Kuwait
Introduction
THE COUNTRIES OF THE
PERSIAN GULF covered in this volume-- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
and the United Arab Emirates--have assumed added prominence as
a result of Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and the Persian Gulf
War in 1991. These states share certain characteristics while
simultaneously differing from one another in various respects.
Islam has played a major role in each of the Persian Gulf states,
although Kuwait and Bahrain reflect a greater secular influence
than the other three. Moreover, the puritanical Wahhabi (see Glossary)
Sunni (see Glossary) sect prevails in Qatar; Bahrain has a majority
population of Shia (see Glossary), a denomination of the faith
that constitutes a minority in Islam as a whole; and the people
of Oman represent primarily a minor sect within Shia Islam, the
Ibadi.
The beduin heritage also exerts a significant influence in all
of the Persian Gulf states. In the latter half of the twentieth
century, however, a sense of national identity increasingly has
superseded tribal allegiance. The ruling families in the Persian
Gulf states represent shaykhs (see Glossary) of tribes that originally
settled particular areas; however, governmental institutions steadily
have taken over spheres that previously fell under the purview
of tribal councils.
Historically, Britain exercised a protectorate at least briefly
over each of the Persian Gulf states. This connection has resulted
in the presence of governmental institutions established by Britain
as well as strong commercial and military ties with it. Sources
of military matériel and training in the late 1980s and early
1990s, however, were being provided by other countries in addition
to Britain.
Because of the extensive coastlines of the Persian Gulf states,
trade, fishing, shipbuilding, and, in the past, pearling have
represented substantial sources of income. In the early 1990s,
trade and, to a lesser extent, fishing, continued to contribute
major amounts to the gross domestic product (GDP--see Glossary)
of these states.
Of the five states, Oman has the least coastal area on the Persian
Gulf because its access to that waterway occurs only at the western
tip of the Musandam Peninsula, separated from the remainder of
Oman by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Partly as a result of
this limited contact with the gulf and partly because of the mountains
that cut off the interior from the coast, Oman has the most distinctive
culture of the five states.
In general, the gulf has served as a major facilitator of trade
and culture. The ancient civilization of Dilmun, for example,
in present-day Bahrain existed as early as the fourth millennium
B.C.
The Persian Gulf, however, also constitutes a ready channel for
foreign conquerors. In addition to Britain, over the centuries
the gulf states have known such rulers as the Greeks, Parthians,
Sassanians, Iranians, and Portuguese. When England's influence
first came to the area in 1622, the Safavid shah of Iran sought
England's aid in driving the Portuguese out of the gulf.
Britain did not play a major role, however, until the early nineteenth
century. At that time, attacks on British shipping by the Al Qasimi
of the present-day UAE became so serious that Britain asked the
assistance of the ruler of Oman in ending the attacks. In consequence,
Britain in 1820 initiated treaties or truces with the various
rulers of the area, giving rise to the term Trucial Coast.
The boundaries of the Persian Gulf states were considered relatively
unimportant until the discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1932 caused
other gulf countries to define their geographic limits. Britain's
1968 announcement that in 1971 it would abandon its protectorate
commitments east of the Suez Canal accelerated the independence
of the states. Oman had maintained its independence in principle
since 1650. Kuwait, with the most advanced institutions--primarily
because of its oil wealth--had declared its independence in 1961.
Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE followed suit in 1971. In the face
of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, all of the Persian Gulf states
experienced fears for their security. These apprehensions led
to their formation, together with Saudi Arabia, of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in May 1981.
Of all the gulf states, Kuwait clearly has the greatest security
concerns. By early 1994, Kuwait largely had succeeded in rebuilding
its damaged infrastructure and oil industry facilities ravaged
by Iraq in the course of its August 2, 1990, invasion and subsequent
scorched-earth policy concerning Kuwait's oil wells. By June 1993,
Kuwait had increased its oil production to such an extent that
it refused the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) quota of 1.8 million barrels per day (bpd--see Glossary);
instead, it demanded parity with the UAE at 2.2 million bpd, which
OPEC refused.
The war and the occupation left significant scars on the Kuwaiti
population. The war caused the departure of more than half the
population, including two-thirds of the foreigners, many of them
Palestinians and other Arabs. In the postwar period, most citizens
returned, but the government apparently decided not to allow foreigners
to exceed 50 percent of the population, and the number of Palestinians
permitted to return dropped sharply.
