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Poland Poland at an Impasse
From the viewpoint of the regime, implementing martial
law
efficiently extinguished the immediate challenge posed by
Solidarity. It did nothing, however, to resolve the
long-standing
crisis of "People's Poland," which in many ways originated
in the
very foundation of communist rule and the shadow of
illegitimacy
and ineptitude from which it never escaped. Jaruzelski
presented
himself as a realistic moderate, a proponent of reform who
nevertheless insisted on the leading role of the party.
Polish
society remained sullenly unresponsive to his appeals,
however.
At the same time, he encountered resistance from the PZPR
conservatives. These so-called hardheads, held in contempt
by the
public, regarded the party chief as too conciliatory and
resented
the interference of Jaruzelski's fellow generals in the
affairs
of the civilian party apparatus.
Time proved that Jaruzelski's coup had staggered
Solidarity
but not killed it. Adherents of the union operated
underground or
from jail cells, advocating a waiting game to preserve the
principles of the Gdansk Agreement. Walesa in particular
refused
to fade into obscurity; he gained added luster by his
receipt of
the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1983. In the next year, the
Jaruzelski government suffered embarrassment when secret
policemen were discovered to have abducted and murdered
Father
Jerzy Popieluszko, a priest who had gained recognition as
the
spiritual adviser of the repressed Solidarity. At that
juncture,
Poland seemed mired in frustrating deadlock, with no
reasonable
prospect of resuscitating the stricken economy or
achieving
political harmony.
Data as of October 1992
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