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Israel
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK: ELITE, VALUES, AND ORIENTATIONS
When Israel became independent, its founding political elite,
associated mainly with Mapai, had almost three decades of experience
in operating self-governing institutions under the British Mandate.
The top Mapai/Labor Party leaders continued to dominate Israeli
politics for another three decades. Their paramount influence
for over half a century as founders, architects, and prime movers
of a Jewish national homeland has had an enduring effect on their
successor generation and the political scene in Israel. The elite,
political culture, social structure, and social makeup of any
nation entwine in complex ways and in the process shape the character
and direction of a given political system. This process holds
true especially in Israel, where ideological imperatives and their
institutionalization have constituted an important part of the
country's evolution.
The first generation of Israeli leaders came to Palestine (which
they called Eretz Yisrael, or Land of Israel) mainly during the
Second Aliyah (see Glossary) between 1900 and 1920 (see Labor
Zionism , ch. 1). The Ashkenazim (Jews of European origin), who
constituted the majority among the Yishuv's mostly Labor Zionist
political and socioeconomic elites, were impelled by Zionist ideals.
The majority held to Labor Zionism, while others adhered to moderate
General Zionism (sometimes called Political Zionism) or right-wing
Revisionist Zionism. To the early immigrants, the themes promoted
by the different Zionist movements provided powerful impulses
for sociopolitical action. These pioneers were essentially Labor
Zionists with an abiding faith in the rectitude of values that
stressed, among other things, the establishment of a modern Jewish
nation promoting mutual assistance under the principle of "from
each according to his ability, to each according to his needs,"
abolition of private ownership of the means of production, and
the idea that human consciousness and character were conditioned
by the social environment. They also held that Jewish land should
be developed in a collectivist agricultural framework, that well-to-do
Jews in the Diaspora should materially aid the cause of the Jewish
homeland, and that the Jews of the Diaspora should seek the fullest
measure of redemption by immigrating to the new Yishuv. In addition,
collectivist values of East European and Central European origin,
in which the founding generation had been socialized, affected
the political orientation of Israel both before and after independence.
The value system of the first generation came to be exemplified
first and foremost in the communal and egalitarian kibbutz and
to a lesser extent in the moshav. Together these institutions
accounted for less than 3 percent of the Jewish population at
any given time, but they have held a special place in Israeli
society as the citadel of pioneer ideology. They also gave Israel
a distinctive self-image as a robust, dedicated, egalitarian,
"farmer- or citizen-soldier" society. The kibbutzim also produced
numbers of national leaders out of proportion to their small population;
they also provided the country with some of its best soldiers
and officers.
The founding generation of Israeli leaders, including David Ben-Gurion,
Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Berl Katznelson, Moshe Sharett, and later, Levi
Eshkol and Golda Meir, in effect shaped the country's socioeconomic
structures and political patterns. These people were instrumental
in establishing the original Labor Zionist parties beginning in
1905, in merging them to establish Mapai in 1930, and in organizing
the Histadrut and Jewish self-defense institutions, such as the
Haganah (see Glossary), which later became the Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) in 1920. These formative, nation-building organizations,
along with the quasi-governmental Elected Assembly (Asefat Hanivharim--see
Glossary), the National Council (Vaad Leumi), the WZO, and the
Jewish Agency, served as the Yishuv's national institutions, shaping
the character of postindependence Israel.
From its earliest days, Mapai, which had an interlocking leadership
with the Histadrut, dominated Israeli public life, including the
top echelons of the IDF, the WZO, and the Jewish Agency. Its legitimacy
as a ruling party was seldom questioned because it was identified
with the mystique of the Zionist struggle for independence, patriotism,
and the successful consolidation of statehood. The essentially
secular political values espoused by Mapai leaders were endorsed
by most of the Jewish population. The absence of effective alternative
governing elites or countervalues within the country's multiparty
coalition-type government system made it difficult to challenge
the Mapai-controlled political mainstream. Moreover, political
patterns from the 1920s until the June 1967 War generally discouraged
the rise of radical right-wing or left-wing destabilizing tendencies.
This trend was rooted in the overall political dominance of Israel's
Labor Party and its predecessors and the strength of the mutual
restraints inherent in Israel's political subcultures.
Mainstream Israeli society is composed of persons who represent
pluralistic cultural and political backgrounds. Politically, some
Israeli Jews have liberal West European orientations; others were
reared in more collectivist Central European and East European
environments, or in authoritarian Middle Eastern political cultures.
Some are religiously more traditional than others, but even among
Orthodox Jews, shades of conviction vary substantially over the
role of Jewish customary laws and the relationship between the
state and religion. Thus, the founding generation had to develop
a political system that reconciled and accommodated the varied
needs of a wide range of groups.