The war also did away with most of the financial reserves from
foreign investments that Kuwait had prudently accumulated in its
Reserve Fund for Future Generations. War costs were estimated
at a minimum of US$20 billion, a reconstruction figure less than
originally feared. Economic progress in 1993, however, was such
that a projected current account surplus of US$3.2 billion was
predicted, together with GDP growth of 11.5 percent in 1994. Kuwait's
willingness to implement World Bank (see Glossary) recommendations
concerning the strengthening of its economy appeared questionable,
however. The bank recommended that Kuwait eliminate subsidies,
encourage government workers to move to the private sector to
reduce serious government overstaffing, liberalize business regulations
to promote private-sector growth, and privatize a number of state
assets. Various of the recommendations would affect significantly
members of the ruling family, many of whom engage in the business
sector.
Kuwait's life is connected intimately with the Al Sabah, who
have ruled Kuwait since 1756; the rule has alternated between
the Jabir and Salim branches, descendants of two sons of the ruler
Mubarak the Great. In 1963 the ruler took the first step of any
gulf state to create a popular assembly. The narrow electorate
and the ruler's right to dissolve the assembly have limited the
influence of the legislature, and the assembly has been dissolved
twice, in each case for a number of years. In October 1992, the
National Assembly was reconstituted. However, only 15 percent
of the Kuwaiti population was able to vote. Freedom of the press,
which had been suspended in 1976, was restored in early 1992.
Despite the existence of several liberal opposition movements
and some Islamist (also seen as fundamentalist) pressures, the
postwar government represents little change, and the ruling family
continues to hold all major ministerial posts.
Apart from development of its oil industry, which dominates its
economy despite attempts at diversification, Kuwait's main concern
continues to be the threat from Iraq to its national security.
In late 1993, incidents continued to occur along the Kuwait-Iraq
border, and Iraqi media persisted in referring to Kuwait as the
"nineteenth province" of Iraq. As of late 1993, Iraq was believed
to hold more than 800 Kuwaiti prisoners of war.
Kuwait has taken several steps to counter the ongoing menace
of Iraq. Although Kuwait sought help from its GCC allies when
Iraq invaded, it recognized that the GCC states lacked the military
strength to provide effective assistance. Kuwait's postwar army
was reportedly down to about 8,000 from a prewar total of about
16,000 personnel. Kuwait therefore determined to build up and
indigenize its own armed forces. Accordingly, a new military conscription
law was enacted in December 1992. Furthermore, to upgrade matériel,
a postwar 1992 decree authorized the expenditure of US$11.7 billion
on military equipment over twelve years. Immediate orders included
218 M-1A2 United States main battle tanks, forty F/A-18 United
States Hornet fighter aircraft, five United States Patriot missile
fire units with missiles, 200 British Warrior armored personnel
carriers, and miscellaneous French matériel. Kuwait also contracted
in January 1993 with the United States Hughes Aircraft Company
for an early warning system. In 1993, however, the National Assembly
demonstrated its intent to review arms contracts and, if feasible,
to reduce expenditures, in particular by eliminating commission
payments to members of the royal family.
Other major steps included the signing of a security agreement
and a Foreign Military Sales agreement with the United States
in 1991, defense agreements with Britain and France in 1992--followed
by additional matériel purchases in 1993--and an agreement with
Russia in 1993. These agreements, as well as participation in
the GCC, involve joint training exercises, thus strengthening
the capabilities of the Kuwaiti armed forces. In line with its
closer relations with the West, Kuwait took immediate action against
perpetrators of the alleged Iraqi- inspired assassination attempt
on former United States president George H.W. Bush during his
attendance at Kuwait's April 1993 celebration of its liberation.
In a further defense measure, with private donations, Kuwait in
1993 began construction of a defensive wall along its 240-kilometer
border with Iraq.
With regard to regional relations, Kuwait in 1993 made conciliatory
gestures toward some of the Arab countries that supported Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. Statements by Minister of Foreign Affairs
Sabah al Ahmad Al Sabah in late June 1993 and by Crown Prince
and Prime Minister Saad al Abd Allah Al Sabah in late October
1993 set forth conditions for such states to mend relations with
Kuwait. The conditions covered support of United Nations (UN)
resolutions condemning Iraqi aggression and pressure on Iraq to
comply with UN resolutions, particularly those concerning border
demarcation and release of prisoners. These statements, which
did not name countries or organizations concerned, appear directed
primarily at Tunisia and Yemen and to a lesser degree at the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Relations with Jordan, however, continued
to be chilly, and Kuwait's relations with Qatar cooled over the
latter's rapprochement with Jordan in August and its restoration
of diplomatic links with Iraq.
