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Nigeria Civil War
Throughout the remainder of 1966 and into 1967, the FMG
sought to convene a constituent assembly for revision of
the
constitution that might enable an early return to civilian
rule.
Nonetheless, the tempo of violence increased. In September
attacks on Igbo in the north were renewed with
unprecedented
ferocity, stirred up by Muslim traditionalists with the
connivance, Eastern Region leaders believed, of northern
political leaders. The army was sharply divided along
regional
lines. Reports circulated that troops from the Northern
Region
had participated in the mayhem. The estimated number of
deaths
ranged as high as 30,000, although the figure was probably
closer
to 8,000 to 10,000. More than 1 million Igbo returned to
the
Eastern Region. In retaliation, some northerners were
massacred
in Port Harcourt and other eastern cities, and a
counterexodus of
non-Igbo was under way.
The Eastern Region's military governor, Lieutenant
Colonel
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, was under pressure from Igbo
officers to assert greater independence from the FMG.
Indeed, the
eastern military government refused to recognize Gowon's
legitimacy on the ground that he was not the most senior
officer
in the chain of command. Some of Ojukwu's colleagues
questioned
whether the country could be reunited amicably after the
outrages
committed against the Igbo in the Northern Region.
Ironically,
many responsible easterners who had advocated a unitary
state now
called for looser ties with the other regions.
The military commanders and governors, including
Ojukwu, met
in Lagos to consider solutions to the regional strife. But
they
failed to reach a settlement, despite concessions offered
by the
northerners, because it proved impossible to guarantee the
security of Igbo outside the Eastern Region. The military
conferees reached a consensus only in the contempt they
expressed
for civilian politicians. Fearing for his safety, Ojukwu
refused
invitations to attend subsequent meetings in Lagos.
In January 1967, the military leaders and senior police
officials met at Aburi, Ghana, at the invitation of the
Ghanaian
military government. By now the Eastern Region was
threatening
secession. In a last-minute effort to hold Nigeria
together, the
military reached an accord that provided for a loose
confederation of regions. The federal civil service
vigorously
opposed the Aburi Agreement, however. Awolowo, regrouping
his
supporters, demanded the removal of all northern troops
garrisoned in the Western Region and warned that if the
Eastern
Region left the federation, the Western Region would
follow. The
FMG agreed to the troop withdrawal.
In May Gowon issued a decree implementing the Aburi
Agreement. Even the Northern Region leaders, who had been
the
first to threaten secession, now favored the formation of
a
multistate federation. Meanwhile, the military governor of
the
Midwestern Region announced that his region must be
considered
neutral in the event of civil war.
The Ojukwu government rejected the plan for
reconciliation
and made known its intention to retain all revenues
collected in
the Eastern Region in reparation for the cost of
resettling Igbo
refugees. The eastern leaders had reached the point of
ruptive in
their relations with Lagos and the rest of Nigeria.
Despite
offers made by the FMG that met many of Ojukwu's demands,
the
Eastern Region Consultative Assembly voted May 26 to
secede from
Nigeria. In Lagos Gowon proclaimed a state of emergency
and
unveiled plans for abolition of the regions and for
redivision of
the country into twelve states. This provision broke up
the
Northern Region, undermining the possibility of continued
northern domination and offering a major concession to the
Eastern Region. It was also a strategic move, which won
over
eastern minorities and deprived the rebellious Igbo
heartland of
its control over the oil fields and access to the sea.
Gowon also
appointed prominent civilians, including Awolowo, as
commissioners in the federal and new state governments,
thus
broadening his political support.
On May 30, Ojukwu answered the federal decree with the
proclamation of the independent Republic of Biafra, named
after
the Bight of Biafra. He cited as the principal cause for
this
action the Nigerian government's inability to protect the
lives
of easterners and suggested its culpability in genocide,
depicting secession as a measure taken reluctantly after
all
efforts to safeguard the Igbo people in other regions had
failed.
Initially the FMG launched "police measures" to restore
the
authority of Lagos in the Eastern Region. Army units
attempted to
advance into secessionist territory in July, but rebel
troops
easily stopped them. The Biafrans retaliated with a
surprise
thrust into the Midwestern Region, where they seized
strategic
points. However, effective control of the delta region
remained
under federal control despite several rebel attempts to
take the
non-Igbo area. The federal government began to mobilize
large
numbers of recruits to supplement its 10,000-member army.
By the end of 1967, federal forces had regained the
Midwestern Region and secured the delta region, which was
reorganized as the Rivers State and Southeastern State,
cutting
off Biafra from direct access to the sea. But a proposed
invasion
of the rebel-held territory, now confined to the Igbo
heartland,
stalled along the stiffened Biafran defense perimeter.
A stalemate developed as federal attacks on key towns
broke
down in the face of stubborn Biafran resistance. Ill-armed
and
trained under fire, rebel troops nonetheless had the
benefit of
superior leadership and superb morale. Although vastly
outnumbered and outgunned, the Biafrans probed weak points
in the
federal lines, making lightning tactical gains, cutting
off and
encircling advancing columns, and launching commando raids
behind
federal lines. Biafran strikes across the Niger managed to
pin
down large concentrations of federal troops on the west
bank.
