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Kuwait
INDEPENDENCE
With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the Arab coast of
the gulf was ruled by ten families: in Kuwait the Al Sabah; in
Bahrain the Al Khalifa; in Qatar the Al Thani; in the present-day
UAE the Al Nuhayyan in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuaimi in Ajman, the
Al Sharqi in Al Fujayrah, the Al Maktum in Dubayy, the Al Qasimi
in Ras al Khaymah and Sharjah, and the Al Mualla in Umm al Qaywayn;
and the Al Said in present-day Oman. These families owed their
positions to tribal leadership; it was on this traditional basis
that the British had negotiated treaties with their leaders in
the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.
A major provision of these treaties was the recognition of sovereignty.
The British were concerned that rulers of the weaker gulf families
would yield some of their territory under pressure from more powerful
groups, such as the Al Saud or the Ottomans. Accordingly, the
treaties signed between 1820 and 1916 recognized the sovereignty
of these rulers within certain borders and specified that these
borders could not be changed without British consent. Such arrangements
helped to put tribal alliances into more concrete terms of landownership.
This meant that the Al Nuhayyan of Abu Dhabi, for example, not
only commanded the respect of tribes in the hinterland but also
owned, as it were, the land that those tribes used--in this case,
about 72,000 square kilometers of Arabia.
Controlling, or owning, land became more important with the discovery
of oil. When oil companies came to explore for oil, they looked
for the "owner" of the land; in accordance with British treaties,
they went to the area's leading families and agreed to pay fees
to the heads of these families. As oil revenues increased, the
leaders became rich. Although the leaders spent much of their
new wealth on themselves, they also distributed it in the area
they controlled according to traditional methods, which initially
consisted mostly of largesse: gifts for friends and food for whomever
needed it. As time passed, the form of largesse became more sophisticated
and included, for example, the construction of schools, hospitals,
and roads to connect principal cities to towns in the interior.
Oil revenues did not change traditional tribal ideas about leadership.
New money, however, increased the influence of area leaders by
giving them more resources to distribute. Because of oil exploration,
tribal boundaries became clearer, and areas were defined more
precisely. Distinctions among tribes also became more evident.
A new sense of identity appeared in gulf shaykhdoms and aroused
a growing expectation that they should rule themselves. To do
this, shaykhs had to cut themselves off from British control and
protection.
By the early 1960s, this was something to which the British had
little objection. India and Pakistan won their independence in
1947; this meant that Britain no longer had to worry about protecting
the western flank of the subcontinent. Britain was also burdened
by the tremendous sacrifices it made during World War II and could
not be as globally involved as it had been before the war. Therefore,
Britain yielded many of its strategic responsibilities to the
United States in the postwar period or gave them up entirely.
However, the British were bound to the gulf by treaties and so
remained in the region, but it was clear by the 1960s that they
sought to leave the gulf.
Kuwait was the first state to terminate the agreement connecting
it with Britain. Oil production in Kuwait had developed more quickly
than in neighboring states; as a result, Kuwaitis were better
prepared for independence. They declared independence in 1961
but ran into immediate trouble when Iraq claimed the territory.
The Iraqis argued that the British had recognized Ottoman sovereignty
over Kuwait before World War I and, because the Ottomans had claimed
to rule Kuwait from what was then the province of Iraq, the territory
should belong to Iraq.
The British immediately sent troops to Kuwait to deter any Iraqi
invasion. British and Kuwaiti positions were supported by the
newly formed League of Arab States (Arab League), which recognized
the new state and sent troops to Kuwait. The Arab League move
left the Iraqis isolated and somewhat intimidated. Accordingly,
when a new Iraqi government came to power in 1963, one of its
first steps was to give up its claim and recognize the independence
of Kuwait.
The experience of Kuwait may have increased the anxiety of other
gulf leaders about declaring their independence. Even into the
1970s, Iran and Saudi Arabia continued to make claims on territory
in Bahrain and the UAE, although by the end of 1971 those states
were independent, and nothing came of those claims. Gulf leaders
also faced uncertainty about the form their state should take.
