Hungary Introduction
Unavailable
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Hungary, 1989
THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC came into existence in
1949 when,
with Soviet support, the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP)
eliminated the last of its rivals and proclaimed the
country a
"people's democracy." The proclamation of the Hungarian
People's
Republic was part of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin's plan
to
enforce total Soviet domination over the countries in
Eastern
Europe that Soviet armies had occupied in their war
against Nazi
Germany.
Like other countries in Eastern Europe, Hungary was
completely Sovietized. The Constitution of 1949
established the
leading role of the HWP in all aspects of Hungarian life.
In
turn, the HWP took its orders from Stalin. Hungary was
also
forced to adopt the Soviet model in its economy and
society.
Hungary embarked on an ambitious drive to industrialize
its
economy, and the new regime collectivized agriculture. The
property of the prewar ruling classes was expropriated,
and the
regime undertook a reign of terror against its perceived
political enemies, who eventually included a number of
prominent
communists. The Hungarian military was subordinated to the
Soviet
military, and the regime established a large secret police
force,
which answered to Moscow, not Budapest.
On October 23, 1989, the Hungarian People's Republic
came to
an end. Acting President Matyas Szuros proclaimed the new
republic: "As provisional president of our Republic, I
greet...
the citizens of our country, our friends abroad. I
ceremonially
announce that, with the declaration of the Constitution
amended
by the National Assembly, as from today, October 23, 1989,
our
country's state form and name is the Republic of Hungary."
New
amendments to the Constitution asserted "the values of
both
bourgeois democracy and democratic socialism," eliminated
the
clause of the Constitution that established the leading
role of
the communist party in government and society, and
proclaimed a
regime based on the rule of law. These new amendments
followed
the Fourteenth Party Congress of the Hungarian Socialist
Workers'
Party (HSWP--the Hungarian Workers' Party had been renamed
the
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on November 1, 1956),
in which
the party split between reformers and conservatives. Out
of this
congress, which had convened October 6, a new party
emerged--the
Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP)--which was modeled on the
socialist parties of Western Europe and was designed to
operate
within a multiparty system. Thus, in 1989 Hungary
experienced a
political transformation. With Poland, it was in the
forefront of
communist countries attempting to reform their polity,
economy,
and social relations.
A number of internal economic and social factors led to
the
crisis that brought about this transformation. A Soviet
leadership itself attempting to carry through far-reaching
reforms allowed Hungary to implement radical reforms. The
example
of wide-ranging political and economic reforms in Poland
also
spurred Hungary's leaders to action.
The economic crisis had been brewing since the
mid-1970s.
Beginning in 1973, world oil prices rose precipitously,
having a
devastating effect on Hungary, which was almost completely
dependent on foreign energy suppliers, mainly the Soviet
Union.
Hungary's leaders responded to higher energy prices with a
plan
to accelerate economic growth and launched a number of
major
economic projects, but they could not carry them out
efficiently.
These efforts were designed to produce goods that could be
exported in return for energy. Moreover, spending on
consumption
and investment also rose. To cover the costs of energy,
consumption, and investment, Hungary borrowed from abroad,
but,
because its exports were unable to cover the costs of its
hard-
currency borrowings, the country ran up a large foreign
currency
deficit. Conservatives in the leadership used these
problems to
win support for the reversal of economic reforms that had
been
instituted in the late 1960s.
Similar problems arose in the late 1970s. Again, world
energy
prices rose, and Western banks limited the flow of credits
as a
result of the crackdown on the Solidarity labor movement
in
Poland and the insolvency in Romania. Increases in
interest rates
caused problems for Hungary's balance of payments.
Hungary joined the International Monetary Fund
(IMF--see Glossary) and the
World Bank (see Glossary) in 1982. These
institutions compelled Hungary to introduce a new
stabilization
program, which called for reductions in spending on
investment
and consumption. By 1985 spending on investment was 21.8
percent
less than it had been in 1981. Prices also rose. The Sixth
Five-
Year Plan (1981-85) called for economic growth of 14
percent to
17 percent over the previous plan period, but in fact
growth rose
only 7 percent. Industrial production increased a mere 12
percent, although the plan called for growth of 19 percent
to 22
percent. Exports were to rise 37 to 39 percent but in fact
rose
only 27 percent.
Performance fell far short of the plan in the late
1980s as
well. In 1986 national income, industrial production, and
agricultural production did not meet the levels called for
in the
plan. In 1987 the economy fared somewhat better, but in
1988
inflation far exceeded the rate for the previous year.
Hungary's
foreign currency debt rose from US$8.6 billion in 1985 to
US$18
billion by December 1987.
In 1989 the country's economic problems continued. By
the end
of 1989, Hungary had a state budget deficit of
approximately 62.2
billion forints (for value of the
forint--see Glossary),
more
than three times the planned budget deficit of 19.5
billion
forints. The foreign debt stood at US$20 billion. Hungary
had to
cut its deficit or forego the last installment of a loan
it had
obtained from the IMF in May 1988. Inflation continued as
well.
Wages rose 12 to 13 percent rather than the planned 6 to 7
percent. Prices rose 15 to 16 percent rather than the
planned 12
to 15 percent. From January through September 1989,
industrial
production was only 98.4 percent of what it had been
during the
same period in 1988. Outputs of the manufacturing sector
fell 5.1
percent. Exports rose by about 22 percent in 1989, but the
need
to increase exports to the West forced enterprises to
forego
profitability in the interests of earning hard currency.
As a
result, bills owed to Hungarian firms went unpaid. In 1989
domestic debt stood at 950 billion forints.
Society felt the effects of the country's economic
problems.
To make ends meet, most Hungarians had to work very hard;
in many
cases, they worked more than one job. Western analysts
estimated
that between 25 and 40 percent of the population lived
below the
poverty level (about 5,200 forints per month). Average
monthly
wages were a mere 6,000 forints. Official statistics
classed
between 1.5 million and 3 million people (out of a
population of
10.6 million) as "socially poor." This group included a
large
share of retired persons, about half of families with two
children, and 70 to 90 percent of families with three or
more
children. Single heads of households and people working on
less
productive collective farms or living on isolated
homesteads were
also likely to be living below the poverty line.
Economic problems took their toll on the family. In the
1980s, every third marriage ended in divorce, and single
parents
headed about 12 percent of all families. In addition to
the heavy
work load needed to achieve a decent standard of living,
another
source of strain on the family was the shortage of
housing,
especially for young families. Having reduced its direct
role in
the provision of housing, the government encouraged
private
individuals to construct their own homes. By the late
1980s, most
new housing units were privately constructed, but the
country had
a long way to go to meet the housing needs of its
citizens.