Bahrain, the only island state of the five Persian Gulf states,
came under the rule of the Al Khalifa (originally members of the
Bani Utub, an Arabian tribe) in 1783 after 180 years of Iranian
control. Prior to 1971, Iran intermittently reasserted its claim
to Bahrain, two-thirds of whose inhabitants are Shia Muslims although
the ruling family is Sunni Muslim. Because of sectarian tensions,
the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and its aftermath had an unsettling
effect on the population; the government believed that a number
of Shia plots during the 1980s received clandestine support from
Iran. In 1992 the island's predominantly urban population (85
percent) consisted of 34 percent foreigners, who accounted for
55 percent of the labor force. The exploitation of oil and natural
gas--Bahrain was the first of the five Persian Gulf states in
which oil was discovered--is the island's main industry, together
with the processing of aluminum, provision of drydock facilities
for ships, and operation of offshore banking units.
The Al Khalifa control the government of Bahrain and held eight
of eighteen ministerial posts in early 1994. A brief experiment
in limited democracy occurred with the December 1972 elections
for a Constituent Assembly. The resulting constitution that took
effect in December 1973 provided for an advisory legislative body,
the National Assembly, voted for by male citizens. The ruler dissolved
the assembly in August 1975. The new Consultative Council, which
began debating labor matters in January 1993, is believed to have
had an impact on the provisions of the new Labor Law enacted in
September 1993.
Bahrain's historical concern over the threat from Iran as well
as its domestic unrest prompted it to join the GCC at the organization's
founding in 1981. Even within the GCC, however, from time to time
Bahrain has had tense relations with Qatar over their mutual claim
to the island of Hawar and the adjacent islands located between
the two countries; this dispute was under review by the International
Court of Justice at The Hague in early 1994. Bahrain traditionally
has had good relations with the West, particularly Britain and
the United States. Bahrain's cordial association with the United
States is reflected in its serving as homeport for the commander,
Middle East Force, since 1949 and as the site of a United States
naval support unit since 1972. In October 1991, following participation
in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Bahrain signed a defense cooperation
agreement with the United States.
Bahrain's relationship with Qatar is long-standing. After the
Al Khalifa conquered Bahrain in 1783 from their base in Qatar,
Bahrain became the Al Khalifa seat. Subsequently, tribal elements
remaining in Qatar sought to assert their autonomy from the Al
Khalifa. Thus, in the early nineteenth century, Qatar was the
scene of several conflicts involving the Al Khalifa and their
rivals, the Al Thani, as well as various outsiders, including
Iranians, Omanis, Wahhabis, and Ottomans. When the British East
India Company in 1820 signed the General Treaty of Peace with
the shaykhs of the area designed to end piracy, the treaty considered
Qatar a dependency of Bahrain. Not until the signing of a treaty
with Britain by Abd Allah ibn Qasim Al Thani in 1916 did Qatar
enter into the Trucial States system as an "independent" protectorate.
Britain's 1971 withdrawal from the Persian Gulf led to Qatar's
full independence in that year.
In preparation for independence, Qatar enacted a provisional
constitution in 1970 that created an Advisory Council, partly
elected. Twenty members are selected by the ruler from nominees
voted in each of ten electoral districts; fifteen members are
appointed directly by the ruler. In January 1992, fifty leading
Qataris petitioned the ruler for an elected council "with legislative
powers" and "a permanent constitution capable of guaranteeing
democracy and determining political, social, and economic structures";
as of early 1994, no action had been taken on these requests.
Governmental control has clearly remained in Al Thani hands; in
January 1994, ten of eighteen members of the Council of Ministers
belonged to the family.
Exploitation of the oil discovered in Qatar in 1939 was delayed
until after World War II. The petroleum industry has grown steadily,
and in 1991 the North Field natural gas project was inaugurated;
the North Field, a 6,000-square-kilometer offshore field considered
to be the world's largest, extends slightly into Iranian territorial
waters. The Qatari government, however, has sought to encourage
diversification and investment in such industries as steel, fertilizers,
and petrochemicals. The work force is predominantly foreign; in
1992 Qataris were estimated to represent only 20 percent of the
approximately 484,000 total population.
