|
Nicaragua Sandinista National Liberation Front
The FSLN has maintained the cohesion needed to
continue as
a potent force in Nicaraguan politics despite an internal
crisis
touched off by its electoral defeat. From the moment that
Daniel
Ortega publicly conceded defeat, he launched an initiative
to
preserve the gains that the Sandinista government claimed
to have
secured for the Nicaraguan people and the property that
the
movement had acquired. However, the performance of the
FSLN
leadership before and after the elections regarding the
social
welfare issue became a topic of dispute among the leaders
of the
groups and between the leadership and the local members.
The
dispute was so severe that it threatened to destroy the
cohesive
party apparatus and discipline that the movement had
created over
almost three decades of struggle and power.
In his concession speech, President Ortega in essence
foreswore the FSLN's identity as a "vanguard party" and
called on
the FSLN to play a role as a strong but loyal opposition
party.
In subsequent speeches, Ortega made clear that the FSLN,
with 40
percent of the vote, still considered itself the largest
single
political force in Nicaragua. Although this new definition
provided the basis for the FSLN's continued role in
government,
the tension between its two roles--its role as the
country's
largest political party and as a force in opposition to
the
government--proved problematic for the FSLN in the early
years of
adjustment to the Chamorro regime.
Despite the FSLN's success in maintaining a position
for the
party and benefits for its members in the postelectoral
period,
the electoral loss intensified preexisting political
tensions
within the FSLN, opened new ideological divisions, and
brought a
host of practical problems that posed great difficulties
for
continuing party activity. The short-term result within
the first
two years after the FSLN's electoral defeat was the
creation of
new power bases and elites. In addition, there were
contradictory
indications about the future of the party: one was that it
might
begin reconstituting itself along more traditional
political
party lines, and the other was that it would modernize,
but not
at the expense of its revolutionary social principles.
The most pressing practical problems were continued
financing
of the party apparatus and continued employment for party
members. By the end of the Sandinista government, the
organizational structure of the party coincided with the
administrative structure of the state, including the
military and
security forces. Thus, according to one analyst, the loss
of the
government meant the loss of party structures and, in
effect, the dispersal of the membership when the new
government's
economic program separated thousands from their work. For
the
FSLN, this change meant that its political apparatus
shrank from
several thousand persons to a few hundred after the
election; for
many members, it meant that holding on to their old jobs
or
obtaining new ones became the central focus of life. The
Piñata
was in part a result of the need to secure new means of
support:
ownership of property and companies established a
financial base
from which FSLN members could earn personal livelihoods
and
produce profits for continued party activities.
The ideological and political debate that took place
after
election was an outgrowth of ideas that had circulated but
never
had been formally raised before the election. These ideas
acquired new urgency as the Sandinistas sought to
understand the
causes of their defeat. Positions were formulated in
preparation
for postelection party activities. The ruling body during
the
postelectoral years continued to be the National
Directorate,
which had been in place since 1979, minus Humberto Ortega,
who,
under the terms of the transition agreement, had been
obliged to
give up his place in order to remain at the head of the
army, and
Carlos Núñez Téllez, who died in October 1990. The new
sevenmember National Directorate continued to meet regularly
and
drafted the guidelines for the document analyzing the
electoral
defeat that was to be discussed in the first postelection
Sandinista Assembly in June 1990. That first meeting made
clear
the extent of the internal differences within the FSLN.
The three-day June 1990 Sandinista Assembly meeting
held in
El Crucero was attended by a large number of FSLN members.
The
membership consisted of all FSLN National Assembly
members,
department coordinators, mass organization leaders, and
representatives of the National Workers' Front (Frente
Nacional
de Trabajadores--FNT). The open debate that characterized
this
meeting and the resulting El Crucero document that
eventually was
circulated were viewed as central in opening the party to
candid
public criticism. In addition, the Sandinista Assembly
created an
Ethics Commission to examine the activities of party
members from
the top leadership down and called for the FSLN's first
national
party congress. Party activities for the next year were
geared
toward preparation for the congress, held in July 1991.