In 1989 the government took steps to solve these
problems. In
contrast to the Soviet reaction to the 1956 uprising in
Hungary
and the 1968 Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, when it
invaded
these countries to ensure continued communist party
domination,
the Soviet Union in 1989 announced support for Hungary's
political and economic reform efforts. Such reforms
included the
introduction of a capitalist market economy and the
emergence of
a multiparty system, anathema to the old communist system.
In addition, Hungary could count on Poland to join it
in a
proreform bloc within the
Warsaw Pact alliance (see Glossary). In
June 1989, the first free elections in the history of
postwar
Eastern Europe took place in Poland. These elections
eventually
brought to power a Solidarity-led government that intended
to
institute many of the same political and economic reforms
in
Poland that Hungary's leaders, as well as Hungary's
opposition
groups, envisaged for their country. In late 1989, the
reform
bloc within the Warsaw Pact was strengthened as the German
Democratic Republic (East Germany), Bulgaria, and
Czechoslovakia
began their own reform efforts.
Although the most important steps toward creating a
democracy
were taken in late 1989, the effort actually began with a
number
of measures in the first half of the year. On January 11,
1989,
the National Assembly passed laws on associations and
assembly,
the first in a series of steps aimed at introducing a
multiparty
system in Hungary. On March 15, 1989, for the first time
in
postwar history, the government allowed commemoration of
the
anniversary of the 1848 revolt against the Habsburg
Empire. About
100,000 people attended the demonstration in Budapest, and
smaller demonstrations took place throughout the country.
The
demonstrators called for government recognition of civil
and
political rights and political pluralism. Shortly
thereafter,
Imre Mecs, a member of the dissident Committee for
Historical
Justice, said that a return to the old ways of ruling the
country
would be very difficult "after hundreds of thousands of
people
throughout the country have shouted out demands for their
rights." On March 22, 1989, the National Assembly passed a
law
that granted the right to strike (although within strictly
defined limits).
The reburial of Imre Nagy and his associates on June 16
marked the most important symbolic break with Hungary's
past in
the first half of 1989. Most Hungarians had never accepted
the
regime's verdict that the events of 1956 represented a
counterrevolution against Marxism-Leninism. The massive
attendance at the reburial and the millions who watched
the
events on television showed that Hungarians rejected the
regime
that had been placed in power by Soviet troops in 1956.
The media were becoming more open as a consequence of
the
reforms. In late 1988, a number of independent
publications had
been established, including Kapu (Gate), which had
a
circulation of more than 35,000 by January 1989;
Reform,
part of a joint venture with media magnate Axel Springer's
conglomerate in the Federal Republic of Germany (West
Germany),
which by early 1989 had a circulation of 256,000; and
Hitel (Credit), which covered social and political
issues
and literature.
It was the HSWP that set the stage for more profound
changes.
Party leaders Imre Pozsgay and Rezsö Nyers sought to
manage the
country's severe economic, social, and political problems
by
sharing power with organizations representing other
sectors of
the population. Indeed, the party's reformist wing--which
was
headed by Pozsgay and Nyers--had accepted the ideas and
program
of the opposition.
The strength of the reformers became apparent at a
February
10, 1989, plenum of the Central Committee of the HSWP. At
that
plenum, the party set as its goal the achievement of
popular
sovereignty and a constitutional state. At a February 20
plenum,
the party Central Committee approved a draft of a new
constitution that contained no clause on the leading role
of the
party. At its March 1989 plenum, the party Central
Committee came
out in support of a multiparty system, free elections, and
independent trade unions; recognized certain individual
freedoms;
and called for the creation of a state governed by a
democratic
socialist constitution and characterized by an independent
judiciary, representative democracy, and depoliticized
military.
The party's new Action Program "offered cooperation and
agreement
on national issues of vital importance to all citizens and
organizations that think in a progressive manner and
accept
responsibility for the country." In line with its changed
outlook, the Central Committee gave up its
nomenklatura
(see Glossary) authority. According to one party
spokesman, this
right had become "obsolete." Indeed, on May 10, 1989, the
National Assembly approved a government reshuffle
involving five
ministers and one state secretary with ministerial rank.
Chairman
of the Council of Ministers Miklos Nemeth himself, rather
than
the Central Committee of the HSWP, selected the new
officials.
The Central Committee also outlined a reform program
for the
economy. At its February 10 plenum, the Central Committee
determined to end the country's "economic, political, and
moral
crisis" by creating a market economy based on mixed
ownership. On
May 4, 1989, the Central Committee released its "Proposal
for a
Three-Year Transformation and Stabilization Program,"
which
called for opening up Hungary to world markets and trade
and
maintaining the country's solvency and creditworthiness.
The
proposal advocated a change from state ownership to stock
companies and limited partnerships and "the sale of
state-owned
[enterprises] to foreigners and private individuals."
State
subsidies to enterprises would be drastically reduced. The
proposal stressed the importance of small- and
medium-sized
companies. For agriculture, the proposal advocated private
ownership, easy lease terms, and the purchase of land by
private
individuals.
The new legislation on political parties and the
liberalized
atmosphere in the country led to the formation of many new
political parties. Indeed, with the decisions made by the
HSWP in
the late winter of 1988 and spring of 1989, it was clear
that the
HSWP was taking many aspects of its own reform program
from the
programs of other parties and organizations promoting
fundamental
political and economic changes. Many of these parties were
not
altogether new, however; they were revivals of historical
parties
that had been disbanded in the late 1940s. Other parties
were
indeed new, formed largely by dissident intellectuals and
students.
The first historical party to reemerge after years of
inactivity was the Independent Smallholders' Party, which
was
refounded in November 1988. In August 1989, the
Smallholders had
an estimated 6,000 members grouped into 230 chapters. The
party
called for privatization of the economy and free
enterprise;
returning land to the peasants from whom it had been
seized
during Hungary's campaign to collectivize agriculture in
the late
1940s; free elections in a pluralistic multiparty
political
system; and a new constitution that would include a clause
establishing Hungary's neutrality.
Another historical party that reestablished itself was
the
Hungarian Independence Party, which was refounded on April
24,
1989. The members of the original Hungarian Independence
Party
had broken with the Smallholders' Party in 1947 because
they
believed that the Smallholders were too willing to
cooperate with
the Hungarian Communist Party. In 1989 the main political
goal of
the Hungarian Independence Party was "the purest
democracy." It
advocated government recognition of individual political
and
civil rights; the removal of communist party control over
the
army, police, and judiciary; the expansion of legislative
power
at the expense of the executive; a free market system;
strong
support for private sector entrepreneurship; tax relief to
encourage entrepreneurs; the reprivatization of
agriculture; and
"perpetual neutrality" for Hungary.