In part because most Qataris belong to the Wahhabi sect that
originated in the Arabian Peninsula, Qatar historically has enjoyed
close relations with Saudi Arabia, with which it settled its 1992
border dispute in 1993. Although Qatar supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq
War of 1980-88, it subsequently improved its relations with Iran,
undoubtedly in part because of its shared gas field. As a GCC
member, Qatar sent forces against Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War but continued to maintain a diplomatic link with Iraq. Qatar's
relations with the United States improved following Operation
Desert Storm, and the two countries signed a defense cooperation
agreement in June 1992 that includes a provision for the pre-positioning
of supplies.
The UAE represents an independent state created by the joining
together in the winter of 1971-72 of the seven former Trucial
Coast states of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Dubayy, Ras al
Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaywayn. In early 1993, UAE citizens
constituted about 12 percent of the total population of nearly
2.0 million. Oil is the major source of income for the federation,
but it is found in a significant amount only in Abu Dhabi and
to a lesser extent in Dubayy, Ras al Khaymah, and Sharjah. In
principle, each amirate is required to contribute to the federation's
budget (according to the provisional constitution, each state's
natural resources and wealth are its own), but in practice only
Abu Dhabi and, to a lesser degree, Dubayy have financed the federation.
The resulting disagreement over budget contributions as well as
over the integration of defense measures and forces led to the
recurring renewal at five- year intervals of the 1971 provisional
constitution, rather than the intended adoption of a permanent
constitution. In fact, the separation of powers is nominal; UAE
organs consist of the Supreme Council of the Union (SCU) composed
of the rulers of the seven amirates (Abu Dhabi and Dubayy have
a veto right on proposed measures), the Council of Ministers,
and the presidency. The chairman of the SCU is the president of
the UAE. In addition, there is an advisory Federal National Council
(FNC) of forty members appointed by the rulers of the amirates,
based on proportional representation; members serve two-year terms.
Following a one-year delay in naming members, the FNC met with
UAE citizens in January 1993, after which it held several sessions.
FNC actions included a call for private firms to employ more UAE
citizens and the establishment of a federal housing loan program
for UAE nationals.
Like other gulf states, the UAE has security concerns, of which
one is its dispute with Iran over the islands of Abu Musa, Tunb
al Kubra (Greater Tumb), and Tunb as Sughra (Lesser Tumb). This
dispute flared anew in early 1992, after lying dormant for twenty
years, when Iran took actions on Abu Musa that violated a shared
sovereignty agreement. The UAE was concerned that Iran intended
to extend its control over the entire island. However, in November
1992 the two countries agreed to abide by the provisions of the
1971 memorandum. The UAE would prefer a final resolution of this
dispute and has expressed a willingness to have its sovereignty
claims arbitrated by the International Court of Justice or the
United Nations.
Militarily, the UAE participated in the 1991 Persian Gulf War
and contributed personnel to the UN peacekeeping force in Somalia
in 1992. The UAE's experience in the Persian Gulf War led it to
consider itself inadequately prepared in terms of matériel; consequently,
in February 1993 it ordered Leclerc main battle tanks and other
equipment from France.
Oman is the only one of the Persian Gulf states whose ruler bears
the title of sultan instead of shaykh. Until
1970 the ruler was known as the sultan of Muscat (the coastal
area) and Oman (the rugged interior imamate), reflecting the diverse
parts of the country. To Ibadi Muslims, the political ruler is
also the imam (see Glossary); the title sultan, taken
from Ottoman usage, indicates a Muslim ruling sovereign combining
religious and political connotations.
The present sultan, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, began his rule in
1970 and immediately started emphasizing economic development
and modernization. Such an emphasis was essential because Oman's
oil, first produced commercially in 1967, had a relatively limited
production span; 1992 estimates projected seventeen more years
of output at the 1992 production rate. National development plans,
therefore, have focused on reducing the dependence on oil and
on confronting problems occasioned by the dramatic rural-to-urban
population shift, the accompanying social transformation, and
the large number of foreign workers, all in the interests of promoting
stability. Oman never has had a census, but in 1992, for planning
purposes, the government estimated the population at 2 million
persons (the actual figure may be closer to 1.5 million), of whom
about 500,000 were foreigners. The latter constituted approximately
55 percent of the labor force.
Oman faces a number of problems. The government must attempt
to provide adequate housing and utilities, especially water; stimulate
agriculture to increase food production; and discourage urban
migration. Specific development goals include establishing new
industries and industrial estates; training indigenous personnel;
developing minerals other than oil; encouraging agriculture, fishing,
and tourism; increasing privatization of state-controlled enterprises;
and diminishing regional imbalances, particularly in the Dhofar
region.
