Paraguay THE ARMED FORCES IN THE NATIONAL LIFE
The ideal of an apolitical military force that is shielded from
domestic political debates, kept out of domestic decision making,
and kept under firm civilian control has not been relevant to the
Paraguayan experience. The nation's military, particularly the army
as the dominant service, traditionally has been the most powerful
institution in the nation, exercising an heroic military role in
times of external threat and exerting a strong political and
economic presence in peacetime. Many military officers have aspired
to national political leadership, and several have achieved it.
In turn, political leaders--whether in power or in the
opposition--historically have sought to exert their personal
influence over the internal operations of the armed forces and to
use the military as an instrument of their own regimes. Such
efforts have fallen squarely within the Paraguayan cultural
tradition, which stresses the importance of personal ties and
personal loyalty over abstract ideology or institutionalism. In
such a small country, military, economic, social, and political
elites frequently shared ties of kinship or personal affinity.
Therefore, institutional barriers have not been strong enough to
prevent the intrusion of political or other considerations into
purely military matters. On one level, the lack of separation
between political and military affairs has resulted in decisions on
such matters as promotions and assignments being based on
considerations other than merit or satisfaction of qualifying
factors.
On another level, this lack of separation has had grave
consequences for national stability. It is true that under the
strong and efficient management of Francia, the Lópezes, and
Stroessner, the military remained internally unified and acted as
the main instrument of authoritarian rule. For most of the rest of
the nation's history, however, political turmoil in the national
leadership was reflected in divisiveness within the armed forces.
The resulting factionalism frequently erupted into violence that
itself threatened public order and political stability. Supporters
of the Stroessner regime have justified his authoritarian rule in
part by noting the correlation between periods of national
stability and the presence of strong rulers able to exert control
over the military and the political process.
In late 1988, the military's most significant role in the
national life was its apparently unified backing for the Stroessner
regime. Such backing resulted from Stroessner's efforts first to
achieve and then to maintain military support. By 1959 he had
completely purged the officer corps of all persons who were not
members of the pro-Stroessner wing of the Colorado Party.
Thereafter, candidates for service were screened for loyalty to the
party. Factionalism within the Colorado Party persisted, however,
and also surfaced in the 1980s in the officer corps. In 1986, for
instance, the head of the army's First Cavalry Division was
reported to have been replaced on political grounds by an officer
closely identified with the "traditionalist" faction of the
Colorado Party--the faction also favored by the army's powerful
First Corps commander, Major General Andrés Rodríguez. In late
1988, it was unclear how deeply the party factionalism had affected
officer morale or how this factionalism had affected relations
between the military and the Colorado Party leadership, which was
taken over by the "militant" faction in late 1987.
Despite its influence in national political affairs, the
Colorado Party did not control the military, and the armed forces
had no political officers serving alongside military officers.
Instead, party loyalty served as a litmus test of trustworthiness
and loyalty to the regime. The Colorado Party, which was highly
organized, block by block in town and cities, also served as a
channel of information on military matters and the actions of
military personnel. In addition, the party was a potential check on
the power of the armed forces.
Stroessner played an active role in overseeing military affairs.
The president chaired the promotion boards held twice a year and
oversaw all important assignments. He devoted one day each week to
military matters and attended numerous ceremonies and parades. He
took time to cultivate junior officers, especially those in direct
command of troops, and made sure that conditions of service were
good enough to keep the military content. In addition to relying on
personal loyalty and oversight, Stroessner relied on the structure
of the military establishment to maintain control over the armed
forces. He held command personally through the armed forces general
staff, dividing command and support duties between the general
staff and the Ministry of National Defense. Stroessner also
maintained his own well-armed and well-trained security force, the
Presidential Escort Regiment.
Data as of December 1988
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