The political system within Israel proper, excluding the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, is geared to the broadest possible level
of public participation. Political activities are relatively free,
although authoritarian and antidemocratic tendencies were evident
among some of the leaders and supporters of right-wing ultranationalist
parties and factions. In the late 1980s, the impetus to "agree
to disagree" within the democratic framework of conciliation began
to show some weakening as a result of intense polarizing controversies
over the future of the occupied territories and various disputes
over issues concerning the state and religion.
By the early 1970s, Jews of Sephardic origin (popularly referred
to in Israel as Oriental Jews) outnumbered their Ashkenazic counterparts
as a demographic group. The older Sephardim were, in general,
from politically authoritarian and religiously traditional North
African and Middle Eastern societies that regarded the Central
European and West European secular and social democratic political
value spectrum as too modern and far-reaching as compared to their
own. They were accustomed to strong authoritarian leaders rather
than ideals emphasizing social democratic collectivism and popular
sovereignty. Nonetheless, a sizable proportion of Sephardim joined
Labor's ranks both as leaders and rank-and-file party members.
Oriental Jews came to be referred to in the 1960s as "the Second
Israel"--the numerically larger but socially, culturally, economically,
and politically disadvantaged half of the nation (see Jewish Ethnic
Groups , ch. 2). Not all Orientals were economically deprived,
but nearly all of those who were relatively poor belonged to Sephardic
communities. The communal gap and attendant tensions between Ashkenazic
and Sephardic Jews have naturally engaged the remedial efforts
of successive governments, but results have fallen far short of
Oriental expectations. The problem was partly rooted in the country's
political institutions and processes. Ashkenazic dominance of
sociopolitical and economic life had been firmly institutionalized
before independence. Over the years, however, Sephardic representation
substantially increased in the country's major political parties,
and as of the 1980s, Sephardic Jews occupied leadership positions
in many municipalities.
Not surprisingly, beginning in the 1950s, most Sephardim tended
to vote against Mapai and its successor, Labor. Both were perceived
as representing the Ashkenazic establishment, even though Sephardim
were always represented among the ranks of party leaders. In the
1950s and early 1960s, while many Sephardim were impressed with
Ben-Gurion's charismatic and authoritative leadership, they nevertheless
tended to support Herut, the major opposition party led by Menachem
Begin, whose right-wing populism and ultranationalist, anti-Arab
national security posture appealed to them. Paradoxically, the
socialist-inspired social welfare system, a system built by Mapai
and sustained by Labor and the Labor-dominated Histadrut, benefited
the Sephardim particularly. In general, the Sephardim tended to
support the right-wing Gahal/Likud blocs that for years had advocated
a substantial modification of the welfare system so as to decrease
its socialist emphasis. In terms of long-range electoral trends,
the Sephardic position did not augur well for the Labor Zionist
elite of the Labor Party.
Pressure for greater political representation and power has come
from the younger, Israeli-born generation of both Ashkenazic and
Sephardic origins. As a group, they were less obsessed with the
past than their elders. The youth have been moving toward a strong,
industrialized, capitalist, Western-style, middle-class society
as the national norm. Although some younger right-wing ultranationalists
and right-wing religious advocates continued to be imbued with
the extremist nationalism and religious messianism of their elders--as
shown, for example, by their support of parties favoring annexation
of the occupied territories--most of the younger generation were
more secular, pragmatic, and moderate on such issues.
The concerns of secular young people went beyond the question
of "Who is a Jew"--which they continuously had to confront because
of right-wing religious pressures--to such critical issues as
the quality of education, social status, economic conditions,
and the comforts of modern life. Their primary interests have
been how to make Israel more secure from external threat and how
to improve the quality of life for all. Nevertheless, for many
Israelis, the founding ideologies remained a ritualized part of
national politics.
Urbanization and industrialization were equally potent forces
of change; their adulterating effect on Israel's founding ideology
has been particularly significant. They have led to new demands,
new opportunities, and new stresses in social and economic life
affecting all social and political strata. The older commitment
to agriculture, pioneering, and collectivism has crumbled before
the relentless pressure of industrialization and the bridging
of the gap between urban and rural life. Collective and communal
settlements have become increasingly industrialized; factories
and high-technology industries have been set up; the mass media
have faciliated an influx of new information and ideas; and additional
layers of bureaucratic and institutional arrangements have emerged.
Kibbutz idealism, the pride of Israel, has declined, especially
among increasingly individualistic and consumer-oriented young
people. To stem this tide and to retain young members, kibbutz
federations and individual kibbutzim have established many educational
and vocational programs and activities.