The Democratic People's Party was active in Hungarian
politics in the late 1940s but was banned in 1949. In 1989
this
party reappeared as the Christian Democratic People's
Party,
which grew out of the Aron Marton Association (named after
a
Catholic bishop in Transylvania). The draft program of the
Christian Democratic People's Party's defined it as "a
political
organization with a Christian worldview that is, however,
independent of the Churches." It called for multiparty
democracy,
parliamentary government, full guarantees for human and
civil
rights, and autonomy for local communities. For the
economy, this
party advocated free enterprise combined with a welfare
system to
help those disadvantaged by a free market system. In
foreign
policy, the Christian Democratic People's Party called for
accelerating Hungary's integration into Europe and the
country's
return to the fold of Christian civilization.
Finally, among the historical parties, the Social
Democratic
Party was refounded on January 9, 1989. Originally founded
in
1890, the Social Democratic Party was forced to merge with
the
Hungarian Communist Party in June 1948 to create the
Hungarian
Workers' Party. Leaders of the reemergent Social
Democratic Party
claimed 30,000 members, but the actual figure was closer
to
3,000. The party was weakened by a split between those who
had
belonged to the party before 1948 and younger members who
sought
leadership positions. The Social Democratic Party
advocated a
West European-style social democracy for Hungary.
Of the new political parties, the largest at the end of
1989
was the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which was founded on
September 27, 1987. In November 1989, the forum had
approximately
20,200 members organized into 327 local organizations in
306
localities across Hungary. This party was largely the
creation of
the provincial intelligentsia and was closely identified
with
Hungarian populism (an interwar political movement that
distrusted Western capitalism and favored an economy based
on
small agricultural producers and independent peasant
entrepreneurs; it also included antinationalist and
anti-semitic
strains). It advocated free and democratic elections, a
multiparty system, an increase in funding for education
and
culture, improvement of social security, and a greater
role for
the church in providing social services. The Hungarian
Democratic
Forum came out for a "third road" for the economy: an
economy
neither capitalist nor socialist. It proposed dismantling
the
state sector in a "socially controlled and economically
rational
way" and encouraging the emergence of an entrepreneurial
stratum.
However, the entrepreneurs were to be groups, not
individuals.
The Alliance of Free Democrats was founded on December
13,
1988. In July 1989, the alliance had about 3,000 members,
who
were organized into twenty chapters in Budapest and
fifteen in
the counties. This party was largely the creation of the
Budapest
intelligentsia. Two ideological strains made up the
alliance:
democratic socialists, who favored state intervention in
the
economy and a mixture of both state and private property;
and
classical liberals, who supported an unrestrained free
market and
the denationalization of the economy. The party's program
called
for a new constitution to end the communist party's
monopoly of
power, to secure the sovereignty of the people, and to
limit the
power of the state by separating the powers of the
executive,
legislature, and judiciary. In the economic realm, the
alliance's
program called for the "denationalization of the economy,"
the
expansion of private ownership, cuts in military
expenditure, and
state assistance to the poorest members of the population
to
minimize poverty. In foreign policy, the alliance
advocated
neutrality for Hungary and the withdrawal of Soviet
troops.
The Federation of Young Democrats, founded in 1988, was
made
up of 4,000 to 5,000 members between the ages of sixteen
and
thirty-five. Members were mainly college and university
students.
The party advocated a multiparty system, political and
military
independence, the evolution of the Warsaw Pact into a
political
alliance, and the privatization of economic assets.
In the spring of 1989, several opposition parties
joined
together to form the Opposition Roundtable to establish
new rules
for the conduct of politics as Hungary entered the era of
reform.
The roundtable was made up of the Alliance of Free
Democrats, the
Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Social Democratic Party,
the
Independent Smallholders' Party, the Hungarian People's
Party,
the Federation of Young Democrats, and the Endre Bajcsy-
Zsilinszky Society (an organization dedicated to
environmental
protection and the defense of Hungarian minority rights in
Romania). (The Democratic League of Free Trade Unions had
observer status at the roundtable.) The Opposition
Roundtable had
two basic objectives: to enter into talks with the HSWP to
determine the principles and rules that would govern the
transition to a pluralist democracy, and to discuss the
means
necessary to overcome Hungary's social and economic
crisis.
In June 1989, the Opposition Roundtable entered into
formal
talks with the HSWP and the so-called "third side," which
was
made up of the Patriotic People's Front, the National
Council of
Trade Unions, and other organizations allied with the
HSWP. In
the negotiations, one committee dealt with political
matters,
including constitutional changes, establishment of a
presidency,
setting of a date for elections to the National Assembly,
revisions of the penal code, creation of a new law on
information, and securing of guarantees against a violent
rollback of the reform process. A second committee dealt
with
economic problems, including the reform of property
rights, the
introduction and strengthening of market mechanisms in the
economy, and, most generally, "strategic questions of
dealing
with the economic crisis" and the means of treating the
social
consequences of the crisis.
The Opposition Roundtable and the party had different
objectives in the negotiations. The former negotiated on
the
premise that the roots of the economic crisis lay in the
political system; it therefore sought to emphasize
constitutional
changes and overall political reform. By contrast, the
HSWP
emphasized measures to alter the economy. Thus, the party
sought
to make the opposition groups in the roundtable share
responsibility for the dislocations, unemployment, and
inflation
that would accompany the effort to pull Hungary out of its
economic crisis. The party hoped to share political
responsibility and yet give up as little power as
possible. The
HSWP hoped to exact agreement to its economic reform
program by
threatening to effect political reforms without the
participation
of the Opposition Roundtable. About 75 percent of the
delegates
to the National Assembly were HSWP members, and the party
leadership believed it could ram through reforms using its
vast
majority in the legislature.
The parties that made up the Opposition Roundtable
represented only a very small fraction of the population.
Further, the HSWP, although numbering several hundred
thousand
members, had little claim to legitimacy within society.
The
members of the "third side" also had little support among
society
as a whole. Thus, in the summer of 1989 a number of
critics
complained that the population as a whole had no say in
the
negotiations that were determining Hungary's political and
economic future.
In several elections to fill seats in the National
Assembly
that had been vacated, the population did have the chance
to make
its voice heard. The HSWP lost every election.
On July 22, 1989, Gabor Rozsik was the first opposition
candidate elected to the National Assembly. He ran for
election
in the town of Godollö, near Budapest, and won 69.5
percent of
the vote. Rozsik was a candidate of the Hungarian
Democratic
Forum but also had the support of the Alliance of Free
Democrats
and the Federation of Young Democrats.
