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Libya
The Revolution and Social Change
In their September 1969 revolution, Qadhafi and the young officers
who provided most of his support aimed with idealistic fervor
at bringing to an end the social inequities that had marked both
the colonial periods and the monarchical regime. The new government
that resulted was socialist, but Qadhafi stressed that it was
to be a kind of socialism inspired by the humanitarian values
inherent in Islam. It called for equitable distribution to reduce
disparities between classes in a peaceful and affluent society,
but in no sense was it to be a stage on the road to communism.
On the eve of the 1969 revolution, the royal family and its most
eminent supporters and officeholders, drawn from a restricted
circle of wealthy and influential families, dominated Libyan society.
These constituted what may be termed the traditional sociopolitical
establishment, which rested on patronage, clientage, and dependency.
Beneath this top echelon was a small middle class. The Libyan
middle class had always been quite small, but it had expanded
significantly under the impact of oil wealth. In the mid- l960s,
it consisted of several distinct social groupings: salaried religious
leaders and bureaucrats, old families engaged in importing and
contracting, entrepreneurs in the oil business, shopkeepers, self-employed
merchants and artisans and prosperous farmers and beduin. Workers
in small industrial workshops, agricultural laborers, and peasant
farmers, among others, composed the lower class.
Most of the urban population consisted of the families of first-generation
workers, small shopkeepers, and a horde of public workers. Above
them were thin layers of the newly rich and of old, prosperous
families. An urban working class, however, had largely failed
to develop, and the middle class was a feeble one that in no way
resembled the counterpart element that had become a vital political
force in many other countries of the Arab world.
At the top of the rural social structure, the shaykhs of the
major tribes ruled on the basis of inherited status. In the cities,
corresponding roles were played by the heads of the wealthy families
and by religious figures. These leaders were jealous of their
position and, far from concerning themselves with furthering social
progress, saw modernization as a threat. In no way, however, did
the leaders present a united front.
The development of the petroleum industry was accompanied by
profound technical and organizational changes and by the appearance
of a younger elite whose outlook had been greatly affected by
technological advances: among their number were technocrats, students,
and young army officers. Not the least notable of the factors
that set this new element apart was age. The civilians of this
group, as well as the military officers, were for the most part
in their thirties or younger, and their views had little in common
with those of the aging authorities who had long controlled a
swollen bureaucracy (11 percent of the 1969 labor force). More
urbanized and better educated than their elders, this new group
entertained hopes and aspirations that had been frustrated by
the group surrounding King Idris. In particular, resentment had
been aroused by the arbitrariness, corruption, and inefficiency
of Idris' government as well as by its questionable probity in
the distribution of oil-funded revenues.
The young officers who formed the Free Officers Movement and
its political nucleus, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC),
showed a great deal of dedication to the revolutionary cause and
a high degree of uniformity in political and economic outlook
(see Qadhafi and the Revolutionary Command Council , ch. 1). In
Libya, as in a number of other Arab countries, admission to the
military academy and careers as army officers were options available
to members of the less privileged economic strata only after national
independence was attained. A military career, offering new opportunities
for higher education and upward economic and social mobility,
was thus a greater attraction for young men from poorer families
than for those of the wealthy and the traditional elite. These
youthful revolutionaries came from quite modest social backgrounds,
representing the oases and the interior as opposed to the coastal
cities, and the minor suppressed tribes as opposed to the major
aristocratic ones.
The officers of the RCC--all captains and lieutenants-- represented
the forefront of a social revolution that saw the middle and lower
middle classes assert control over social and political prerogatives
heretofore denied them. They quickly displaced the former elite
of the Idris era and became themselves the prime movers of the
Libyan state. Numbering only about a dozen men, they were gradually
joined by sympathetic civilian and military personnel in constituting
a new elite.
