
Jean-Claude
Duvalier in the 1970s, represented yet another variant of
a
specialized army corps assigned the responsibilities of
maintaining presidential power and discouraging coups
d'état.
More recently, Avril's core of support also lay clearly
within the Presidential Guard. As of mid-1989, Avril had
not
fully consolidated his power base, and contenders vied for
his
position as military chief of state. Avril was also forced
to
contend with army and nonmilitary groups linked to the
tonton
makouts. The tonton makouts, although abolished
in
1986, were never effectively disbanded. They continued to
play a
leading role in the politics of the army, and they,
together with
the Duvalierists, appeared to represent the central
obstacle to
Avril's consolidation of power. Ironically, these were the
same
people to whom he owed personal and political debts.
Data as of December 1989
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