In other elections held on July 22, either less than
the
required 50 percent of the eligible voters of the election
district participated or else none of the candidates
managed to
receive a majority of the votes cast. In Szeged the
Hungarian
Democratic Forum's candidate won 59.4 percent of the vote,
but
the turnout was less than the required 50 percent. In the
repeat
election on August 5, the Hungarian Democratic Forum's
candidate
won with about 62 percent of the vote, while the HSWP's
candidate
received 22 percent of the vote. In Kecskemet no candidate
received the majority of votes, but in the August 5 runoff
election, the Hungarian Democratic Forum's candidate won
with
about 70 percent of the vote. In the July 22 election in
Kiskunfelegyhaza, 61 percent of the people voted, but no
candidate received a majority. The HSWP's candidate,
however, won
44.7 percent of the votes, the highest vote total. In the
repeat
election, only 46 percent of eligible voters participated,
and
the result was therefore invalid.
Finally, in a September 16 election for a National
Assembly
seat in Zala County, the HSWP candidate received less than
one-
third of the votes cast. The Hungarian Democratic Forum,
the
Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Federation of Young
Democrats
all supported the winner, who received more than 59
percent of
the vote.
These elections demonstrated serious weaknesses on the
part
of the HSWP. In all locales, despite almost a total
monopoly of
the media and overwhelming advantages over the opposition
in
funds available to run campaigns, HSWP candidates showed
poorly.
These elections served as yet another reminder that the
HSWP had
either to transform itself fundamentally or to resign
itself to a
marginal role in Hungary's new political system.
Other evidence for the lack of support for the HSWP
came from
poll data. A survey conducted by Janos Simon and Laszlo
Bruszt of
the Sociological and Social Science Institute of the
Hungarian
Academy of Sciences found that only 36.5 percent of those
surveyed would vote for the HSWP. Most of that support
came in
the villages and small towns. The support of the remainder
of
those surveyed was divided among the Social Democratic
Party (13
percent); the Hungarian Democratic Forum (11. 4 percent);
the
Alliance of Free Democrats (5.6 percent); the
Smallholders' Party
(5.4 percent); the Hungarian People's Party (4.3 percent);
and
the Christian Democratic People's Party (4.3 percent).
The lack of public support for the HSWP did not deter
it from
attempting to carry through its objectives in negotiations
with
the Opposition Roundtable. In September an agreement was
signed
that seemed at least in the short run to have met the
HSWP's
objectives. In addition, this agreement caused a split in
the
roundtable itself, thereby seeming to bring additional
benefits
to the party.
The agreement between the HSWP and the Hungarian
Democratic
Forum, the Smallholders' Party, the Hungarian People's
Party, and
the Endre Bajscy-Zsilinszky Society was to establish "the
political and legal conditions for a peaceful transition
to a
multiparty system." It contained six draft laws dealing
with the
following issues: the establishment of a constitutional
court to
ensure the constitutionality of legislation; the
acceptance by
the HSWP of the values of bourgeois democracy and
democratic
socialism; a draft electoral law; amendments to the penal
code
and criminal code to ensure that they "conform to the
accepted
norms of human and civil rights"; an increase in the
amount of
state aid for election campaigns from 35 million forints
to 100
million forints; and the surrender by the HSWP of some 2
billion
forints of its assets to finance other political parties.
The argument also called for the creation of a strong
presidency that would embody the unity of the nation,
exercise
authority through the Council of Ministers, and act as
commander
in chief of the armed forces in peacetime. Any party or
group
with 50,000 supporting signatures could nominate
candidates for
president and vice president. The winning candidate would
have to
receive at least half the votes with a minimum turnout of
half to
two-thirds of the electorate. If no candidate received the
necessary number of votes, a second round of voting would
be
held. According to the agreement, the presidential
election was
to take place before new elections to the National
Assembly.
The Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of
Young
Democrats did not sign the agreement. First, they argued
that it
failed to require the withdrawal of the HSWP from the
workplace,
a presence that lay at the basis of the party's
substantial
control over the economy. Second, these two parties
maintained
that the agreement did not call upon the HSWP to render a
full
accounting of its finances and property. Third, the
Alliance of
Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats also
believed that the agreement was inadequate because it did
not
call for the dissolution of the Workers' Guard, the HSWP's
private army.
Fourth and perhaps most important, the Alliance of Free
Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats held that
the
agreement was seriously flawed in setting the elections
for
president before the elections to the National Assembly.
The HSWP
wanted the elections for president to be held relatively
quickly
because its candidate--Imre Pozsgay--was the most popular
political figure in the country at the time. For its part,
the
Hungarian Democratic Forum minimized the importance of
Pozsgay's
candidacy because of the difficulty of even a well-known
politician's winning an absolute majority, the damage
already
caused to Pozsgay's candidacy by his role in the HSWP
leadership,
and the fact that Pozsgay could not count on the support
of the
conservative and centrist factions of the HSWP. The
Alliance of
Free Democrats argued, by contrast, that election of a
president
before the elections to the National Assembly would
distort the
parliamentary elections, that only the new National
Assembly
should have the power to define the role of the elections
to the
National Assembly, and that the new president could unduly
influence the outcome of the elections to the National
Assembly.
Finally, the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation
of
Young Democrats underscored the dangers of electing a
communist
president in a fledgling democracy.
The Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of
Young
Democrats decided to call for the resolution of these four
issues
by a popular referendum. According to a law passed on June
15,
1989, 100,000 signatures would be sufficient to call for a
binding popular referendum on matters subject to political
dispute. The two parties managed to collect almost 200,000
signatures, and a referendum was scheduled for November
26. The
Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young
Democrats
both urged Hungarians to render a vote of "yes" on the
following
issues: disbanding the Workers' Guard, abolishing party
cells in
the workplace, demanding that the HSWP give a full account
of its
assets, and requiring that the newly elected National
Assembly
elect the president.
On September 18, 1989, negotiations on the economy
began
between the Opposition Roundtable and the HSWP. Talks were
quickly suspended in the third committee, which was
charged with
discussing changes in ownership and determining how many
enterprises should remain under state control. Talks
proceeded in
the other five committees, which dealt with the state
budget
deficit, major state investments, social welfare, land
reform,
and ownership reform.
HSWP losses in the four National Assembly elections,
the
agreement with elements of the Opposition Roundtable, and
the
widespread dissatisfaction with the agreement reached
between the
roundtable and the party set the stage for the Fourteenth
Party
Congress of the HSWP, which began on October 6, 1989.
These
events demonstrated that Hungary had entered a new
political era
in which the methods and structure of a Marxist-Leninist
party
were no longer relevant. The decisions reached at the
Fourteenth
Party Congress marked an attempt by the party leadership
to adapt
to this new era.
The party had undergone some significant changes prior
to the
congress. The most important among these changes was the
emergence of factions within the party. Marxist-Leninist
parties
had long condemned factions within their ranks; decision
making
was carried out via democratic centralism, which required
a
unified party position in support of the leadership on all
issues
of theory and practice.
