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Panama Involvement in Political and Economic Affairs
Panama's security forces have changed dramatically since
independence. Originally established as a police force after the
national army was abolished, these forces evolved toward a
paramilitary configuration during the 1950s and 1960s. In the late
1970s, they began to evolve once more as Panama assumed
responsibility for defending the canal. During each successive
stage, prior functions and missions were not abandoned; rather, new
ones were added. These three different stages of institutional
development were associated with three distinct types of military
participation in politics. During the earliest period when the
security forces performed a police role, the institution merely
reflected the interests of the dominant civilian elite. Thus, they
were used to keep the peace and to prevent the urban masses from
challenging the elite through strikes and other socially disruptive
types of activity.
With the adoption of a paramilitary role, the newly formed
National Guard began to act politically to further its own
interests and those of the commander in chief. The Guard not only
began to serve as the court of last resort for settling feuds among
the civilian elite, but eventually seized political power in its
own name. Under the leadership of Torrijos, the National Guard and
its General Staff fashioned a "civilian" political regime in their
own image, but real power remained in the hands of the military
(see The Panama Defense Forces
, ch. 4). In 1983 Panama implemented
constitutional changes aimed at restoring direct presidential
elections, but it was clear that even Torrijos's death would not
force the military to give up its central role in politics. Despite
the Constitution's assertion that the ultimate political authority
in Panama was the will of the people, the civilian government that
expressed this will was expected to rely heavily on the advice of
the military. According to the Constitution, "Power emanates from
the people and is exercised by the government through a
distribution of functions among the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches acting in harmonic collaboration with the
National Guard."
The central role played by the FDP during the 1980s was the
logical outgrowth of both the historical evolution of Panama's
security forces and changes in the civilian sector. Before the
National Guard was created in the early 1950s, officers in the
National Police did not have enough social standing or sufficient
institutional support to play a significant role in politics. By
the 1970s, however, officers had emerged with enhanced social
status, an enlarged institutional power base, and growing links
with marginalized civilian groups. As the "spokesman" for these
groups during the 1970s and 1980s, the military worked to implement
social and economic policies viewed as being both in the interest
of these groups and of benefit to the military itself.
In the economic sphere, the National Guard and the Defense
Forces have sought to have civilian technocrats whose views were
similar to those of the military appointed to key decision-making
positions. During the 1970s, for example, Torrijos worked with a
small group of professionals from the reform wing of the National
Liberal Party, placing them in key government positions. And in
supporting the presidential candidacy of Nicolás Ardito Barletta
Vallarino (a former vice president of the World Bank) in 1984, the
Defense Forces once again demonstrated their penchant for working
with like-minded civilian professionals.
Top FDP officers were also alleged to have been engaged in a
wide variety of legal and illegal business activities. A series of
articles published in the New York Times in 1986 suggested
that the FDP commander was deeply involved in both drug
transactions and arms smuggling. Panama's alleged role in the drug
business had never historically been related to production
activities (although some marijuana was supposedly grown there),
but rather to transshipment and the laundering of illicitly
obtained funds. The articles went so far as to suggest that the FDP
commander in chief was not only aware of these activities but
played an active role in encouraging them. Subsequently, additional
credible evidence of FDP involvement in drug-trafficking and moneylaundering activities continued to surface.
The Defense Forces have at times cooperated with the United
States government in some activities related to drug trafficking,
such as making arrests, extraditing traffickers, and seizing boats
carrying drug cargoes. In response to a United States request,
Panama made drug money-laundering illegal in 1986 and agreed to
give United States authorities access to certain bank records in
drug investigations. "Operation Pisces," a drugs and moneylaundering sting launched by the Drug Enforcement Administration in
1987 against cocaine traffickers, received extensive support from
Panamanian authorities. Nevertheless, observers increasingly
believed that such cooperation was an expedient ploy to sacrifice
lower-level operations and personnel in order to safeguard more
significant illegal activities.
Data as of December 1987
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