Although calls for the democratization of the party did
not
produce changes in the top leadership, they had their
effect at
lower levels. In August and September 1990, for the first
time,
almost 600 executive committees and coordinators were
elected,
rather than appointed, at the municipal and departmental
levels.
These elections were seen as significant because they
resulted in
the election of people who would not have been selected
under the
previous rules. The elections were less than a fully
democratic
enterprise, however, because campaigning was not
permitted,
forestalling any uncontrolled discussion of the future of
the
party. The elections also led to debate about the
membership of
the party. The Sandinistas opted not to follow the model
of
standard parties by creating an open membership. They did
establish, however, in addition to the categories of
militants
and aspirants, who numbered 18,000 and 17,300,
respectively, in
August 1990, a third category of membership--affiliates,
numbering 60,400 that month. The party leadership also
held about
200 local meetings in the summer of 1990 to discuss a
draft
statement on programs, principles, and a proposal for new
bylaws
that would be presented to the FSLN's National Congress.
More
than 3,000 elected delegates attended eighteen
departmental
meetings in mid-June 1991, to debate the issues and choose
501
representatives to the National Congress.
The democratization process did not reach to the very
top of
the FSLN leadership, however. Early expectations that the
501
National Congress delegates would elect individual members
to the
National Directorate were quashed when the National
Directorate
proposed that the National Congress vote on the
candidates. The
departmental congresses ratified this proposal and another
giving
the nonelected members of the Sandinista Assembly voting
rights
in the National Congress. In July 1991, nine candidates
for the
National Directorate ran unopposed as a slate. The slate
consisted of the seven current members plus the former
vice
president and current head of the Sandinista bloc in the
National
Assembly, Sergio Ramírez Mercado, and the National
Directorate
secretary, René Núñez Téllez. Humberto Ortega was on the
slate
but declined a seat because of his army position. Daniel
Ortega
was elected secretary general of the party. Thus, some
congress
delegates' hopes of removing individual members were
dashed, and
the slate was elected by a 95 percent vote.
Nevertheless, the National Congress did adopt
significant
liberalization measures. It elected ninety-eight members
to a new
120-member Sandinista Assembly. The National Congress also
decided that future national congresses, to be held every
four
years, would elect the members of the Sandinista Assembly,
the
Ethics Commission, and the National Directorate
individually by a
secret and direct vote. This change was hailed as
progress,
although not the democratization that a significant but
minority
elite desired.
The National Congress also brought to the fore the
ideological debate between two FSLN factions. On the one
side
were the pragmatists who sought accommodation with the
Chamorro
forces and professed a new, more social democratic
orientation.
On the otherside were the "principled" or radical forces,
who
sought a continuation of the old revolutionary model and
saw
progress as dependent on establishing a clear
confrontational
position against the Chamorro government. The National
Congress
also aired the FSLN leadership's self-criticism of the
party,
attributing the electoral loss to several of the party's
own
failings. Still, ideologically, the congress's result was
indeterminate, preserving many of the party's
revolutionary
aspirations and anti-imperialist, anticapitalist
principles but
also urging modernization and adaptation to the current
global
situation.
Differences within the FSLN led to new forces within
the
party. Three factions have emerged, united on ideals and
ends but
not necessarily on means, according to analyst Aldo Díaz
Lacayo.
One faction, headed by Humberto Ortega, stresses the need
for an
alliance with the Chamorro government's "progressive
bourgeoisie." The second faction, composed of those
holding
positions in state structures such as the National
Assembly, and
headed by Sergio Ramírez, calls for unconditional
democratization. The third, headed by Daniel Ortega, is
the
party's union sector and is often viewed as the most
traditionally Sandinista in style and ideology.
Data as of December 1993
|
