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Nigeria The 1964-65 Elections
The federal parliamentary election campaign in December
1964--the first since independence--was contested by two
political alliances incorporating all the major parties.
The
Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) was composed of the NPC,
Akintola's Western-based Nigerian National Democratic
Party, and
opposition parties representing ethnic minorities in the
Midwestern and Eastern regions. It was opposed by the
United
Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), which joined the NCNC
and the
remnants of the Action Group with two minority-based
northern
allies, the Northern Elements Progressive Union and the
United
Middle Belt Congress.
Not surprisingly, the NNA adopted a platform that
reflected
the views of the northern political elite and, hence, was
an
attempt by the NPC to gain firmer control of federal
politics
through an alliance with the Western Region. Its appeal to
voters
outside the north was based essentially on the advantages
to be
gained from associating with the party in power. The NNA
preyed
on Yoruba fears of Igbo domination of the federal
government. The
UPGA was employed in an attempt by the NCNC to use the two
regional governments that it controlled as a springboard
to
domination of the federal government. Strategically it
offered a
reformist program, combining a planned economy that
endorsed
increased public spending while also encouraging private
enterprise. The UPGA proposed to divide the country into
states
that reflected ethnicity. Its proposals were intended to
undermine the existing regional basis of political power
by
creating a sufficient number of states in each region so
that
none of the mayor ethnic groups--Hausa, Yoruba, or
Igbo--could
dominate region. The UPGA presented itself as an
alternative to
northern and, more specifically, to Hausa-Fulani
domination of
the federal government. Convinced that it would win if the
election were held in an atmosphere free from interference
by
ruling parties in the Northern Region and the Western
Region, the
UPGA spent most of its efforts denouncing what it regarded
as NNA
intentions to rig the election in those regions.
The election was postponed for several weeks because of
discrepancies between the number of names on voting rolls
and on
census returns. Even then the UPGA was not satisfied and
called
on its supporters to boycott the election. The boycott was
effective in the Eastern Region, where polling places did
not
open in fifty-one constituencies that had more than one
candidate
running for office. In other constituencies in the region,
UPGA
candidates ran unopposed. Nationwide, only 4 million
voters cast
ballots, out of 15 million who were eligible. The NNA
elected 198
candidates, of whom 162 represented the NPC, from the 261
constituencies returning results. After an embarrassing
delay,
President Azikiwe agreed to ask Balewa to form a
government with
the NNA majority. The boycott had failed to stop the
election,
and in March 1965 supplementary elections were held in
those
areas in the Eastern Region and in Lagos where the boycott
had
been honored. UPGA candidates were elected in all these
constituencies, bringing the NCNC-dominated coalition a
total of
108 seats in the House of Representatives. The UPGA became
the
official opposition.
After this decisive defeat, the UPGA prepared for the
November 1965 legislative election in the Western Region
in an
attempt to gain control of the three southern regions and
the
Federal Territory of Lagos, the region surrounding the
capital.
If successful, the NPC-dominated NNA still would have
controlled
the House of Representatives, but it would have given the
predominantly southern UPGA a majority in the Senate,
whose
members were chosen by the regional legislatures.
Once more NCNC strategy failed. Amid widespread charges
of
voting irregularities, Akintola's NNDP, supported by its
NPC
ally, scored an impressive victory in November. There were
extensive protests, including considerable grumbling among
senior
army officials, at the apparent perversion of the
democratic
process. In the six months after the election, an
estimated 2,000
people died in violence that erupted in the Western
Region. In
the face of the disorders, the beleaguered Balewa
delegated
extraordinary powers to the regional governments to deal
with the
situation. By this time, Azikiwe and the prime minister
were
scarcely on speaking terms, and there were suggestions
that
Nigeria's armed forces should restore order.
In January 1966, army officers attempted to seize
power. In a
well-coordinated action, the conspirators, most of whom
were
Igbo, assassinated Balewa in Lagos, Akintola in Ibadan,
and Bello
in Kaduna, as well as senior officers of northern origin.
In a
public proclamation, the coup leaders pledged to establish
a
strong and efficient government committed to a progressive
program and eventually to new elections. They vowed to
stamp out
corruption and to suppress violence. Despite the bloody
and
calculated character of the coup, these sentiments
appealed
directly to younger, educated Nigerians in all parts of
the
country.
The army's commander in chief, Major General Johnson
Aguiyi
Ironsi, quickly intervened to restore discipline within
the army.
In the absence of Azikiwe, who was undergoing treatment in
a
London hospital, Balewa's shaken cabinet resigned, leaving
the
reins of authority to the armed forces. Ironsi, also an
Igbo,
suspended the constitution, dissolved all legislative
bodies,
banned political parties, and as an interim measure formed
a
Federal Military Government (FMG) to prepare the country
for a
return to civilian rule at an unspecified date. He
appointed
military governors in each region and assigned officers to
ministerial positions, instructing them to implement
sweeping
institutional reforms.
Ironsi and his advisers favored a unitary form of
government,
which they thought would eliminate the intransigent
regionalism
that had been the stumbling block to political and
economic
progress. A decree issued in March abolished the
federation and
unified the federal and regional civil services. Civilian
experts, largely Igbo, set to work on a new constitution
that
would provide for a centralized unitary government such as
the
NCNC had favored since the 1950s.
Although the decree contained a number of concessions
to
regional interests, including protection of northerners
from
southern competition in the civil service, Ironsi's action
showed
dangerous disregard for the nuances of regional politics
and
badly misjudged the intensity of ethnic sensitivities in
the
aftermath of the bloody coup. The failure of the military
government to prosecute Igbo officers responsible for
murdering
northern leaders stirred animosities further. Igbo civil
servants
and merchants residing in the north made the situation
even worse
through their triumphant support for the coup.
Furthermore,
Ironsi was vulnerable to accusations of favoritism toward
the
Igbo. The coup was perceived not so much as an effort to
impose a
unitary government as a plot by the Igbo to dominate
Nigeria.
Likewise, many Muslims saw the military decrees as
Christianinspired attempts to undermine emirate government.
Troops of northern origin, who made up the bulk of the
infantry, became increasingly restive. Fighting broke out
between
them and Igbo soldiers in garrisons in the south. In June
mobs in
the northern cities, abetted by local officials, carried
out a
pogrom against resident Igbo, massacring several hundred
people
and destroying Igbo-owned property. Some northern leaders
spoke
seriously of secession. Many northerners feared that
Ironsi
intended to deprive them of power and to consolidate
further an
Igbo-dominated centralized state.
In July northern officers and army units staged a
countercoup, during which Ironsi and a number of other
Igbo
officers were killed. The Muslim officers named
thirty-one-year-
old Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Yakubu "Jack"
Gowon,
a Christian from a small ethnic group (the Anga) in the
middle
belt, as a compromise candidate to head the FMG. A young
and
relatively obscure officer serving as army chief of staff,
Gowon
had not been involved in the coup, but he enjoyed wide
support
among northern troops who subsequently insisted that he be
given
a position in the ruling body. His first act was to repeal
the
Ironsi decree and to restore federalism, a step followed
by the
release of Awolowo and Enahoro from prison.
Data as of June 1991
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