Nicaragua THE CHAMORRO GOVERNMENT TAKES POWER
President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro
Courtesy Embassy of Nicaragua, Washington
The Chamorro victory in the 1990 elections surprised
most of
the participants and many observers, both domestic and
international. Many Nicaraguans did not view Chamorro as a
politician and found her unprepared a for leadership role.
The
election date had been advanced nine months by the
Sandinistas
from the constitutionally set month of November 1990. This
decision was taken in response to the meeting of
representatives
of the Nicaraguan government with the Nicaraguan
Resistance
(commonly referred to as Contras--short for
contrarevolucionarios--see Glossary) at Sapoá. The
talks
represented a Sandinista effort to secure a definitive end
to
United States assistance to the Contras and an end to the
civil
conflict that was debilitating the economy and eroding the
Sandinistas' base of support. The talks seemed designed to
project the Sandinistas' image as peacemakers, and the
Sandinista
leadership was confident of winning the upcoming election.
From the moment on election night that the UNO victory
was
evident, there was widespread fear that the Sandinistas
would
block the Chamorro government from taking power. In hopes
of
securing a stable transition, Chamorro took a conciliatory
approach toward the defeated Sandinistas. The three most
influential international groups that came to observe the
elections became a crucial element in ensuring a peaceful
transition. Nevertheless, the negotiated transition
created
problems that would haunt the Chamorro government through
at
least the early years of its existence.
Negotiations on the transition began on February 27,
1990, in
Managua. A meeting between the FSLN and UNO leaders took
place in
the presence of former United States president Jimmy
Carter,
Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General
João
Baena Soares, and the head of the United Nations (UN)
electoral
mission, former United States attorney general Elliott
Richardson. The Nicaraguan parties agreed to continue
negotiations on important transition issues and named two
chief
negotiators: Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren, Chamorro's
son-in-law and
campaign manager for UNO; and Humberto Ortega Saavedra,
minister
of defense and President Ortega's brother, for the FSLN.
Negotiations between UNO and the Sandinistas led to a
series
of arrangements on amnesty, property, and media laws, as
well as
a Protocol on Procedures for the Transfer of Presidential
Powers,
signed by representatives of the UNO and the FSLN, one
month
after the elections. The agreement gave the Sandinistas on
March
27, guarantees that the changes they had instituted in
their
eleven years in power would not be overturned. The
protocol
pledged to carry out efforts toward reconciliation "on the
basis
of a national understanding that will take into account
the
achievements and transformations implemented thus far for
the
people's benefit, and all must be based on full respect
for
rights, Nicaragua's Constitution, and the laws of the
Republic."
Specific guarantees were given on property rights: the
protocol provided "tranquility and legal security to the
Nicaraguan families who have benefited from grants of
urban and
rural properties by the state before 25 February 1990,
harmonizing such grants with the legitimate legal rights
of
Nicaraguans whose property was affected, for which purpose
actions must be taken according to law. Methods to provide
adequate compensation to those who may be affected will be
established." The protocol also provided guarantees of
job
stability to government officials and employees "on the
basis of
their efficiency, administrative honesty, and years of
service. .
."
On paper at least, the Chamorro government secured
guarantees
that the military would submit to civilian rule, that it
would be
amenable to restructuring and downsizing, and that it
would be
nonpartisan because members on active duty would not be
allowed
to hold leadership posts in political parties. The
Sandinistas,
however, obtained guarantees of their continued control of
the
military because the protocol provided for respect "for
the
integrity and professionalism of the Sandinista People's
Army
(Ejército Popular Sandinista--EPS) and of the forces of
public
order as well as for their ranks [hierarchy and],
promotion
roster, and . . . [command structure] in accordance with
the
Constitution and the laws of the Republic . . .." These
guarantees were confirmed on inauguration day, April 25,
1990, by
President Chamorro's decision to retain the Sandinista
minister
of defense, General Humberto Ortega Saavedra, as army
chief.
These transition agreements formed the basis for the
relationship between the outgoing Sandinista and the
incoming
Chamorro governments. They facilitated a peaceful transfer
of
power. Along with the follow-up "transition" laws that the
lameduck Sandinista-dominated National Assembly passed in the
interregnum before Chamorro's inauguration, the transition
agreements became part of the legal structure under which
the
Chamorro government would operate. In the first months of
the
Chamorro regime, the transition agreements provided the
basis for
Sandinista challenges on the scope and interpretation of
laws.
They also created a rift between the Chamorro government
and most
of the leaders of the coalition that had supported it, who
charged that the Chamorro team had made unnecessary and
detrimental concessions to the FSLN. The Chamorro
government,
however, argued that its options were limited. It had
inherited a
Sandinista-constructed constitutional and legal system and
owed
its existence to the Sandinista revolutionary process; its
existence was not the result of a military victory that
would
have enabled to construction of a new political system
that may
have been more to its constituents' liking.
Data as of December 1993
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