Should they all, with the exception of Oman whose situation was
different in that its treaty relationship with Britain did not
guarantee its borders as did treaties of the other gulf states,
band together in the largest entity possible? Or should they break
up into nine separate states, the smallest of which had little
territory, few people, and no oil?
British action forced gulf leaders to decide. Because of domestic
financial concerns, Britain decided in the late 1960s to eliminate
its military commitments east of Suez. As a result, the gulf shaykhs
held a number of meetings to discuss independence. Initially,
leaders considered a state that would include all nine shaykhdoms;
Qatar had even drawn up a constitution to this effect. In the
end, however, so large a federation proved unworkable.
An obstacle to creating a "superstate" was the status of Bahrain,
which had been occupied by Iran at various times. The shah of
Iran argued that he had a stronger claim to the island than the
Al Khalifa, who had only come to Bahrain in the eighteenth century.
Furthermore, the shah indicated that Iran would not accept a federation
of Arab states that included Bahrain.
In the end, the United Nations (UN) considered the issue of Bahrain;
it decided to deny the Iranian claim to the island and to allow
the Bahrainis to form an independent state. Bahrain was better
suited to independence than some of the other shaykhdoms because
the island had been a center of British administration and had
a more developed infrastructure and education system than its
neighbors. Ironically, the greater British presence on Bahrain
made residents more resentful of treaty ties to Britain. Bahrain
was the only place in the gulf where demonstrations against Britain
occurred.
Backed by the UN decision, Bahrain declared its independence
on August 15, 1971. On September 3, 1971, Qatar followed, removing
another state from any potential federation. Although Qatar had
minimal contact with Britain, it was well suited to independence
because it had a history of support from the Al Saud that went
back to the beginnings of the Wahhabi state. Accordingly, at independence,
Qatar could expect continued support from Saudi Arabia. It could
also anticipate substantial oil revenues that had been increasing
since the 1950s.
The same was not true for the other gulf states. The five southern
shaykhdoms--Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Ras al Khaymah, Sharjah, and Umm
al Qaywayn--had little oil in their territory and so could not
afford self-sufficiency as countries. Although substantial deposits
had been discovered in Abu Dhabi and Dubayy, these two states
preferred the security of a confederation rather than independence.
Abu Dhabi, for example, had an outstanding border dispute with
Saudi Arabia and a history of poor relations with that country
because of Abu Dhabi's opposition to Wahhabi Islam. Abu Dhabi
might have protected itself by forming a federation with the five
southern shaykhdoms, but this would not have suited Dubayy. Although
Dubayy had oil of its own, its rulers, the Al Maktum, had a history
of hostility toward their relatives in Abu Dhabi, the Al Nuhayyan,
from whom they split in the early nineteenth century. The Al Maktum
would not have liked the Al Nuhayyan to dominate a confederation
of gulf leaders while they were isolated in Dubayy.
Powers beyond the gulf coast also had an interest in the state
to be formed. The Saudis no longer sought to control the gulf
coast, but they remained concerned about stability on the eastern
border. The British and other oil-consuming countries in the West
were similarly concerned, and all parties believed that the largest
state would also be the most stable. Accordingly, many forces
were applying pressure in 1970 to convince the seven shaykhs to
stay together.
Thus, in 1971 soon after Qatar became independent, the remaining
shaykhs, with the exception of the Al Qasimi in Ras al Khaymah,
took the preliminary constitution that Qatar had originally drawn
up for a nine-member confederation and adapted it to a six-member
body. On December 2, 1971, one day after the British officially
withdrew, these six shaykhdoms declared themselves a sovereign
state.
Ras al Khaymah originally refused to join the confederation.
The Al Qasimi, who ruled the area, claimed a number of islands
and oil fields within the gulf to which Iran laid claim as well.
In the negotiations to form the UAE, the Al Qasimi sought support
for their claims from Arab states on the peninsula as well as
from some Western powers. When their efforts proved unsuccessful,
the Al Qasimi pulled out of the negotiations. They quickly realized,
however, that they could not exist on their own and joined the
union in February 1972.
