Honduras Civilian Democratic Rule
In the decade since Honduras returned to civilian
democratic
rule in 1982, the political system has undergone notable
changes.
Hondurans successfully elected three civilian presidents
in the
1980s, and elections came to be celebrated in an almost
holidaylike atmosphere, similar to the electoral process in Costa
Rica. In
1993 the nation was again gearing up for national
elections in
November, with conservative Osvaldo Ramos Soto of the PNH
squaring
off against Carlos Roberto Reina, leader of a leftist
faction of
the PLH. Although remaining a powerful factor in the
political
system, the military is increasingly facing challenges
from
civilians who are beginning to hold it responsible for
involvement
in human rights violations.
Nevertheless, many observers have noted that although
Honduras
has held regular elections and has begun to hold the
military
accountable, the nation still faces numerous political
challenges,
most notably reforming the administration of justice so
that both
military and civilian elites can be held accountable for
their
actions, realizing civilian control over the military, and
rooting
out corruption from government.
The human rights situation deteriorated significantly
in the
first few years of civilian rule, when the military, under
the
command of General Gustavo Álvarez Martínez, initiated a
campaign
against leftists that led to the disappearance of more
than 100
people. Small insurgent groups also began operating during
this
period, but the overwhelming majority of political
killings were
carried out by the military. Although this violence paled
in
comparison to the violence in neighboring El Salvador and
Guatemala, it marked a departure from the relatively
tranquil
Honduran political environment. Beginning in 1985,
political
violence declined significantly but did not completely
disappear;
a small number of extrajudicial killings continued to be
reported
annually for the balance of the 1980s and early 1990s. In
July 1988
and January 1989, when the Honduran government was held
responsible
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) for
the 1982
disappearances of Ángel Manfredo Velásquez and Saúl
Godínez,
Honduran authorities were also held responsible by the
court for a
deliberate kidnapping campaign of between 100 and 150
individuals
believed to be tied to subversive activities between 1981
and 1984.
In the early 1990s, as the political conflicts in El
Salvador
and Nicaragua were abating, the Honduran public
increasingly began
to criticize the military for human rights violations,
including a
number of political and other types of extrajudicial
killings. One
case that ignited a public outcry against the military was
the July
1991 rape, torture, and murder of an eighteen-year old
student,
Riccy Mabel Martínez, by military members. Initially, the
military
would not allow the civilian courts to try the three
suspects, but
ultimately the military discharged the suspects from the
military
so as not to set the precedent of military members being
tried in
civilian courts. After a long drawn out process, two of
the
suspects, including a former colonel, were convicted of
the crime
in July 1993, marking the first time that a high-ranking
officer,
even though no longer in the military, was prosecuted in
the
civilian courts.
Observers credit former United States Ambassador
Cresencio
Arcos with speaking out promptly on the case and urging
the
Honduran government to prosecute it through an open
judicial
process. In fact, the United States embassy increasingly
has been
viewed as a champion for human rights in Honduras, and its
human
rights reports in the early 1990s were considerably more
critical
than those prepared in the 1980s.
Although Honduras has experienced more than a decade of
civilian
democratic rule, some observers maintain that the military
is still
the most powerful political player in the country. Its
disregard
for civilian authority is demonstrated by the military's
immunity
from prosecution for human rights violations. In early
1993, after
the military received considerable public criticism for
alleged
involvement in the killing of a businessperson in San
Pedro Sula in
January 1993, military forces were deployed in both San
Pedro Sula
and in the capital. Rumors abounded about the true
intention of the
deployment, reportedly made without the knowledge of
President
Callejas. Some observers speculated that armed forces
chief,
General Luis Alonso Discua Elvir, took the action to
intimidate his
opponents and stem a barrage of recent criticism against
the
military. President Callejas later announced that he had
ordered
the deployment as one of a series of actions to deter
criminal
violence.
Some critics maintain that President Callejas should
have been
more forceful with the military and attempted to assert
more
civilian control during his presidency, particularly when
the
military tried to impede the prosecution of the Riccy
Martínez
case. Some maintain that Callejas himself had close ties
with
General Discúa, thus explaining why no strong civilian
action was
taken against the military. Others, however, maintain that
Callejas
substantially improved civilian control over the military
with the
establishment of such commissions as the Ad Hoc Commission
for
Institutional Reform, which recommended the breakup of the
National
Investigations Department, and the creation of a new
Department of
Criminal Investigation (Departamento de Investigación
Criminal--
DIC) within the civilian government.
A growing concern of the business sector in the early
1990s was
the military's increasing involvement in private
enterprise.
Through its Military Pension Institute (Instituto de
Pensión
Militar--IPM), the military acquired numerous enterprises,
including the nation's largest cement factory, a bank, a
real
estate agency, cattle ranches, a radio station, and a
funeral home.
Critics maintain that the military has a competitive
advantage in
a number of areas because of certain benefits derived from
its
status, such as the ability to import items duty free.
According to some observers, a fundamental problem
associated
with the Honduran political system is the almost
institutionalized
corruption found within its ranks. Analysts maintain that
the
primary motivation of politicians in Honduras is personal
interest;
bribery (la mordida) is a common or
institutionalized
practice. Publicized instances of corruption are found
throughout
the political system, in all branches of government, and
some
observers maintain that Hondurans have come to expect this
of their
politicians. As noted by Mark B. Rosenberg, political
power in
Honduras is defined by one's ability to convert public
authority
into private advantage. Some analysts contend that
corruption is
literally a necessity to govern effectively in Honduras.
Former
United States ambassador Cresencio Arcos notes that "there
is more
than a kernel of truth in the Latin American cliché, a
deal for my
friend, the law for my enemies."
Some observers maintain that the Callejas government
moderated
corrupt practices, as demonstrated by the creation of the
Fiscal
Intervention Commission that turned its attention to
investigating
extensive corruption in the Customs Directorate. Others
maintain
that the commission was a smokescreen to give the
appearance that
the government was doing something to root out corruption,
when in
fact the Callejas government was saturated with
corruption, and
personal enrichment was the norm. The issue of corruption
is a
theme in the 1993 presidential campaign of PLH candidate
Carlos
Roberto Reina, who has pledged a moral revolution to
punish those
public officials enriching themselves through corruption.
Data as of December 1993
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