In late 1988 and 1989, factions did indeed arise within
the
party, whose leadership was split between reformers (who
encouraged the rise of factions) and conservatives (who
condemned
the incipient factions). Factions in support of reforms
within
the party--known as the "reform circles"--had been growing
rapidly since November 1988, when the first groups were
organized
by Jozsef Geczi of the Department of Political Theory at
Attila
Jozsef University in Szeged. The first national conference
of
reform circles took place in Szeged on May 21-22, 1989,
and was
attended by more than 400 representatives of 110 reform
groups.
The manifesto produced by the conference maintained that
problems
in Hungary were part of a "crisis of Asiatic despotism."
The
document called for the building of a new organization
based on
the values of the Hungarian progressive movement, the
socialist
movement, progressive bourgeois traditions, and Hungarian
populism. The manifesto demanded the reform of the HSWP.
The
reform circles also held a second conference in Budapest
on
September 2-3 to prepare for the party congress.
By contrast, the Ferenc Munnich Society (named after
the
minister of the armed forces and internal affairs who came
to
power with Janos Kadar in 1956) was a faction formed by
party
conservatives in November 1988. Retired army officers,
retired
state security officers, members of the Workers' Guard,
and
conservative party members predominated among its 10,000
to
20,000 members. According to Robert Ribanszki, who was one
of the
society's leaders, "the primary goal of the [Ferenc
Munnich
Society] is to stop the further deterioration of socialist
achievements . . . and to lend support to the development
and
strengthening of socialism." The Ferenc Munnich Society
sought
the retention of the HSWP's leading role in social,
economic, and
governmental institutions. It strongly criticized the
reform
circles and the party's reform leaders, chiefly Pozsgay
and
Nyers.
Delegates to the Fourteenth Party Congress of the HSWP
came
from the different party factions. In fact, the rules for
election of delegates expressly called for the
representation of
these factions at the congress. Every party member could
"propose
delegates and be eligible for election." The guidelines
stressed
that members were to acquaint themselves with the views of
candidates prior to the election of delegates, so they
could vote
for the representatives of the faction of their choice. At
the
congress itself, Pozsgay stated that "our party will
respect the
freedom of platforms and trends, and respect the
protection of
minority rights more strongly" than the former party. The
guidelines for delegate selection and Pozsgay's sentiments
starkly contrasted with election procedures for previous
congresses.
To be sure, party leaders did not always follow the
guidelines in carrying out the delegate selection.
Nevertheless,
a number of platforms were strongly represented at the
congress.
At the beginning of the proceedings, the Reform Alliance
had 464
delegates; the People's Democratic Platform (a centrist
grouping), 68 delegates; the For the Equality of Chances
of the
Provinces Platform, 35 delegates; the For the HSWP
Platform, 35
delegates; the Young People's Platform, 28 delegates; and
the
Agricultural and Food Processing Platform, 28 delegates.
In
addition, in another departure from previous congresses,
delegates from districts south of Lake Balaton and the
southwest
met to decide on a common approach to the interests of
their
regions
(see
fig. 1).
The Reform Alliance was the best organized of the
factions,
and it had the most elaborate program. By the end of the
second
day of the congress, the Reform Alliance had 511 members,
about
40 percent of the total. This faction played an important
role in
the outcome of the congress. It called for an open break
with the
past, as well as for a repudiation of the HSWP's crimes
and
mistakes, and it sought to staff leadership positions with
new
personnel who would promote new kinds of policies. The
Reform
Alliance also advocated the democratization of party
decision
making.
Indeed, in large measure the congress produced the new
policies called for by the Reform Alliance. To begin with,
the
party changed its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party
(HSP).
The party's statutes still defined it as a "Marxist
political
organization," but it fully accepted "the values of human
development, humanism, freedom, and democracy." The term
Leninist did not appear in any of the documents
emanating
from the congress.
The HSP's manifesto dedicated the organization to
building a
"democratic, law-governed state marked by direct
democracy" and
the creation of a "market-based economy." The party also
called
for a social welfare policy to moderate extreme
differences in
living standards but at the same time advocated a system
of wages
and salaries to reward productivity. The party's program
sought
an "undisturbed and balanced relationship" with the Soviet
Union
but at the same time obligated the party to work for
mutually
advantageous political and economic relations with every
country
and with every "integrating and cooperative organization."
Finally, the HSP came out firmly in support of minority
rights
within Hungary and castigated the violation of the rights
of
Hungarians elsewhere.
The HSP's rejection of Leninist organizational
principles was
clearly apparent in its new organizational structure. The
bylaws
allowed freedom of choice in joining or leaving the party;
freedom of conscience, expression, and action; and
tolerance of
different views, opinions, and trends within the party. It
also
located in the will of the membership the source of every
decision and action by the party. According to the bylaws,
any
minority view that had the support of at least 10 percent
of the
membership was to be stated along with the position of the
majority. Terms of office for party officials were to be
decided
by the electing forum; nominations were to take place by
open
ballot, and elections were to be held by secret ballot.
The party congress was to be the HSP's highest
representative
and decision-making organ. The National Steering Committee
replaced the Central Committee to act as "the party
membership's
representative and control organ between the congresses."
The
National Presidium, consisting of twenty-five people, was
to lead
the party between congresses. Except for the chairman of
the HSP,
members of the National Presidium could not be members of
the
Steering Committee. The party leader, called the chairman,
was to
be elected by a secret ballot of the party congress. Rezsö
Nyers
was elected chairman of the HSP with 87 percent of the
vote. The
chairman and the leader of the party's bloc in the
National
Assembly served as ex officio members of the National
Presidium;
all others were elected from a slate of candidates
prepared by
the delegates to the congress, by a nominating committee,
or by
the chairman. The National Conciliation Committee was set
up to
protect party members' rights and to ensure that the
actions of
national and local party organs conformed to the HSP's
bylaws.
The Central Financial Committee was established to manage
the
party's finances and property.
At the bottom of the HSP's organizational pyramid were
the
basic organizations, which required a minimum of three
members.
Local organizations were to be set up in election
districts
throughout the country. Regional party organs were to be
established at the county level and in Budapest. According
to the
bylaws, these party organs were independent of the
national
organization. They were to decide on their own which
candidates
to nominate for election to local representative bodies
within
their jurisdictions, and they could nominate candidates
from
their jurisdictions for election to the National Assembly.
At the Fourteenth Party Congress, the leadership gave
each
HSWP member until October 31, 1989, to decide whether or
not to
accept membership in the new party. The HSWP's membership
had
declined throughout 1989. In mid-1988 the HSWP had
approximately
817,000 members; by September 1989, its membership stood
at
725,000. However, relatively few members of the old party
decided
to join the new organization. As a result, the leadership
decided
to extend the deadline for old HSWP members to December
31. As of
mid-December, the HSP claimed about 51,000 members.
