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Indonesia SOCIAL CLASSES
The experiences of population mobility in the
archipelago
underscore the continuing importance of social
stratification in
Indonesia. In 1992 the definition and function of social
classes in
Indonesia, however, was a matter of considerable
controversy.
Scholars and policy analysts debated the degree to which
social
classes could be defined in ethnic, economic, religious,
or
political terms. Although few would dispute that Indonesia
was a
highly stratified society, it was nonetheless difficult to
identify
an "upper class." Hereditary ruling classes and
traditional elites-
-reinforced by their positions in the Dutch colonial
bureaucracy--
no longer possessed unchallenged access to political power
and
wealth. Indeed, they could not even claim to be an elite
culture in
the late twentieth century. The powerful generals (mostly
Javanese)
and capitalists (mostly ethnic Chinese
capitalists--cukong)
of the postindependence period were newcomers to their
positions,
and, apart from extravagant conspicuous consumption, they
demonstrated few clear institutional and cultural patterns
that
suggested they were a unitary group in the early 1990s
(see Political Dynamics
, ch. 4;
Personnel
, ch. 5).
Defining a lower class in Indonesia is equally
difficult. Even
before the banning of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)
in 1965,
Indonesia's poor formed alliances that had less to do with
class
than with economics, religion, and community ties. In some
cases,
the poor peasantry identified across class lines with
orthodox Muslim
(santri--see Glossary)
landowners on the
basis of
their common religious affiliation. This alliance was
particularly
evident in lowland East Java. In other cases, small
landowners
united against both the Islamic right wing and Chinese
entrepreneurs. There also were divisions between the
indigenous, or
long-settled peoples
(pribumi--see Glossary) and
later Chinese and Arab immigrants. The oil boom of the 1970s
effected society and income distribution in ways that benefited the
landed peasantry and the urban middle class. However, no
independent social groups based on lower class affiliations emerged as
a major political force. Although income disparities remained a
major cause of concern, the number of poor Indonesians decreased in
the 1970s and 1980s.
Between the nation's poor and privileged classes lay a
complex
mosaic of middle class groups. Although the very existence
of a
bourgeoisie in any traditional sense was questioned by
some,
others, like economist Howard W. Dick, argued that there
was a
middle class united not by any political vision, economic
interests, ethnic identification, or even income levels,
but by
patterns of consumption. This group liked to buy
television sets,
motorcycles, newspapers, and video cassettes. What set
this middle
class apart in 1992 was not how much its members
consumed,
but how they did it. "Among the rakyat
[lower
class]," reported Dick, "consumer durables are shared: it
is antisocial to restrict the access of one's neighbors. Middle
class
households, by contrast, confine the enjoyment of such
goods to
members of the household. Fences are raised, doors locked
and
windows barred." In this view, the middle class of the
early 1990s
defined itself in relation to lower (not upper) classes,
and did so
by the way it consumed goods. The role of Islam, women,
and
regional ethnic identifications in this developing
national
culture, however, was very poorly understood.
Data as of November 1992
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