Philippines Government and Politics
Malacañang Palace in Manila, the official residence of the
president
AS PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO entered the final year of her
six-year term in 1991, she presided over a demoralized nation
reeling from the effects of natural calamities and economic
malaise. The country had slid into dictatorship and gross
economic mismanagement during Ferdinand E. Marcos's twenty-year
presidency. When Aquino was elevated to the presidency in an
inspiring People's Power Revolution in 1986, Filipinos' hopes
rose. Inevitably, the stark realities of the nation's economic
and political predicaments tarnished Aquino's image.
Aquino's achievements, however, were significant. She helped
topple a dictator who had unlimited reserves of wealth, force,
and cunning. She replaced a disjointed constitution that was
little more than a fig leaf for Marcos's personalistic rule with
a democratic, progressive document that won overwhelming popular
approval in a nationwide plebiscite. She renounced the
dictatorial powers she inherited from Marcos and returned the
Philippines to the rule of law; she lived with the checks on her
own power inherent in three-branch government; and she scheduled
national elections to create a two-chamber legislature and local
elections to complete the country's redemocratization.
The 1987 constitution returned the Philippines to a
presidential system. The national government is in theory highly
centralized, with few powers devolving to provincial and
municipal governments. In fact, local potentates often reserve
powers to themselves that the national government is not even
aware of. The national government consists of three branches: the
executive, headed by the president; two houses of Congress, the
Senate and the House of Representatives; and the Supreme Court,
which heads an independent judiciary. A bill of rights guarantees
political freedoms, and the constitution provides for regular
elections.
The performance of these institutions was, of course,
conditioned by Philippine history and culture, and by poverty.
For example, the twenty-four members of the Senate, elected by
nationwide ballot, in the 1980s were drawn almost entirely from
old, prominent families. Senators staked out liberal, nationalist
positions on symbolic issues, such as military base rights for
the United States, but were exceedingly cautious about any
structural changes, such as land reform, that could jeopardize
their families' economic positions.
Political parties grew in profusion after the Marcos martiallaw regime (1972-81) was ended. There were 105 political parties
registered in 1988. As in the pre-Marcos era, most legal
political parties were coalitions, built around prominent
individuals, which focused entirely on winning elections, not on
what to do with the power achieved. There was little to
distinguish one party from another ideologically, which was why
many Filipinos regarded the political system as irrelevant.
President Aquino's early years in office were punctuated by a
series of coup attempts. Her greatest frustration, and a most
serious impediment to economic development, was a fractious,
politicized army. Some officers wanted to regain the privileges
they enjoyed under Marcos; others dreamed of saving the nation
(see Proclamation 1081 and Martial Law
, ch. 1;
Political Role
, ch. 5). Although all coup attempts failed, they frightened away
foreign investors, forced Aquino to fire cabinet members of whom
the army did not approve, pushed her policies rightward, and lent
an air of impermanence to her achievements.
Criticism of the Aquino administration came from all parts of
the political spectrum. Filipino communists refused to
participate in a government they saw as a thin cover for
oligarchy. The democratic left criticized Aquino for abandoning
sweeping reform and for her probusiness and pro-American
policies. Her own vice president, Salvador H. Laurel, castigated
her mercilessly from the beginning and even encouraged the army
to overthrow her. The far right (sugar barons, military
malcontents, and ex-Marcos cronies) characterized her as naive
and ineffective and ridiculed her for being what she always said
she was, a "simple housewife." In reality she was far more than
that. Amidst this cacophony, Aquino seemed to have calmly
accepted that she would not be able to resolve the Philippines'
deeply rooted structural problems and that it would be enough to
have restored political democracy. She prepared the ground for
her successor.
The Roman Catholic Church also was a major political factor.
It had reverted to a less visible (but no less influential) role
than in the declining years of Marcos's rule, when its relative
invulnerability to harassment spurred priests and nuns to become
political activists. Most church leaders criticized human rights
abuses by military units or vigilantes, but they supported
constitutional government. Cardinal Jaime Sin, who played such a
pivotal role in Aquino's triumph over Marcos, recognized her
personal virtue but denounced the corruption that stained her
administration. Some parish priests, disgusted by the country's
extreme polarization of wealth and power, cooperated with the New
People's Army
(see The Communist Insurgency
, ch. 5).
The communist insurgency had not been eradicated, although
guerrillas posed less of a threat than they did before 1986. They
conducted murderous internal purges. Still, if a guerrilla army
wins by not losing, the New People's Army was a real alternative
to the elected government. It fought for more than twenty years,
and the class inequities it condemned continued to grow in the
early 1990s. The fight against Filipino Muslim separatists in
Mindanao likewise continued, also at a diminished level.
Philippine foreign relations in the late 1980s and early
1990s were colored by the contradiction between subjective
nationalism and objective dependency. After nearly fifty years of
independence, Filipinos still viewed their national identity as
undefined and saw international respect as elusive. They chafed
at perceived constraints on their sovereign prerogatives and
resented the power of foreign business owners and military
advisers. Yet, as a poor nation deeply in debt to private banks,
multilateral lending institutions, and foreign governments, the
Philippines had to meet conditions imposed by its creditors. This
situation was galling to nationalists, especially because the
previous regime had squandered its borrowed money. Filipinos also
sought to achieve a more balanced foreign policy to replace the
uncomfortably close economic, cultural, military, and personal
ties that bound them to the United States, but this was unlikely
to happen soon.
Data as of June 1991
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