Reactions of Hungary's opposition groups to the changes
in
the HSWP were decidedly mixed. The Hungarian Democratic
Forum
stated that "reform of the ruling party is a long-awaited
and
important event" but believed that the party had failed to
make a
clear break with the past. The Alliance of Free Democrats
feared
that "the setting up of the HSP does not mean genuine
change. The
first resolutions of the new party and the composition of
its
presidium do not indicate, for the time being, a break
away from
its past as a state party." The Social Democratic Party
stated
that it "did not consider the new socialist party, which
carries
certain social democratic features, a real political
rival" and
that free elections would show whether the public
considered the
changes to be credible.
Conservative party members decided to maintain the
existence
of the HSWP. Former General Secretary Karoly Grosz was to
become
a member, as was Janos Berecz, the former HSWP ideology
secretary. The conservatives held their own Fourteenth
Party
Congress of the HSWP in mid-December 1989. The HSWP
leadership
dedicated itself to creating a "unified Marxist party of
workers,
peasants, and intellectuals" to retain the achievements of
the
past four decades, to overcome the country's "stifling
crisis,"
and to find paths leading to the realization of socialist
ideals.
Shortly after the HSP congress, the National Assembly
took
action on three measures that were the subject of the
November 26
referendum called for by the Alliance of Free Democrats
and the
Federation of Young Democrats. In a session on October
17-18, the
National Assembly voted to ban all party organizations
from the
workplace. At the same session, the legislature passed a
law on
political parties, which called for redistribution of some
of the
HSP's assets to other political parties and the selling
off of
other party assets to help finance the government's health
and
education systems. Finally, on October 20 the National
Assembly
disbanded the Workers' Guard, without naming a successor
organization.
In October the National Assembly also passed a number
of
other measures that would have a significant impact on
Hungary's
political future. The country's name was changed to the
Republic
of Hungary. A new amendment to the Constitution vested
legislative power solely in the National Assembly, which
henceforth would have the power to draft and enact laws,
confirm
the government, and pass a budget. A second new amendment
abolished the Presidential Council and in its place
established
the presidency. The president of the republic, who was
given a
term of office of four years, was granted extensive
powers: to
serve as commander in chief of the armed forces; to
declare war
or a state of emergency if the National Assembly were
prevented
from doing so; to represent Hungary in foreign relations;
to sign
international agreements; and to nominate the president of
the
Supreme Court (who then required confirmation by the
National
Assembly).
A third amendment created the Constitutional Court to
review
the constitutionality of laws. It was to have power to
annul laws
deemed unconstitutional. Individuals and institutions
could turn
to the court with grievances against the state. The
Supreme Court
consisted of fifteen judges, who were to be nominated by a
committee of the National Assembly made up of
representatives of
various parties and then confirmed by the whole National
Assembly.
Yet another amendment stated that "the Hungarian
Republic
recognizes the inalienable and inviolable rights of man"
and that
the state's foremost duty is to protect those rights. The
Constitution explicitly endorsed the freedoms of speech,
press,
and assembly.
Finally, an amendment on the economic system defined it
as "a
market economy that also makes use of the advantages of
economic
planning, and in which public and private property are
equal and
receive equal protection." More detailed legislation that
would
transform the economy from a command system to a
market-based
system was to be dealt with later.
Other laws concerned the election system. A party
assets law
stipulated that party assets must be paid for exclusively
through
membership fees, state support, and after-tax profits of
companies and limited companies founded by the parties.
All
parties represented in the National Assembly were to be
entitled
to state budget support: 25 percent of the funds were to
be
shared equally, while 75 percent of the funds were to be
divided
according to the number of seats held by each party. The
amount
of funds would be determined by the availability of money
in the
budget.
According to the new electoral law, the National
Assembly to
be elected in 1990 will have 386 members chosen in a
two-part
secret ballot. One ballot will elect 176 deputies from
individual
electoral districts each having about 350,000 people.
Parties and
individuals nominate candidates for these seats. If no
candidate
wins a majority in a given district, a second round of
balloting
is held. Those parties that are able to enter candidates
in at
least 25 percent of the electoral districts in a given
county
(and in Budapest, which has the status of a county) can
nominate
a party list for that county (or for Budapest). In the
second
ballot, voters will choose a party as such, that is, they
will
cast a ballot for one of the county-level lists, from
which
another 152 deputies will be elected. Parties that are
able to
put forward seven or more of these lists or that win 66
percent
of the vote for the county-level list in any given county
can
enter a slate for the national list of deputies.
Fifty-eight
deputies will be named from the national list; seats will
be
distributed in proportion to the total number of votes
secured by
losing parties on the county-level ballot. However, those
parties
that fail to win at least 4 percent of the votes cast for
the
county-level lists will not qualify for party
representation in
the National Assembly, although their individual members
could
win seats in the district-level elections.
Approximately one month after the National Assembly
enacted
these momentous changes, the national referendum called
for by
the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young
Democrats was held. The questions on the removal of the
HSP from
the workplace, the nature of the HSP's assets, and the
disbanding
of the Workers' Guard were moot at this point because the
National Assembly had already passed laws resolving these
issues.
However, 50.1 percent of those who voted supported the
proposition that the presidential election should take
place
after the elections to the National Assembly.
Subsequently, district elections to the National Assembly
were
set for March 25, 1990.
Hungary's political transformation during 1989 was
reflected
in military and foreign policy developments. In May
Hungary
removed the barbed wire fence that marked the border with
Austria. In September Hungary proposed establishment of a
border
security zone with Austria and Yugoslavia, as well as a
number of
steps to reduce its military presence along the borders
with
these two countries. Specifically, the proposal called for
a
fifty-kilometer-wide "confidence building zone" on either
side of
the boundaries with Austria and Yugoslavia. The number of
tanks
in these areas would be halved, and Austria and Yugoslavia
would
be given details of Hungary's deployments. Military
exercises
would be curtailed, and the Austrians and Yugoslavs would
be
invited to observe any exercises that were held.
The budget deficit led to defense budget cuts. In 1990
the
military budget was to be reduced by 30 percent compared
with
1989. In addition, the Ministry of Home
Affairs--responsible for
the police and the Border Guards--was to have a 1990
budget of
900 million forints less than it asked for. Armed forces
were to
be reduced from about 100,000 troops to less than 80,000
troops
by 1991. Also beginning in 1991, military service was to
be cut
from eighteen months to one year. HSP organizations were
withdrawing from the armed forces and attempting to set up
organizations in residential areas.
These budget cuts and reductions in force levels were
accompanied by the reorganization of the Ministry of
Defense.