By the late 1980s, this governing class consisted of Qadhafi
and the half-dozen remaining members of the Free Officers Movement,
government ministers and other high state officials and managers,
second-echelon officers of the Free Officers Movement, and top
officials and activists of local mass organizations and governing
councils. Civilian officials and bureaucrats as a whole were considerably
better educated than their military colleagues. Many of them possessed
college degrees, came from urban middle-class backgrounds, and
were indispensable for the administrative functioning of government
and the economy. Below this elite was the upper middle class composed
of educated technocrats, administrators, and remnants of a wealthy
commercial and entrepreneurial class. The lower middle class contained
small traders, teachers, successful farmers, and low-level officials
and bureaucrats. This new and small revolutionary elite sought
to restructure Libyan society. In broad terms, the young officers
set off to create an egalitarian society in which class differences
would be minimal and the country's oil wealth would be equally
shared. Their aim was to curb the power and wealth of the old
elite and to build support among the middle and lower middle classes
from which they had come and with which they identified. The policies
they devised to remold society after 1969 entailed extension of
state control over the national economy, creation of a new political
structure, and redistribution of wealth and opportunity through
such measures as minimum wage laws, state employment, and the
welfare state.
The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) created in 1971 was thus intended
as a mass mobilization device (see Subnational Government and
Administration , ch. 4). Its aim was the peaceful abolition of
class differences to avoid the tragedy of a class struggle; the
egalitarian nature of its composition was shown by a charter prescribing
that, at all levels, 50 percent of its members must be peasants
and laborers. At the heart of the cultural revolution of 1973
was the establishment of people's committees (see The Popular
Revolution and People's Committee , ch. 4). These were made up
of working-level leaders in business and government, who became
the local elites in the new society. That same year brought enactment
of a law requiring that larger business firms share profits with
their personnel, appoint workers to their boards of directors,
and establish joint councils composed of workers and managers.
At the same time, the government launched a long-term campaign
against a new privileged class pejoratively identified as "bourgeois
bureaucrats." Multiple dismissals at this time included top university
administrators, hospital directors, and oil-industry officials,
as well as numerous lower ranking employees. However, in 1975,
public administrators, including educational and public health
service, made up nearly 24 percent of the labor force---more than
twice the proportion at the time of the monarchy's demise. Late
in 1976, a newspaper editorial complained that the labor force
still contained tens of thousands of administrators and supervisors--most
of them in the public sector---while in other countries this element
seldom exceeded 2 percent of the total.
Having attacked the bureaucracy and concentrations of wealth
and privilege, the regime in the later 1970s dealt with the entrepreneurial
middle class (see Role of the Government , ch. 3). The first restrictions
on private traders appeared as early as 1975, but the real blows
came a few years later. A 1978 law struck at much-prized investments
in private property by limiting ownership of houses and apartments
to one per nuclear family, although the government promised compensation
to the dispossessed. New restrictions were placed on commercial
and industrial establishments, foreign trade became a monopoly
of public corporations, workers assumed control of major industrial
and commercial enterprises, and private wholesale trade was abolished.
Finally, state investments and subsidies were shifted away from
small businesspeople.
Although the Libyan middle class was suppressed by the abovementional
restrictions in the late 1970s, it was not destroyed. Indeed,
a significant number of its members adapted themselves to the
social dictates of the revolutionary regime by cooperation with
it or by recruitment into the modernizing state apparatus. Its
ranks still contained educated technocrats and administrators,
without whose talents the state could not function, as well as
remnants of the commercial and entrepreneurial class, some of
them well-to-do. A separate category of small traders, shopkeepers,
and farmers could also be identified. They, too, sought careers
in the state sector, although many of them continued to operate
small businesses alongside public enterprises. Those who could
not adapt or who feared persecution fled abroad in significant
numbers (see The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , ch.
1).
In contrast with the old regime, it was now possible for members
of the middle and lower classes to seek and gain access to positions
of influence and power. The former criteria of high family or
tribal status had given way to education to a considerable degree,
although patronage and loyalty continued to be rewarded as well.