As the 1970s began, the social base of Israeli politics had become
highly complex, and political fluidity resulted. A major catalyst
in creating a new mood was the October 1973 War, known in Israel
as the Yom Kippur War, which dealt a crushing blow to popular
belief in Israel's strength and preparedness in the face of its
Arab adversaries (see The October 1973 War , ch. 5). The result
was a loss of confidence in the political and national security
elite, headed at the time by Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister
of Defense Moshe Dayan, and Minister-without-Portfolio Israel
Galilee. After the war, in which Egyptian and Syrian forces scored
military gains, many charges and countercharges concerned inadequate
military preparedness. Nevertheless, Meir's government returned
to power in the country's parliamentary elections held on December
31, 1973. Apparently, despite widespread misgivings, many Israelis
believed that continuity was preferable to change and uncertainty
under Begin's newly formed and untried center-right Likud Bloc
(see The Likud Bloc , this ch.).
Meir's resignation from the prime ministership in April 1974
resulted in a succession crisis and the departure of the last
of Labor's old guard party leaders, mostly in their late sixties
and seventies, such as Meir, Pinchas Sapir, and Israel Galilee.
Meir's departure triggered political infighting among the Labor
elite, specifically between the former Mapai and Rafi (Israel
Labor List--see Appendix B) factions; a new generation centered
around the triumvirate of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yigal
Allon, succeeded Meir.
The second most striking political development in the 1970s was
the ascendance of a new right-wing counterelite in May 1977. An
upset victory in the ninth parliamentary elections, called an
"earthquake" by some, brought Begin's center-right Likud to power,
ending Labor's half a century of political dominance. The new
political elite won primarily because of the defection of former
Labor leaders and previous Labor voters to the Democratic Movement
for Change (DMC), which had been founded in 1976 by Yigal Yadin
and several other groups. Despite the subsequent collapse of the
DMC and the defection of moderates from the Likud-led cabinet--for
example, former Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman formed his own
list Yahad (Together--see Appendix B) in 1981 and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Moshe Dayan created Telem--Likud's success in
the tenth parliamentary elections of 1981 resulted from its continued
ability to present itself as a viable governing group and a party
dedicated to ultranationalism and territorial expansionism.
The top echelons of the Israeli political elite as of the late
1980s were still predominantly of European background; many of
them had either immigrated to Palestine during the 1930s and the
1940s or had been born in the Yishuv to parents of East European
or Central European origin. A growing number of Oriental politicians,
however, were making their mark in the top ranks of all the major
parties and at the ministerial and subministerial levels. A majority
of the elite had a secular university education, while a minority
had a more traditional religious education. The political elite
was overwhelmingly urban--most resided in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem,
or Haifa. A minority, particularly the Sephardim, came from the
newer development towns. Among the elite who resided in rural
areas most, especially members of Labor and its satellites, represented
communal kibbutzim and, to a lesser extent, moshavim.
By occupational category, professional party politicians constituted
by far the largest single group, followed, in numerical order,
by lawyers, kibbutz officials, educators, Histadrut or private
sector corporate managers, journalists, ex-military officers,
and, to a lesser degree, functionaries of religious institutions.
Many of the elite were in the forty-to-mid-sixty age bracket.
In 1988 the political elite numbered more than 200 individuals,
excluding the broader social elite encompassing business, military,
religious, educational, cultural, and agricultural figures. The
number would be greater if senior officials in such key offices
as the Office of the Prime Minister and the ministries of defense,
foreign affairs, finance, and commerce, as well as the Histadrut
and its industrial and financial enterprises and trade unions,
were included.
The power of individual members of the elite varied depending
on their personal reputation and their offices. The most influential
were found in the cabinet. Members of the Knesset came next. Elected
mayors of large municipalities such as Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and
Haifa had considerable importance because of the influence of
local politics on national-level politics. In addition, the president,
Supreme Court justices, and the head of the Office of the State
Comptroller had the prestige of cabinet members although they
lacked decision-making responsibility.
During the late 1980s, the criteria for entrance into the top
elite were more open and competitive than previously. Political
parties, and, to some extent, the civil service, continued to
be the principal vehicles for upward mobility. Under the country's
electoral system of proportional representation, participation
in party politics remained essential for gaining top positions,
except in limited cases of co-optation from nonparty circles,
principally the military. In earlier periods, party nominating
committees primarily determined a politician's entry into a parliamentary
delegation; in the 1980s, internal party elections increasingly
governed this decision. This system placed a high premium on partisan
loyalty, membership in a party faction, and individual competence.
The political establishment, whether in office or in opposition,
secularist or Orthodox, left-wing or right-wing, has remained
basically loyal to the state. Establishment interpretations of
classical Zionist ideologies have varied according to the adherents'
diverse backgrounds and political and religious orientations,
but internal political cleavages have not undermined the essential
unity of Israeli society and political institutions. Except for
certain segments among a minority of extremist right-wing religious
or secular ultranationalists, most Israeli citizens have sought
to maintain democratic values and procedures; their differences
have centered mainly on tactics rather than on the goal of realizing
a modern, democratic, prosperous social welfare state.
Data as of December 1988
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