First, the Main Political Administration (see Glossary),
which supervised political and ideological work in the military,
was
disbanded. New education officers were to work side by
side with
commanders and to train soldiers in civics and educate
them about
social policy problems. Second, some of the functions of
the
Ministry of Defense were transferred to the new "Command
of the
Hungarian People's Army," which was to assume
responsibility for
actual military assignments. A smaller Ministry of Defense
continued to function, but it had responsibility for
military
policy and other administrative and theoretical matters
only. The
minister of defense was accountable to the prime minister,
and
the commander of the Hungarian People's Army was
responsible to
the president, who was commander in chief of the armed
forces.
On February 2, 1990, following talks between the Soviet
Union
and Hungary, Moscow agreed to withdraw all of its troops
from
Hungary. The communique that resulted from the talks
stated that
the two sides "agreed that the withdrawal of Soviet troops
will
be carried out on the basis of an intergovernmental
agreement to
be concluded within the shortest possible time." On March
10,
1990, Budapest and Moscow signed an agreement for the
withdrawal
of all Soviet forces from Hungary by June 30, 1991. The
withdrawal began on March 11, 1990, and two-thirds of
Soviet
troops and equipment were to be removed by the end of
1990.
In foreign policy, Hungary continued to adhere to its
semi-
independent stance within the Warsaw Pact. In the early
1980s,
Hungary had attempted to halt the deterioration of
relations
between East and West by seeking constructive relations
with the
leading states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
Hungary also attempted to develop relations with some
states
considered pariahs by other members of the Warsaw Pact,
notably
the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Israel, both of
which it
recognized in 1989. Moreover, in the late 1980s the Soviet
Union
also liberalized many of its own foreign policy positions
in an
effort to resolve a number of disagreements with Western
countries and to seek help for its ailing economy. As part
of
this approach, Moscow allowed its East European allies
much more
leeway in foreign policy than it had in the past. Hungary
managed
to take great advantage of this new Soviet approach.
One of the most significant foreign policy events of
the late
1980s was the visit of United States president George Bush
to
Hungary from July 11 to 13, 1989. President Bush gave
moral and
material support to Hungary's reform efforts. Four
agreements
resulted from Bush's visit: the Hungarian airline MALEV
won
approval to fly into and out of Los Angeles and Chicago;
Hungary
gained permission to open a consular office on the West
Coast of
the United States; the two countries signed an agreement
on
agricultural cooperation; and the two countries signed an
agreement for a US$750,000 study by the University of
Pittsburgh
of the financial operations of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplen County
and
its outdated steelworks.
President Bush also agreed to ask other Western
countries to
help Hungary and to request that the United States
Congress make
money available to assist the private sector in Hungary.
The
services of the United States Peace Corps were also to be
made
available to Hungary. Perhaps most important for Budapest,
President Bush said he would ask Congress to give
most-favored-
nation status to Hungary on a permanent rather than on a
yearly
basis. On October 27, the president announced that Hungary
would
be perpetually granted most-favored-nation status.
Relations with the Soviet Union continued to prosper,
as they
had since Mikhail S. Gorbachev became Soviet leader in
March
1985. Significantly, in 1989 Budapest and Moscow agreed to
switch
to dollar-accounted trade beginning in 1991. Hungary was
to pay
the Soviet Union for its energy and raw materials using
dollars
and applying current Western price rates. Hungary was to
receive
hard currency for its manufactures sold to the Soviet
Union.
Hungary would have to compete with Western firms for the
Soviet
market, but Hungary's leaders believed that such
competition
would help bring their country's industry up to world
standards.
The move to trade in hard currency with the Soviet
Union was
expected to resolve the problem of Hungary's huge trade
surplus
with that country. In the first half of 1989, the surplus
amounted to 800 million rubles. These rubles were not a
convertible currency and therefore were of little use to
Hungary.
The surplus amounted to an interest-free loan to the
Soviet
Union, and the Hungarian economy could not afford this
burden.
Hungary had more serious problems with three other
Warsaw
Pact allies--East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.
East
Germans traveling or vacationing in Hungary used Hungary's
open
border with Austria to flee to that country en route to
West
Germany. East Berlin had vociferously protested the
Hungarian
decision to allow the East Germans to leave for Austria.
The
official East German news agency called the decision "an
organized trade in humans under the pretense of
humanitarian
considerations." However, after the emergence of a reform
government in East Germany and the opening of the Berlin
Wall in
early November 1989, relations between the two countries
warmed
considerably.
Relations with Czechoslovakia became problematic when
Hungary
suspended work on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam project on
May 13.
The Hungarian government took this action in response to
public
protests over the environmental damage caused by the
project and
in light of a recommendation by a panel of experts that
the
project be abandoned. In turn, Czechoslovakia charged that
Hungary's suspension of the project was politically
motivated and
a violation of international law. On November 15, Hungary
announced that the Nagymaros section of the dam "will not
be
built." The new reform government that took power in
Czechoslovakia in late 1989 was drafting plans to suspend
and
halt its part of the project, which had also raised
environmental
concerns in that country.
Until the overthrow of Romanian leader Nicolae
Ceausescu in
late December 1989, Hungary's relations with Romania had
progressively worsened over the course of the year. The
number of
refugees from Romania who settled in Hungary steadily
increased
in 1989, and, significantly, the number of ethnic
Romanians among
the refugees rose to about 20 percent of the total.
In an attempt to resolve outstanding problems between
the two
countries, Rezsö Nyers, together with Foreign Minister
Gyula Horn
and Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, met Ceausescu in
Bucharest on
July 8. The Hungarians sought a radical improvement in the
treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania--the most
important
source of friction between Budapest and Bucharest. The
Hungarians
rejected Ceausescu's claim that the nationality issue was
strictly Romania's internal affair. The Hungarian
delegation also
called for easing travel restrictions between the two
countries
and appealed for a halt to Ceausescu's plan to raze 7,000
to
8,000 villages and relocate their inhabitants in large
apartment
complexes. The meeting produced no result, as Ceausescu
again
expressed the view that he had "solved" all nationality
problems
in his country.
The Romanian government's threats to the lives of
Laszlo
Tökes, an ethnic Hungarian Reformed minister in Timisoara,
Romania, and his family initiated the revolution in
Romania that
brought Ceausescu's ouster and execution in December 1989.
In
response to the violence perpetrated by the Ceausescu
regime on
its citizens in an effort to stem the popular revolt, the
Hungarian government took several measures. Hungary called
on the
United Nations Security Council to involve itself in the
Romanian
affair. Hungary canceled the 1948 Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between the two countries. Hungary also closed
the
border between Hungary and Romania and formally protested
the
events in Romania to Romanian representatives in Hungary.
As fighting broke out between the Romanian army, which
was
supporting the revolutionary Council of National Salvation
Front,
and Ceausescu's secret police organization--the
Securitate--
Hungary extended support to the new regime in Romania.
Hungary
was the first foreign government to recognize the Council
of
National Salvation Front as the legitimate government of
Romania.
