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Iraq
Urban Society
Iraq's society just before the outbreak of the war was undergoing
profound and rapid social change that had a definite urban focus.
The city has historically played an important economic and political
role in the life of Middle Eastern societies, and this was certainly
true in the territory that is present-day Iraq. Trade and commerce,
handicrafts and small manufactures, and administrative and cultural
activities have traditionally been central to the economy and
the society, notwithstanding the overwhelming rural character
of most of the population. In the modern era, as the country witnessed
a growing involvement with the world market and particularly the
commercial and administrative sectors, the growth of a few urban
centers, notably Baghdad and Basra, has been astounding. The war,
however, has altered this pattern of growth remarkably--in the
case of Baghdad accelerating it; in the case of Basra shrinking
it considerably (see Social Systems , this ch.).
Demographic estimates based on the 1987 census reflected an increase
in the urban population from 5,452,000 in 1970 to 7,646,054 in
1977, and to 11,078,000 in 1987 or 68 percent of the population.
Census data show the remarkable growth of Baghdad in particular,
from just over 500,000 in 1947 to 1,745,000 in 1965; and from
3,226,000 in 1977 to 3,845,000 in 1987.
The population of other major cities according to the 1977 census
was 1,540,000 for Basra, 1,220,000 for Mosul, and 535,000 for
Kirkuk (detailed information from the October 1987 census was
lacking in early 1988). The port of Basra presents a more complex
picture: accelerated growth up to the time the war erupted, then
a sharp deceleration once the war started when the effects of
the fighting around the city began to be felt. Between 1957 and
1965, Basra actually had a higher growth rate than Baghdad--90
percent in Basra as compared with Baghdad's 65 percent. But once
the Iranians managed to sink several tankers in the Shatt al Arab,
this effectively blocked the waterway and the economy of the port
city began to deteriorate. By 1988 repeated attempts by Iran to
capture Basra had further eroded the strength of the city's commercial
sector, and the heavy bombardment had rendered some quarters of
Basra virtually uninhabitable. Because of the war reliable statistics
were unavailable, but the city's population in early 1988 was
probably less than half that in 1977.
In the extreme north, the picture was somewhat different. There,
a number of middle-sized towns have experienced very rapid growth--triggered
by the unsettled conditions in the region. Early in the war the
government determined to fight Kurdish- guerrilla activity by
targeting the communities that allegedly sustained the rebels.
It therefore cleared whole tracts of the mountainous region of
local inhabitants. The residents of the cleared areas fled to
regional urban centers like Irbil, As Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk;
by and large they did not transfer to the major urban centers
such as Mosul and Kirkuk.
Statistical details of the impact of these population shifts
on the physical and spatial character of the cities were generally
lacking in the 1980s. According to accounts by on-the- spot observers,
in Baghdad--and presumably in the other cities as well--there
appeared to have been no systematic planning to cope with the
growth of slum areas. Expansion in the capital until the mid-1970s
had been quite haphazard. As a result, there were many open spaces
between buildings and quarters. Thus, the squatter settlements
that mushroomed in those years were not confined to the city's
fringes. By the late 1950s, the sarifahs (reed and mud
huts) in Baghdad were estimated to number 44,000, or almost 45
percent of the total number of houses in the capital.
These slums became a special target of Qasim's government. Efforts
were directed at improving the housing and living conditions of
the sarifah dwellers. Between 1961 and 1963, many of
these settlements were eliminated and their inhabitants moved
to two large housing projects on the edge of the city-- Madinat
ath Thawra and An Nur. Schools and markets were also built, and
sanitary services were provided. In time, however, Ath Thawra
and An Nur, too, became dilapidated, and just before the war Saddam
Husayn ordered Ath Thawra rebuilt as Saddam City. This new area
of low houses and wide streets has radically improved the lifestyles
of the residents, the overwhelming majority of whom were Shias
who had migrated from the south.
