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Qatar DEVELOPMENTS SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Since the early 1970s, increased oil production and
regional
instability have dominated events in the Persian Gulf.
Revenues
from the oil industry grew dramatically after oil
producers
raised their prices unilaterally in 1973; as a result,
funds
available to gulf rulers increased. Governments began
massive
development projects that brought rapid material and
social
change. As of 1993, the turmoil that these changes caused
had not
yet stabilized. Those states that had benefited longest
from oil
money, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, made the greatest
progress in
adjusting to the new oil wealth. Oman--which has used its
oil
reserves only since the early 1970s and which had suffered
under
the repressive policies of Said ibn Taimur--saw
substantially
less progress.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 challenged gulf
stability.
Many gulf leaders agreed with some of the social goals of
the
revolution and its efforts to tie Iran more firmly to its
Islamic
roots. But Iran's desire to spread the movement beyond its
borders clearly threatened gulf leaders. Furthermore,
several
gulf states have significant Shia or Iranian minorities
(Bahrain
has a Shia majority although the ruling family is Sunni),
and
gulf rulers feared that Iran would use ethnic or sectarian
loyalties to stir up such minorities.
As of 1993, however, Shia of the western gulf had not
responded enthusiastically to the Iranian call. Kuwait and
Bahrain, which have the largest Shia populations,
experienced
some limited pro-Iranian demonstrations in 1979. In
general,
however, Shia in both these states feel that they have
more to
gain by supporting the existing regimes than by supporting
the
convulsive changes that have taken place in Iran.
Iran was perhaps more threatening to gulf stability
because
of its strong anti-Western stance in world and in regional
politics. The new Iranian position stood in stark contrast
to the
gulf amirs' long history of involvement with the British
and the
close ties to the West that the oil industry entailed.
Thus, the
Iranian political worldview was one to which rulers in the
gulf
states could not subscribe.
In 1980 the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War made the
Iranian
threat more concrete. For the first six years of the
conflict,
the gulf states sought to mediate between the two
countries and
to remain neutral. Their position changed, however, in
1986, when
fighter aircraft attacked tankers belonging to Saudi
Arabia and
Kuwait. Whether Iran or Iraq was responsible for the first
attacks remains uncertain, but the gulf states decided to
blame
the Iranians and began to take Iraq's side in the war.
Iran
responded by opening up a limited secret campaign against
the
gulf states. A number of explosions occurred in Kuwait and
Bahrain for which many believed Iran was responsible. Such
attacks made all the states in the region more concerned
about
external threats.
In 1981, partly in response to these concerns, Kuwait,
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE formed the
Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC)
(see Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council
, ch. 7). The goal of the GCC has been
to
provide for regional defense and to coordinate policy on
trade
and economic issues. Although the GCC has taken steps to
increase
the military capabilities of various members, the region
has
remained dependent to a great extent on the protection of
the
Western powers. For instance, when the Iran-Iraq War made
the
gulf unsafe for oil tankers in the late 1980s, it was
ships from
Europe and the United States that protected shipping and
cleared
the area of mines.
Whereas broader, regional alliances in the gulf have
changed
dramatically since the 1970s, individual political systems
have
remained relatively unchanged. All the gulf countries
grant
ultimate power to a single family, whose leading member
rules as
amir, but they also provide for an advisory body whose
members
are drawn from outside the royal family. Kuwait and
Bahrain have
gone beyond this and have set up separate parliaments with
limited power to draft legislation. However, the Al Sabah
and the
Al Khalifa have sometimes dissolved these bodies; thus, it
remains uncertain whether parliaments will become a
permanent
feature of gulf politics.
The ruling families' hold on power has been challenged
at
various times. More problematic is the manner in which the
gulf
states have distributed individual citizenship. Since the
1930s,
the population has increased dramatically because of the
oil
boom, but the number of citizens has not increased
correspondingly. Most of the gulf states place
restrictions on
citizenship, requiring that an individual trace his or her
roots
in the country to before 1930. Accordingly, the millions
of
people that have poured into the region since the 1940s
have only
partial legal status and lack political rights in the
countries
in which they reside. Although they may have lived there
for two
generations, they can be asked to leave at any time.
Data as of January 1993
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