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Iraq
Rural Society
Rural Iraq contains aspects of the largely tribal mode of social
organization that prevailed over the centuries and still survived
in the 1980s--particularly in the more isolated rural areas, such
as the rugged tableland of the northwest and the marshes in the
south. The tribal mode probably originated in the unstable social
conditions that resulted from the protracted decline of the Abbasid
Caliphate and the subsequent cycles of invasion and devastation.
In the absence of a strong central authority and the urban society
of a great civilization, society devloped into smaller units under
conditions that placed increasing stress on prowess, decisiveness,
and mobility. Under these conditions, the tribal shaykhs emerged
as a warrior class, and this process facilitated the ascendancy
of the fighter-nomad over the cultivator.
The gradual sedentarization that began in the mid-nineteenth
century brought with it an erosion of shaykhly power and a disintegration
of the tribal system. Under the British Mandate, and the monarchy
that was its creation, a reversal took place. Despite the continued
decline of the tribe as a viable and organic social entity, the
enfeebled power of the shaykhs was restored and enhanced by the
British. This was done to develop a local ruling class that could
maintain security in the countryside and otherwise head off political
challenges to British access to Iraq's mineral and agricultural
resources and Britain's paramount role in the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms
(see World War I and the British Mandate , ch. 1). Through the
specific implementation of land registration, the traditional
pattern of communal cultivation and pasturage--with mutual rights
and duties between shaykhs and tribesmen--was superseded in some
tribal areas by the institution of private property and the expropriation
by the shaykhs of tribal lands as private estates. The status
of the tribesmen was in many instances drastically reduced to
that of sharecroppers and laborers. The additional ascription
of judicial and police powers to the shaykh and his retinue left
the tribesmen-cum-peasants as virtual serfs, continuously in debt
and in servitude to the shaykh turned landlord and master. The
social basis for shaykhly power had been transformed from military
valor and moral rectitude to an effective possession of wealth
as embodied in vast landholdings and a claim to the greater share
of the peasants' production.
This was the social dimension of the transformation from a subsistence,
pastoral economy to an agricultural economy linked to the world
market. It was, of course, an immensely complicated process, and
conditions varied in different parts of the country. The main
impact was in the southern half--the riverine economy-- more than
in the sparsely populated, rain-fed northern area. A more elaborate
analysis of this process would have to look specifically at the
differences between Kurdish and Arab shaykhs, between political
and religious leadership functions, between Sunni and Shia shaykhs,
and between nomadic and riverine shaykhs, all within their ecological
settings. In general the biggest estates developed in areas restored
to cultivation through dam construction and pump irrigation after
World War I. The most autocratic examples of shaykhly power were
in the rice-growing region near Al Amarah, where the need for
organized and supervised labor and the rigorous requirements of
rice cultivation generated the most oppressive conditions.
The role of the tribe as the chief politico-military unit was
already well eroded by the time the monarchy was overthrown in
July 1958. The role of some tribal shaykhs had been abolished
by the central government. The tribal system survived longest
in the mid-Euphrates area, where many tribesmen had managed to
register small plots in their names and had not become mere tenants
of the shaykh. In such settings an interesting amalgam occurred
of traditional tribal customs and the newer influences represented
by the civil servants sent to rural regions by the central government,
together with the expanded government educational system. For
example, the government engineer responsible for the water distribution
system, although technically not a major administrator, in practice
became the leading figure in rural areas. He would set forth requirements
for the cleaning and maintenance of the canals (see Agriculture
, ch. 3), and the tribal shaykh would see to it that the necessary
manpower was provided. This service in the minds of tribesmen
replaced the old customary obligation of military service that
they owed the shaykh and was not unduly onerous. It could readily
be combined with work on their own grazing or producing lands
and benefited the tribe as a whole. The government administrators
usually avoided becoming involved in legal disputes that might
result from water rights, leaving the disputes to be settled by
the shaykh in accordance with traditional tribal practices. Thus,
despite occasional tensions in such relationships, the power of
the central government gradually expanded into regions where Baghdad's
influence had previously been slight or absent.