Another striking feature of the initial waves of migration to
Baghdad and other urban centers is that the migrants have tended
to stay, bringing with them whole families. The majority of migrants
were peasant cultivators, but shopkeepers, petty traders, and
small craftsmen came as well. Contact with the point of rural
origin was not totally severed, and return visits were fairly
common, but reverse migration was extremely rare. At least initially,
there was a pronounced tendency for migrants from the same village
to relocate in clusters to ease the difficulties of transition
and maintain traditional patterns of mutual assistance. Whether
this pattern has continued into the war years was not known, but
it seems likely. A number of observers have reported neighborhoods
in the capital formed on the basis of rural or even tribal origin.
The urban social structure has evolved gradually over the years.
In pre-revolutionary Iraq it was dominated by a well- defined
ruling class, concentrated in Baghdad. This was an internally
cohesive group, distinguished from the rest of the population
by its considerable wealth and political power. The economic base
of this class was landed wealth, but during the decades of the
British Mandate and the monarchy, as landlords acquired commercial
interests and merchants and government officials acquired real
estate, a considerable intertwining of families and interests
occurred. The result was that the Iraqi ruling class could not
be easily separated into constituent parts: the largest commercial
trading houses were controlled by families owning vast estates;
the landowners were mostly tribal shaykhs but included many urban
notables, government ministers, and civil servants. Moreover,
the landowning class controlled the parliament, which tended to
function in the most narrowly conceived interest of these landlords.
There was a small but growing middle class in the 1950s and 1960s
that included a traditional core of merchants, shopkeepers, craftsmen,
professionals, and government officials, their numbers augmented
increasingly by graduates from the school system. The Ministry
of Education had been the one area during the monarchy that was
relatively independent of British advisers, and thus it was expanded
as a conspicuous manifestation of government response to popular
demand. It was completely oriented toward white-collar, middle-class
occupations. Within this middle class, and closely connected to
the commercial sector, was a small industrial bourgeoisie whose
interests were not completely identical with those of the more
traditional sector.
Iraq's class structure at mid-century was characterized by great
instability. In addition to the profound changes occurring in
the countryside, there was the economic and social disruption
of shortages and spiraling inflation brought on by World War II.
Fortunes were made by a few, but for most there was deprivation
and, as a consequence, great social unrest. Longtime Western observers
compared the situation of the urban masses unfavorably with conditions
in the last years of Ottoman rule. An instance of the abrupt population
shifts was the Iraqi Jews. The establishment of the state of Israel
led to the mass exodus of this community in 1950, to be replaced
by Shia merchants and traders, many of whom were descendants of
Iranian immigrants from the heavily Shia populated areas of the
south.
The trend of urban growth, which had commenced in the days immediately
preceding the revolution, took off in the mid-1970s, when the
effects of the sharp increases in the world price of oil began
to be felt. Oil revenues poured into the cities where they were
invested in construction and real estate speculation. The dissatisfied
peasantry then found even more cause to move to the cities because
jobs--mainly in construction--were available, and even part-time,
unskilled labor was an improvement over conditions in the countryside.
As for the elite, the oil boom of the 1970s brought greater diversification
of wealth, with some going to those attached to the land, and
some to those involved in the regime, commerce, and, increasingly,
manufacturing. The working class grew but was largely fragmented.
A relatively small number were employed in businesses of ten or
more workers, whereas a much larger number were classified as
wage workers, including those in the services sector. Between
the elite and the working masses was the lower middle class of
petty bourgeoisie. This traditional component consisted of the
thousands of small handicraft shops, which made up a huge part
of the so-called manufacturing sector, and the even more numerous
one-man stores. The newer and more rapidly expanding part of this
class consisted of professionals and semiprofessionals employed
in services and the public sector, including the officer corps,
and the thousands of students looking for jobs. This class became
particularly significant in the 1980s because former members of
it have become the nation's elite. Perhaps the most important
aspect of the growth of the public sector was the expansion of
educational facilities, with consequent pressures to find white-collar
jobs for graduates in the noncommodity sectors.
Data as of May 1988
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