The Hungarian army maintained constant contact with the
Romanian
army. The radio locator units of the Hungarian army
established
the locations of several secret Securitate radio
transmitters and
relayed that information to the Romanian military
leadership. The
Hungarians offered ammunition to the Romanian army, but
that
offer was turned down. Finally, both the Hungarian
government and
private citizens and political parties proffered food and
medical
aid to the beleaguered Romanians.
The revolution in Romania promised an immediate
improvement
in relations between Budapest and Bucharest. The new
Romanian
government ended the Ceausescu regime's harsh measures
against
its population, including the notorious resettlement
program. The
two governments agreed to reopen consulates in the
Romanian city
of Cluj and the Hungarian city of Debrecen and to open
cultural
institutes in Budapest and Bucharest.
As this account shows, in 1989 and early 1990 Hungary
had
experienced a dizzying series of political changes.
Noncommunist
political parties were poised to assume political power. A
number
of significant steps had been taken to establish the rule
of law
in Hungary, although the opposition parties made it clear
that
this process had only just begun. The communist party--in
whatever acronymic guise--was dwindling in importance.
Soviet
troops were beginning their withdrawal from Hungary. The
government was pressing toward Hungary's opening to the
noncommunist world with vigor and determination. Hungary
was
indeed in the throes of a revolution, albeit a peaceful
one,
accompanied by its Central European neighbors on the road
to a
new political future.
March 13, 1990
* *
*
On March 25, 1990, round one of the first free
parliamentary
elections in forty-three years took place in Hungary. In
the 152
district elections, only five candidates succeeded in
winning a
majority. Among the winners was former Prime Minister
Miklos
Nemeth, who ran as an independent. Runoff elections on
April 8
were to decide the outcome of the other 147 district
races.
In balloting for the county-level lists, the Hungarian
Democratic Forum gained 24.7 percent of the vote, which
translated into 40 seats in the National Assembly. The
Alliance
of Free Democrats won 21.39 percent of the vote for
thirty-four
seats, and the Independent Smallholders' Party 11.73
percent for
sixteen seats. Other parties winning the necessary 4
percent
threshold for representation in the National Assembly were
the
Hungarian Socialist Party with 10.89 percent of the vote,
the
Federation of Young Democrats with 8.95 percent of the
vote, and
the Christian Democratic People's Party with 6.46 percent
of the
vote. Among the many parties failing to reach the required
threshold were the Social Democratic Party and the
Hungarian
Socialist Workers' Party.
The Hungarian Democratic Forum emerged as the clear
winner
after the second round of elections held on April 8 in
those
electoral districts where no candidate gained a majority
in the
first round of voting. The forum gained a total of 164
seats in
the National Assembly in the two rounds of voting. Second
was the
Alliance of Free Democrats with ninety-two seats. The
Hungarian
Democratic Forum chose to form a government together with
the
Independent Smallholders' Party, which won forty-four
seats, and
the Christian Democratic People's Party, which won
twenty-one
seats. Hence, the governing coalition held 229 seats at
about 60
percent of the 394 total. (On March 1, the National
Assembly had
added 8 seats to its previous total of 386, 1 each for the
country's Gypsy, Croatian, Serbian, Romanian, Slovak,
Slovenian,
German, and Jewish minorities. Nominations for these seats
were
to be prepared by an interparty committee within the
National
Assembly or by the National Assembly as a whole.)
The new National Assembly convened for the first time
on May
2, 1990. At that meeting, it elected Árpad Goncz, a
writer jailed
for six years following the Revolution of 1956, as
president of
the National Assembly, which made him interim president of
the
republic. Goncz was actually a founder of the Alliance of
Free
Democrats. In return for the Hungarian Democratic Forum's
support
for Goncz, the Alliance of Free Democrats agreed to
support a
series of amendments to the Constitution that were to
secure the
establishment of "an independent democratic constitutional
state"
in Hungary and provide the legal basis for a market
economy.
Another amendment agreed to by the two parties would
require only
a simple majority in the National Assembly to approve
legislation
for all matters except those of the highest political
importance
(such matters included a law on referendums, a
nationalities law,
a citizenship law, legal provisions concerning the freedom
of
conscience and religion, and other issues). The two
parties also
agreed to an amendment according to which the president
would be
elected to a four-year term by the National Assembly
rather than
be elected by the population as a whole. Yet another
amendment
would change the method for the representation of national
minorities in the government and in the National Assembly.
On May 23, 1990, Jozsef Antall of the Hungarian
Democratic
Forum became the prime minister. Other government
ministers
included Balazs Horvath of the Hungarian Democratic Forum,
who
became minister of the interior; Ferenc Jozsef Nagy of the
Independent Smallholders' Party, who became minister of
agriculture; Lajos Fur of the Hungarian Democratic Forum,
who
became minister of defense; Geza Jeszensky of the
Hungarian
Democratic Forum, who became minister of foreign affairs;
and
Peter Akos Bod of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, who
became
minister of trade and industry.
The elections and the formation of a new noncommunist
government took place against the backdrop of crisis
situations
in the economy and in foreign relations with Romania. In
January
1990, prices of meat, poultry, flour, milk and other dairy
products, and cooking fat and oil rose an average of 32
percent;
car prices rose 25 percent; and prices of beer,
cigarettes, and
gasoline also rose. On February 1, rents for state-owned
apartments increased an average of 35 percent, while bus
and
train fares rose 45 percent, and railroad fares rose 20
percent.
The drastic price increases resulted from a reduction in
government spending to reduce the budget deficit from 50
billion
forints in 1989 to 10 billion forints in 1990. To meet
this
objective, the government cut many price subsidies and
decontrolled most producer prices.
On March 18 and 19, severe anti-Hungarian violence
erupted in
the Romanian town of Tîrgu Mures. In the clashes between
Romanians and Hungarians, 3 people died and 269 were
injured.
This violence led to a rapid deterioration of relations
between
Hungary and Romania. Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth
addressed a
note of protest to Romanian Prime Minister Petre Roman.
Hungarian
Foreign Minister Gyula Horn addressed a letter to United
Nations
Secretary General Xavier Peres de Cuellar and to Jan
Martenson,
head of the UN Human Rights Committee, asking that the
committee
mediate the dispute without delay. For its part, the
Romanian
government responded by holding the Hungarian government
responsible for the bloodshed in Tîrgu Mures, and called
upon
Hungary to refrain from interfering in Romania's internal
affairs. In response to these changes, the Hungarian
government
stated that accusations of Hungarian interference were
unfounded,
and that the source of the tragic events lay in the
Romanian
government's hesitancy to take resolute action to stem the
rise
of national chauvinism in Romania. The Hungarian
government
called for talks between the two governments on all issues
as a
means to reduce tension.
May 25, 1990
Stephen R. Burant
Data as of September 1989
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