Despite the erosion of the historic purposes of tribal organization,
the prolonged absence of alternative social links has helped to
preserve the tribal character of individual and group relations.
The complexity of these relations is impressive. Even in the southern,
irrigated part of the country there are notable differences between
the tribes along the Tigris, subject to Iranian influences, and
those of the Euphrates, whose historic links are with the Arab
beduin tribes of the desert. Since virtually no ethnographic studies
on the Tigris peoples existed in the late 1980s, the following
is based chiefly on research in the Euphrates region.
The tribe represents a concentric social system linked to the
classical nomadic structure but modified by the sedentary environment
and limited territory characteristic of the modern era. The primary
unit within the tribe is the named agnatic lineage several generations
deep to which each member belongs. This kinship unit shares responsibilities
in feuds and war, restricts and controls marriage within itself,
and jointly occupies a specified share of tribal land. The requirements
of mutual assistance preclude any significant economic differentiation,
and authority is shared among the older men. The primary family
unit rests within the clan, composed of two or more lineage groups
related by descent or adoption. Nevertheless, a clan can switch
its allegiance from its ancestral tribal unit to a stronger, ascendant
tribe. The clans are units of solidarity in disputes with other
clans in the tribe, although there may be intense feuding among
the lineage groups within the clan. The clan also represents a
shared territorial interest, as the land belonging to the component
lineage groups customarily is adjacent.
Several clans united under a single shaykh form a tribe (ashira).
This traditionally has been the dominant politico-military unit
although, because of unsettled conditions, tribes frequently band
together in confederations under a paramount shaykh. The degree
of hierarchy and centralization operative in a given tribe seems
to correlate with the length of time it has been sedentary: the
Bani Isad, for example, which has been settled for several centuries,
is much more centralized than the Ash Shabana, which has been
sedentary only since the end of the nineteenth century.
In the south, only the small hamlets scattered throughout the
cultivated area are inhabited solely by tribesmen. The most widely
spread social unit is the village, and most villages have resident
tradesmen (ahl as suq--people of the
market) and government employees. The lines between these village
dwellers and the tribespeople, at least until just before the
war, were quite distinct, although the degree varies from place
to place. As the provision of education, health, and other social
services to the generally impoverished rural areas increases,
the number and the social influence of these nontribal people
increase. Representatives of the central government take over
roles previously filled by the shaykh or his representatives.
A government school competes with the religious school. The role
of the merchants as middlemen--buyers of the peasants' produce
and providers of seeds and implements as well as of food and clothing--has
not yet been superseded in most areas by the government-sponsored
cooperatives and extension agencies. Increasingly in the 1980s,
government employees were of local or at least rural origin, whereas
in the 1950s they usually were Baghdadis who had no kinship ties
in the region, wore Western clothing, and took their assignments
as exile and punishment. In part the administrators provoked the
mutual antagonism that flourished between them and the peasants,
particularly as Sunni officials were often assigned to Shia villages.
The merchants, however, were from the region--if not from the
same village--and were usually the sons of merchants.
Despite some commercial developments in rural areas, in the late
1980s the economic base was still agriculture and, to a lesser
but increasing extent, animal husbandry. Failure to resolve the
technical problem of irrigation drainage contributed to declining
rural productivity, however, and accentuated the economic as well
as the political role of the central government. The growth of
villages into towns and whatever signs of recent prosperity there
were should be viewed, therefore, more as the result of greater
government presence than as locally developed economic viability.
The increased number of government representatives and employees
added to the market for local produce and, more important, promoted
the diffusion of state revenues into impoverished rural areas
through infrastructure and service projects. Much remained to
be done to supply utilities to rural inhabitants; just before
the war, the government announced a campaign to provide such essentials
as electricity and clean water to the villages, most of which
still lacked these (see Electricity , ch. 3). The government has
followed through on several of these projects--particularly in
the south--despite the hardships caused by the war. The regime
apparently felt the need to reward the southerners, who had suffered
inordinately in the struggle.
Data as of May 1988
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