But in general, social mobility was much improved, a product of
the revolutionary order that encouraged participation and leadership
in such new institutions as the Basic People's Congress and the
revolutionary committees (see Glossary; see also Subnational Government
and Administration , ch. 4). Only the highest positions occupied
by Qadhafi and a small number of his associates were beyond the
theoretical reach of the politically ambitious.
The core elite in the 1980s, which consisted of Qadhafi and the
few remaining military officers of the RCC, presented a significant
contrast of its own with respect to the top political leadership
of the Idris era. This was the result of a commitment to national
unity and identity, as well as of common social background. Within
this small group, the deeply ingrained regional cleavages of the
past, particularly that between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, had
almost disappeared and were no longer of political significance.
Similarly, the ethnic distinction between Arab and Berber within
the elite was no longer important. The old urban-rural and center-
periphery oppositions, remained very important, but they did not
characterize the core elite itself. Rather, they differentiated
the core elite from the country's former rulers, because the revolutionary
leadership was deeply rooted in the rural periphery, not the Mediterranean
coastal centers.
The rest of society, including government officials immediately
below Qadhafi, appeared to be a good deal less unified. Despite
the exertions of the core elite, a sense of national unity and
identity had not yet developed in the late 1980s, and loyalty
to region, tribe, and family remained stronger than allegiance
to the state. There was much alienation from the regime, often
expressed in terms of lethargy and passivity. Incessant pressures
on the part of the regime to enlist as many people as possible
in running public affairs had provoked much resentment and resistance.
Many adults did not participate, despite the exhortations and
oversight of the revolutionary committees, themselves a source
of uncertainly and anxiety.
All of these pressures applied to the educated middle class,
estimated to number perhaps 50,000 out of a total population of
3.6 million. Many were clearly alienated by the shortages of consumer
goods, the militarization of society, and the constant demands
to participate actively in the institutions of the jamahiriya
(see Glossary), sentiments that characterized other social classes
as well. Like their fellow citizens, the educated sought refuge
in the affairs of their families, demonstrating yet again the
strength of traditional values over revolutionary norms, or in
foreign travel, especially in Europe.
The country's youth were also pulled in opposite directions.
By the mid-1980s, the vast majority knew only the revolutionary
era and its achievements. Because these gains were significant,
not surprisingly young people were among the most dedicated and
visible devotees of the revolution and Qadhafi. They had benefited
most from increased educational opportunities, attempted reforms
of dowry payments, and the emancipation of young women (see The
Family, the Individual, and the Sexes , this ch.). Libyan youth
also enjoyed far more promising employment prospects than their
counterparts elsewhere in the Maghrib.
With few outlets such as recreation centers or movies for their
energies, a large number of the youth were found in the revolutionary
committees, where they pursued their task of enforcing political
conformity and participation with a vigor that at times approached
fanaticism. Others kept watch over the state administration and
industry in an attempt to improve efficiency. Not all were so
enthusiastic about revolutionary goals, however. For instance,
there was distaste for military training among students in schools
and universities, especially when it presaged service in the armed
forces. In the 1980s, some of this disdain had resulted in demonstrations
and even in executions (see Opposition to Qaddafi , ch. 4).
By the late 1980s, Libyan society clearly showed the impact of
almost two decades of attempts at restructuring. The country was
an army-dominated state under the influence of no particular class
or group and was relatively free from the clash of competing interests.
Almost all sources of power in traditional life had been eliminated
or coopted. Unlike states such as Saudi Arabia that endeavored
to develop their societies within the framework of traditional
political and economic systems, Libya had discarded most of the
traditional trappings and was using its great wealth to transform
the country and its people.
With its highly egalitarian socialist regime, Libya differed
considerably in its social structure from other oil-rich states.
Salaries and wages were high, and social services were extensive
and free. There was much less accumulation of private wealth than
in other oil states, and social distinction was discouraged as
a matter of deliberate public policy. But Libyan society was deeply
divided, and entire segments of the population were only superficially
committed to the course that the revolutionary regime had outlined.
And while the old order was clearly yielding to the new, there
was much doubt and unease about where society and state were headed.
Data as of 1987
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