|
Iraq
COUPS, COUP ATTEMPTS, AND FOREIGN POLICY
The Baath Party that
orchestrated the overthrow of Qasim was founded in the early 1940s
by two Syrian students, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad Din al Bitar.
Its ideological goals of socialism, freedom, and unity reflected
the deeply felt sentiments of many Iraqis who, during the monarchy,
had suffered from the economic dislocationa that followed the
breakup of the old Ottoman domain, from an extremely skewed income
distribution, and from the suppression of political freedoms.
Beginning in 1952, under the leadership of Fuad Rikabi, the party
grew rapidly, especially among the Iraqi intelligentsia. By 1958
the Baath had made some inroads into the military. The party went
through a difficult period in 1959, however, after the Mosul and
Kirkuk incidents, the failed attempt on Qasim's life, and disillusionment
with Nasser. The Baath's major competitor throughout the Qasim
period was the ICP; when Qasim was finally overthrown, strongly
pitched battles between the two ensued. The Baath was able to
consolidate its bid for power only with the emergence of Ali Salih
as Saadi as leader.
Upon assuming power, the Baath established the National Council
of Revolutionary Command (NCRC) as the highest policy- making
body and appointed Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, one of the Free Officers,
as prime minister and Arif as president. The real power, however,
was held by the party leader, Saadi. Despite the dominance of
the newly established NCRC, the Baath's hold on power was extremely
tenuous. The organization was small, with an active membership
of fewer than 1,000, and it was not well represented in the officer
corps or in the army at large. Its leadership was inexperienced,
and its ideology was too vague to have any immediate relevance
to the deep-seated problems besetting Iraq in the early 1960s.
Its ambiguity of purpose had served the party well during the
Qasim era, enabling it to attract a diverse membership sharing
only a common aversion for "the sole leader." In the post-Qasim
period, that ambiguity was tearing the party asunder.
The party's lack of cohesion and lack of a coherent program had
two major effects on Baath policy. First, it led party strongman
Saadi to establish a one-party state that showed little tolerance
for opposing views. Second, in the absence of strong ideological
ties, the Baath increasingly was pervaded by cliques from the
same village, town, or tribe. This tendency became even more pronounced
during the 1970s.
Troubled by internal dissension and unable to suppress a new
wave of Kurdish unrest in the north, the Baath held power for
less than a year. Most damaging was the foundering of unity talks
with Nasser and the new Baathist regime in Syria. When the unity
plan collapsed, Nasser launched a vituperative campaign challenging
the legitimacy of the Baath in Iraq and in Syria. Nasser's attacks
seriously eroded the legitimacy of a regime that had continually
espoused pan-Arabism. Another factor contributing to the party's
demise was Saadi's reliance on the National Guard- -a paramilitary
force composed primarily of Baath sympathizers-- to counter the
Baath's lack of support in the regular army. By bolstering the
guard, Saadi alienated the regular army. Finally, the Baath was
sharply divided between doctrinaire hard-liners, such as Saadi,
and a more pragmatic moderate wing.
With its party ranks weakened, the Baath was overthrown by Arif
and a coterie of military officers in a bloodless coup in November
1963. Upon assuming power, Arif immediately announced that the
armed forces would manage the country. The governing core consisted
of Arif; his brother, Abd ar Rahman Arif; and his trusted colleague,
Colonel Said Slaibi. Arif was chairman of the NCRC, commander
in chief of the armed forces, and president of the republic; his
brother was acting chief of staff, and the colonel was commander
of the Baghdad garrison. The Arif brothers, Slaibi, and the majority
of Arif's Twentieth Brigade were united by a strong tribal bond
as members of the Jumailah tribe.
Other groups who participated in the 1963 coup included Nasserites--an
informal group of military officers and civilians who looked to
Nasser for leadership and who desired some kind of unity with
Egypt--and Baathists in the military. By the spring of 1964, Arif
had adroitly outmaneuvered the military Baathists and had filled
the top leadership posts with civilian Nasserites. Arif and the
Nasserite officers took steps to integrate the military, economic,
and political policies of Iraq with those of Egypt; this was expected
to lead to the union of the two countries by 1966. (The United
Arab Republic [UAR], which Iraq expected to join, existed from
1958 to 1961 and consisted of Egypt and Syria. Arif proposed that
Iraq join [partly as an anticommunist measure] but this union
never occurred.) In May 1964, the Joint Presidency Council was
formed, and in December the Unified Political Command was established
to expedite the ultimate constitutional union of the two countries.
In July 1964, Arif announced that henceforth all political parties
would coalesce to form the Iraqi Arab Socialist Union. Most important
for the future, Arif adopted Nasser's socialist program, calling
for the nationalization of insurance companies, banks, and such
essential industries as steel, cement, and construction--along
with the tobacco industry, tanneries, and flour mills. Arif's
nationalization program proved to be one of the few legacies of
the proposed Egyptian-Iraqi union (see Industrialization , ch.
3).
By 1965 Arif had lost his enthusiasm for the proposed union,
which had received only lukewarm support from Nasser. Arif began
ousting Nasserite officers from the government. As a result, the
newly appointed prime minister, Brigadier Arif Abd ar Razzaq,
who was also a leading Nasserite, made an unsuccessful coup attempt
on September 12, 1965. In response, President Arif curtailed Nasserite
activities and appointed fellow tribal members to positions of
power. Colonel Abd ar Razzaq an Nayif, a fellow Jumailah, became
head of military intelligence. Arif also attempted to bring more
civilians into the government. He appointed the first civilian
prime minister since the days of the monarchy, Abd ar Rahman Bazzaz.
