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Oman Labor
A foreign work force was the key to the development of
Oman's
physical and administrative infrastructure. However, in
1993
indigenization was among the government's principal
priorities.
Only 23 percent of the private-sector work force is Omani,
whereas the public-sector work force is dominated by Omani
nationals. In 1990 Omanis made up 80 percent of public
corporation employees, 52 percent of diwan employees, and
65
percent of the civil service. In certain organizations and
ministries--such as the Oman News Agency and the
ministries of
foreign affairs; interior; justice, awqaf [religious
endowments],
and Islamic affairs; national heritage and culture; and
social
affairs and labor--Omanis exceed 90 percent of the work
force.
In the banking sector, 70.8 percent of the work force
was
Omani in 1990; in the oil sector, it was 61.0 percent,
with a
large disparity between producing and nonproducing
companies. Of
PDO's work force, 61.0 percent was Omani, compared with
53.4
percent of Elf Aquitaine Oman, 20 percent of Occidental
Oman, and
21.0 percent of Japex Oman
(see Hydrocarbon Sector
, this
ch.). In
non-oil-producing companies, Omanis averaged 31.6 percent
of the
work force. In 1990 only 24.0 percent of insurance-sector
workers
and 19.0 percent of hotel-sector workers were Omanis.
The government hopes that an increasing number of
Omanis will
enter trade and industry, increasing the number of Omanis
in the
private sector to 45.2 percent by 1995. RO40 million
(US$104
million) was allocated to training in 1990, with the
intent of
training 100,000 individuals and creating 160,000 job
opportunities. In March 1991, the Higher Committee for
Vocational
Training and Labor was established to generate employment
for
Omanis and to establish other policies for the indigenous
and
foreign work force.
Institution building has been largely a foreign
initiative.
The professional core of the civil administration has
consisted
mainly of British and United States citizens, influencing
the
development of ministries, the judiciary, development
planning,
and resource management. The dependency on foreign
advisers in
the 1990s is likely to grow, given increasing Western,
notably
United States, involvement in the gulf after Operation
Desert
Shield and Operation Desert Storm, particularly in defense
and
security areas. Also, the emphasis of the Joint United
StatesOman Commission on institution building and privatization
has
resulted in sustained foreign influence in the sultanate
(see International Relations
, this ch.).
The government not only faces a skills barrier to its
indigenization program but also a psychological obstacle.
As a
result of the initiation of a civil administrative
structure, a
sense of entitlement has arisen in the public psyche. By
ensuring
positions in the public sector for Omani nationals, the
government inadvertently created the notion that it was
the
universal provider for its citizens. This notion may be
difficult
to reverse and perhaps will become a source of political
instability if the government proves unable to fulfill its
obligations should an economic downturn and consequent
financial
difficulties occur.
Data as of January 1993
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