In September 1968, Owerri was captured by federal
troops
advancing from the south, and early in 1969 the federal
army,
expanded to nearly 250,000 men, opened three fronts in
what Gowon
touted as the "final offensive." Although federal forces
flanked
the rebels by crossing the Niger at Onitsha, they failed
to break
through. The Biafrans subsequently retook Owerri in fierce
fighting and threatened to push on to Port Harcourt until
thwarted by a renewed federal offensive in the south. That
offensive tightened the noose around the rebel enclave
without
choking it into submission.
Biafran propaganda, which stressed the threat of
genocide to
the Igbo people, was extremely effective abroad in winning
sympathy for the secessionist movement. Food and medical
supplies
were scarce in Biafra. Humanitarian aid, as well as arms
and
munitions, reached the embattled region from international
relief
organizations and from private and religious groups in the
United
States and Western Europe by way of nighttime airlifts
over the
war zone. The bulk of Biafra's military supplies was
purchased on
the international arms market with unofficial assistance
provided
by France through former West African colonies. In one of
the
most dramatic episodes of the civil war, Carl Gustav von
Rosen, a
Swedish count who at one time commanded the Ethiopian air
force,
and several other Swedish pilots flew five jet trainers
modified
for combat in successful strikes against Nigerian military
installations.
Biafra's independence was recognized by Tanzania,
Zambia,
Gabon, and the Ivory Coast, but it was compromised in the
eyes of
most African states by the approval of South Africa,
Southern
Rhodesia, and Portugal. Britain extended diplomatic
support and
limited military assistance to the federal government. The
Soviet
Union became an important source of military equipment for
Nigeria. Modern Soviet-built warplanes, flown by Egyptian
and
British pilots, interdicted supply flights and inflicted
heavy
casualties during raids on Biafran urban centers. In line
with
its policy of noninvolvement, the United States prohibited
the
sale of military goods to either side while continuing to
recognize the FMG.
In October 1969, Ojukwu appealed for United Nations
(UN)
mediation for a cease-fire as a prelude to peace
negotiations.
But the federal government insisted on Biafra's surrender,
and
Gowon observed that "rebel leaders had made it clear that
this is
a fight to the finish and that no concession will ever
satisfy
them." In December federal forces opened a four-pronged
offensive, involving 120,000 troops, that sliced Biafra in
half.
When Owerri fell on January 6, 1970, Biafran resistance
collapsed. Ojukwu fled to the Ivory Coast, leaving his
chief of
staff, Philip Effiong, behind as "officer administering
the
government." Effiong called for an immediate,
unconditional
cease-fire January 12 and submitted to the authority of
the
federal government at ceremonies in Lagos.
Estimates in the former Eastern Region of the number of
dead
from hostilities, disease, and starvation during the
thirty-month
civil war are estimated at between 1 million and 3
million. The
end of the fighting found more than 3 million Igbo
refugees
crowded into a 2,500-square-kilometer enclave. Prospects
for the
survival of many of them and for the future of the region
were
dim. There were severe shortages of food, medicine,
clothing, and
housing. The economy of the region was shattered. Cities
were in
ruins; schools, hospitals, utilities, and transportation
facilities were destroyed or inoperative. Overseas groups
instituted a major relief effort, but the FMG insisted on
directing all assistance and recovery operations and
barred some
agencies that had supplied aid to Biafra.
Because charges of genocide had fueled international
sympathy
for Biafra, the FMG allowed a team of international
experts to
observe the surrender and to look for evidence.
Subsequently, the
observers testified that they found no evidence of
genocide or
systematic destruction of property, although there was
considerable evidence of famine and death as a result of
the war.
Furthermore, under Gowon's close supervision, the federal
government ensured that Igbo civilians would not be
treated as
defeated enemies. A program was launched to reintegrate
the
Biafran rebels into a unified Nigeria. A number of public
officials who had "actively counselled, aided, or abetted"
secession were dismissed, but a clear distinction was made
between them and those who had simply carried out their
duties.
Igbo personnel soon were being reenlisted in the federal
armed
forces. There were no trials and few people were
imprisoned.
Ojukwu, in exile, was made the scapegoat, but efforts to
have him
extradited failed.
An Igbo official, Ukapi "Tony" Asika, was named
administrator
of the new East Central State, comprising the Igbo
heartland.
Asika had remained loyal to the federal government during
the
civil war, but as a further act of conciliation, his
all-Igbo
cabinet included members who had served under the
secessionist
regime. Asika was unpopular with many Igbo, who considered
him a
traitor, and his administration was characterized as inept
and
corrupt. In three years under his direction, however, the
state
government achieved the rehabilitation of 70 percent of
the
industry incapacitated during the war. The federal
government
granted funds to cover the state's operating expenses for
an
interim period, and much of the war damage was repaired.
Social
services and public utilities slowly were reinstituted,
although
not to the prewar levels.
Data as of June 1991
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