On coming to power, Qabus ibn Said confronted the rebellion in
the Dhofar region, which had began in 1964. To counter the revolt,
he concentrated on establishing development projects in this neglected
area of the country and on improving the transportation and communications
infrastructure. With the assistance of Iran, Jordan, and several
gulf states, he also took military action to repress the rebellion.
The sultan was aided in these efforts by the fact that the bureaucracy
and major posts were largely in the hands of ruling family members.
Leading government posts contined to be in the hands of ruling
family members into the 1990s. For example, in early 1994 the
sultan also served as prime minister, minister of defense, minister
of finance, minister of foreign affairs, and chairman of the central
bank. Other members of the ruling family served as deputy prime
minister for legal affairs, deputy prime minister for security
and defense, and minister of national heritage and culture. Still
other ruling family members served as special advisers and as
governors of the capital and of the Dhofar region. Close cooperation
occurs between the ruling family and the merchants; tribal shaykhs
now play a lesser role. Following the example of other gulf states,
in 1991 Qabus ibn Said created the Consultative Council, which
has representatives from the forty- one wilayat, or governorates,
but no government officials, in contrast to the State Consultative
Council, established in 1981, which the new council replaced.
In the area of foreign relations, Oman has been closely aligned
with Britain and the United States; it first signed a military
accord with the latter in 1980. This "facilities access" agreement
was most recently renewed in 1990. In the region, Oman has sought
to play an independent, nonconfrontational role. In late October
1992, Oman ended a twenty-five-year border dispute with Yemen
by signing a border-delineation agreement; it also concluded a
border agreement with Saudi Arabia as a result of which Oman began
demarcating the boundary between the two countries. Moreover,
Oman has acted as mediator between the United States and Iran
and between Britain and Iran. Meanwhile, Oman has been increasing
its arms purchases and building up its armed forces.
Oman's purchase of military matériel is consonant with the general
pattern of Persian Gulf states, which have been spending heavily
on military equipment since at least the early 1980s, primarily
to compensate for their limited manpower. In most instances, women
are not included in the armed forces. Lacking domestic arms production
capability, the gulf states mainly need aircraft, air defense
missile systems, early warning systems, and small missile attack
craft, as well as main battle tanks and armored personnel carriers.
The gulf countries recognize the potential threats they face,
particularly from Iraq and possibly from Iran. In addition, they
have experienced the need to counter domestic insurgencies, protect
their ruling families and oil installations, and possibly use
military force in pursuing claims to disputed territory. A partial
solution to their defense needs lay in the formation of the GCC
in 1981.
The Persian Gulf War brought with it, however, the realization
that the GCC was inadequate to provide the gulf states with the
defense they required. As a result, most of the states sought
defense agreements with the United States, Britain, France, and
Russia, more or less in that order. Concurrently, the gulf countries
have endeavored to improve the caliber and training of their armed
forces and the interoperability of military equipment through
joint military exercises both within the GCC framework and with
Western powers. The United States has sought to complement GCC
collective security efforts and has stated that it does not intend
to station forces permanently in the region.
At a November 1993 meeting, GCC defense ministers made plans
to expand the Saudi-based Peninsula Shield forces, a rapid deployment
force, to 25,000. The force is to have units from each GCC state,
a unified command, and a rotating chairmanship. The ministers
also agreed to spend up to US$5 billion to purchase three or four
more AWACS aircraft to supplement the five the Saudi air force
already has and to create a headquarters in Saudi Arabia for GCC
defense purposes. The UAE reportedly considered the proposed force
increase insufficient; furthermore, Oman sought a force of 100,000
members.
In addition to these efforts, directed at the military aspects
of national security, declining oil revenues for many of the states
and internal sectarian divisions also have led the gulf countries
to institute domestic efforts to strengthen their national security.
Such efforts entail measures to increase the role of citizens
in an advisory governmental capacity, to allow greater freedom
of the press, to promote economic development through diversification
and incentives for foreign investment, and to develop infrastructure
projects that will increase the standard of living for more sectors
of the population, thereby eliminating sources of discord. The
ruling families hope that such steps will promote stability, counter
the possible appeal of radical Islam, and ultimately strengthen
the position of the ruling families in some form of limited constitutional
monarchy.
January 26, 1994
Helen Chapin Metz
Data as of January 1993
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