Bazzaz strongly advocated the rule of law and was determined to
end the erratic, military- dominated politics that had characterized
Iraq since 1958. He also tried to implement the First Five-Year
Economic Plan (1965-70) to streamline the bureaucracy and to encourage
private and foreign investment.
In April 1966, Arif was killed in a helicopter crash and his
brother, Major General Abd ar Rahman Arif, was installed in office
with the approval of the National Defense Council and the cabinet.
Abd ar Rahman Arif lacked the forcefulness and the political acumen
of his brother; moreover, he was dominated by the ambitious military
officers who were responsible for his appointment. The government's
weak hold on the country thus became more apparent. The most pressing
issue facing the new government was a renewed Kurdish rebellion.
The 1964 cease-fire signed by Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani
and Abd as Salaam Arif was short-lived; by April 1965, the two
sides were again engaged in hostilities. This time military support
provided by the shah of Iran helped the Kurds win important victories
over the Iraqi army. Kurdish inroads in the north and escalating
Iraqi-Iranian tensions prompted Iraq's prime minister Bazzaz to
propose a more far-reaching settlement to the Kurdish problem.
Some of the more salient points of Bazzaz's proposal included
amnesty, use of the Kurdish language in Kurdish areas, Kurdish
administration of their educational, health, and municipal institutions,
and the promise of early elections by which the Kurds would gain
proportional representation in national as well as in provincial
assemblies. When Barzani indicated that he approved of these proposals,
the Kurdish conflict appeared to have ended.
The army, however, which had opposed having Bazzaz as a civilian
head of the cabinet, feared that he would reduce their pay and
privileges; consequently, it strongly denounced reconciliation
with the Kurds. President Arif yielded to pressure and asked for
Bazzaz's resignation. This ended the rapprochement with the Kurds
and led to a collapse of civilian rule. The new prime minister
was General Naji Talib, a pro-Nasserite who had been instrumental
in the 1958 Revolution and who strongly opposed the Kurdish peace
plan.
Arif also sought to further the improved relations with Iran
initiated by Bazzaz. This rapprochement was significant because
it denied the Kurds access to their traditional place of asylum,
which allowed recovery from Iraqi attacks. Arif visited Tehran
in the spring of 1967; at the conclusion of his visit, it was
announced that the countries would hold more meetings aimed at
joint oil exploration in the Naft-e Shah and Naft Khaneh border
regions. They also agreed to continue negotiations on toll collection
and navigation rights on the Shatt al Arab and on the demarcation
of the Persian Gulf's continental shelf.
During the winter of 1966-67, Arif faced a crisis emanating from
a new source, Syria. The IPC transported oil from its northern
fields to Mediterranean ports via pipelines in Syria. In 1966
Damascus claimed that the IPC had been underpaying Syria, based
on their 1955 agreement. Syria demanded back payments and immediately
increased the transit fee it charged the IPC. When the IPC did
not accede to Syrian demands, Syria cut off the flow of Iraqi
oil to its Mediterranean ports. The loss of revenue threatened
to cause a severe financial crisis. It also fueled anti-Talib
forces and increased public clamor for his resignation. In response,
Talib resigned, and Arif briefly headed an extremely unsteady
group of military officers.
In the opinion of Phebe Marr, a leading authority on Iraq, on
the eve of the June 1967 War between Israel and various Arab states,
the Arif government had become little more than a collection of
army officers balancing the special interests of various economic,
political, ethnic, and sectarian groups. The non-intervention
of Iraqi troops while Israel was overtaking the Egyptian, Syrian,
and Jordanian armies and was conquering large tracts of Arab territory
discredited the Arif regime in the eyes of the masses. To stave
off rising discontent, Arif reappointed strongman Tahir Yahya
as prime minister (he had first been appointed by Arif in November
1963). Yahya's only accomplishment was to lessen Iraq's economic
dependence on the Western-owned IPC: on August 6, his government
turned over all exploitation rights in the oil-rich North Rumailah
field to the state- controlled INOC (see Post-World War II Through
the 1970s , ch. 3). The Arif government, however, had lost its
base of power. Lacking a coherent political platform and facing
increasing charges of corruption, the government was only hanging
on.
Ultimately two disaffected Arif supporters--Colonel Abd ar Razzaq
an Nayif and Ibrahim ad Daud--were able to stage a successful
coup against Arif, and the Baath quickly capitalized on the situation.
Nayif and Daud had been part of a small group of young officers,
called the Arab Revolutionary Movement, that previously had been
a major source of support for Arif. By July 1968, however, reports
of corruption and Arif's increased reliance on the Nasserites
(whom both Nayif and Daud opposed) had alienated the two officers.
Nayif and Daud acted independently from the Baath in carrying
out the coup, but lacked the organizational backing or the grass-roots
support necessary to remain in power. In only a few weeks, the
Baath had outmaneuvered Nayif and Daud, and, for the second time
in five years, had taken over control of the government.
Data as of May 1988
|