Oman was never considered a possible confederation member. Always
geographically separate from its neighbors to the north, Oman
had never entered into the agreements with Britain that governed
other gulf rulers. The British had been closely involved in Oman
since the middle of the nineteenth century, but they were under
no official obligation to defend it.
The issue in Oman was one of internal unity rather than of sovereignty
over foreign affairs. The historical split between coast and interior
had continued through the second half of the nineteenth century
and the first part of the twentieth. In 1920 the Al Said sultan,
Taimur ibn Faisal, came to terms with this split by granting limited
sovereignty to the tribes of the interior. Because of ambiguous
language, the peoples of the interior believed that the treaty
cut them off from the Al Said; the Al Said, however, never gave
up their claim to all of Oman.
The dispute between the two groups was exacerbated by the exploration
for oil, which began in Oman in 1924. The oil fields lay in the
interior, and the oil companies negotiated for access to them
with the Al Said in Muscat. This Al Said sultan gladly sold them
rights to the Omani oil fields, although the tribes of the interior
claimed sovereignty over the area. When the oil men went inland
to explore, they were attacked by the tribes, whom the sultan
considered to be rebels, leading the oil companies to complain
to the British government. Their complaints encouraged the British
to continue their aid to the sultan, hoping that he would pacify
the area and ensure Western access to Omani oil.
The sultan was eventually successful. In 1957 forces loyal to
Said ibn Taimur captured the town of Nazwah, which the Al Said
had not controlled since the nineteenth century. In 1958 the sultan
withdrew to his palace in the coastal city of Salalah in Dhofar,
a southern province that the Al Said had annexed in the nineteenth
century, and took little interest in maintaining stability in
the country. While keeping his military relationship with the
British, he restricted Oman's contact with the rest of the world,
discouraged development, and prohibited political reform.
In the end, the Al Said control over a united Oman survived,
but Said ibn Taimur did not. Although the sultan had partially
reestablished his authority in the Omani interior, he was unable
to handle the increasing complexity of domestic politics. By the
1960s, Omani affairs had become international issues. Western
oil companies sought to work in the interior of the country, and
foreign governments, such as the Marxist state of the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen, were sending arms to the rebels
in Dhofar.
The Al Said hold over the region remained problematic, however,
and in 1964 another rebellion arose, this time in Dhofar. The
Dhofar rebellion, which was not brought under control until 1976,
obliged the sultan to seek foreign military assistance; therefore,
British forces, particularly the air force, resumed action in
the country. The rebels pointed to British involvement as an indication
of the sultan's illegitimacy and brought their case to the UN,
which eventually censured Britain for its continuing involvement
in Oman.
Said ibn Taimur's policies frustrated many, not only in Oman
but also in Britain, whose citizens were heavily involved in the
sultan's military and intelligence apparatus. By 1970 these elements
decided they could bear with the situation no longer; a coalition
of Omani military and civilian forces, as well as British forces,
attacked the palace and forced Said ibn Taimur to abdicate. They
replaced him with his son, Qabus ibn Said Al Said, who had played
no role in Said ibn Taimur's government. The sultan had actually
locked his son in the palace for fear that Qabus ibn Said, who
had been educated in Britain, would challenge his archconservative
policies.
On his release, Qabus ibn Said consolidated the sultanate's hold
over the interior and then solicited regional rather than British
help to put down the rebellion in Dhofar. Other Arab leaders,
as well as the shah of Iran, sent troops to Oman in response to
Qabus ibn Said's requests; with the help of this coalition, by
1976 the sultan ended the Dhofar rebellion.
Qabus ibn Said was not an Ibadi imam as the first rulers in his
line had been, but in 1970 this was less important than it had
been in earlier times. Only about 60 percent of Oman's population
was Ibadi, concentrated in the northern mountains. Furthermore,
the province of Dhofar had a relatively short history of association
with the rest of Oman.
Data as of January 1993
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