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Qatar TRIBAL NATURE OF GULF SOCIETY
Gulf states have not granted citizenship freely for two
reasons. First, they are reluctant to share wealth with
recent
arrivals; second, the tribal nature of gulf society does
not
admit new members easily. A tribe usually traces its
lineage to a
particular eponymous ancestor. The standard Arabic
reference to
tribe is bani fulan, or "the sons [bani] of
so-and-
so." The Bani al Murrah in Saudi Arabia, for example,
trace their
line back to a figure named Murrah, who lived some time
before
the Prophet.
Over a period of 1,500 years, the sons of Murrah, or
any
other ancient figure, have tended to become numerous,
making
further distinctions necessary. Accordingly, tribes are
divided
into clans and then into households (fukhud; sing.,
fakhd). Households include groups of single
families.
Together this extended group of families calls itself a
tribe.
Each tribe has certain characteristics, such as different
speech,
dress, and customs. But since the 1950s, speech has become
less
of a distinguishing factor because of the fluidity of gulf
society.
The name of a tribe may also reflect some past event.
For
example, the name Utub--the tribe to which the Al
Sabah of
Kuwait and the Al Khalifa of Bahrain belong--comes from
the
Arabic word for wander (atab). In 1744 the tribe
"wandered" out of the desert and into the gulf area and
became
the Utub.
Two of the most important tribal groups in Arabia are
the
Qahtan and the Adnan, whose roots stem from the belief
that
tribes in the north of the peninsula were descended from
Adnan,
one of Ismail's sons, and that tribes in the south were
descended
from Qahtan, one of Noah's sons. People in the gulf often
attribute the structure of tribal alliances to this
north-south
distinction, and many still classify their tribes as
Adnani or
Qahtani.
Historically, the tribal nature of society has
occasioned
petty warfare in the gulf. Arab tribes have attacked each
other
since before Islam, but tribal customs have prevented
these
attacks from turning into random violence. Clans, however,
have
defected from their tribe and made alliances with other
tribes,
and tribes have sometimes banded together to form a more
powerful
group.
Moreover, although some tribes may trace their lineage
to
some heroic figure, the real identity of the tribe lies in
the
people that currently compose it. In the tribe, an
individual
bases his or her sense of self-esteem on the honor of the
tribe
as a whole.
In Arabia it was impossible to survive in the desert
alone,
and so families banded together to find water and move
their
flocks to new grazing lands. Once they established the
necessary
resources through collective effort, they guarded them
jealously
and refused to share them with outsiders. It therefore
became
necessary to set up boundaries between members of the
group or
between the tribe and outsiders. The tribe worked to
restrict
membership in order to preserve its sense of solidarity.
As a
result, birth into the right family tended to be the only
way to
become a member of a tribe. Marriage sometimes extended
the
tribal line beyond blood lines, but, in general, people
tended to
marry within the tribe and only went outside to establish
alliances with other tribes.
The emphasis on the group precluded the rise of a
strong
leader. Accordingly, tribal leadership is often described
as "the
first among equals," suggesting a collective leadership in
which
one among a number of leaders is recognized as the most
authoritative. This principal leader must continue to
consult
with his lesser colleagues and so rules by consensus.
An extension of this pattern of leadership is the
concept of
leading families within the tribe. Although tribalism
tends to
discourage inherited authority, traditions of leadership
are
nevertheless passed down, and tribes expect that certain
families
will furnish them with leaders generation after
generation. This
pattern occurred when tribes that were previously nomadic
settled
down in oases or coastal areas. It then became more likely
that
certain families would accumulate wealth, whether in food
or in
goods, and with this wealth would increase their
authority. In
this way, the individual families that in the 1990s
controlled
the gulf states established themselves around 1800.
Relations
with the British and the discovery of oil continued that
process.
The existence of these ruling families is perhaps the
most
obvious manifestation of Arab tribalism in gulf society in
1993.
Another manifestation is the collective manner in which
these
families rule. In most of these states, the position of
amir is
not passed from father to son but alternates among
different
parallel patrilineal lines. This makes the appointment of
the
next amir an open issue and something on which the entire
family
must agree. The family also participates in the various
consultative bodies that exist to advise the leader. Such
bodies,
which include figures outside the ruling family, help to
institutionalize the first among equals system in these
states.
The way that government officials are appointed
reflects the
importance of tribal connections. Members of the ruling
family
are accommodated first, followed by families and tribes
with whom
the rulers have been traditionally allied. In Bahrain, for
example, the ruling Al Khalifa have given the major
positions in
the bureaucracy to Sunni Arabs from tribes that helped
them rule
the island in the nineteenth century. The Al Khalifa have
given
lesser positions to Shia Arabs from merchant families with
whom
they engaged in the pearl industry but with whom they had
no
tribal alliances. But the Al Khalifa have been reluctant
to give
positions of authority to Shia farmers of Iranian descent
to whom
they had neither tribal nor economic ties.
Tribal cohesiveness is also reflected in the efforts of
the
gulf states to restrict citizenship. The gulf has always
been
relatively cosmopolitan, and its port cities have included
Arab
Shia from Iraq, freed slaves from Africa, Indian pearl
traders,
and Iranian farmers and merchants, in addition to tribal
Sunni
Arabs. (In 1939, for example, before the oil boom started,
39
percent of Qatar's population was non-Arab.) The dominant
Arab
tribes have accommodated many of these groups, and those
who
arrived in the region before 1930 became full citizens of
the
gulf states, albeit without the connections of tribal
Arabs. The
tremendous influx since 1940, however, has caused the
naturally
restrictive nature of tribal society to reassert itself to
prevent a further dilution of tribal identities.
Ironically, those foreigners closest to the tribal
Arabs, the
nontribal Arabs, represent the greatest threat. Only Arabs
from
other Arab states might conceivably stay in the gulf and
expect
to be citizens. Others, even Muslims from the coasts of
Pakistan
and India, whose history is intertwined with that of the
gulf,
would have a difficult time arguing in the twentieth
century that
they should be citizens of an Arab state.
Modern Arab politics, however, often speaks of a single
Arab
nation in which all Arabs might be citizens. This has led
to the
notion that Arabs should have rights in the gulf states
simply
because of their ethnicity. The continuing exodus of
millions of
Palestinian Arabs since 1948, and their subsequent
residence
throughout the Arab world, has added urgency to the demand
that
individual Arab states define their qualifications for
citizenship. Many Arabs argue that Palestinians in
particular,
but other Arabs as well, should be accepted as citizens in
the
gulf. Gulf leaders have understandably opposed this for
fear that
nontribal Arabs would challenge traditional ways of rule.
Although people from all over the world may come to the
gulf to
work, sovereignty and citizenship are closely guarded by
the
predominantly tribal population that has its roots in the
Arabian
Peninsula. In this way, the Persian Gulf coast has
preserved its
ties with the Arab interior that form the essence of its
identity.
* * *
The literature on Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and
Oman
may be divided into two groups: books on Oman and books on
the
rest of the gulf states. Calvin Allen has a relatively
brief
study of the modern history of Oman entitled Oman: The
Modernization of the Sultanate. John C. Wilkinson has
written
a number of scholarly studies on Oman, including his
recent work,
The Imamate Tradition of Oman. This is an excellent
and
detailed study of most aspects of Omani history.
For the rest of the gulf, a number of brief studies
exist, of
which the most recent is The Arab Gulf and the Arab
World,
a collection of articles on various aspects of modern gulf
life
edited by B.R. Pridham; it contains little on the history
of the
region. For more historical background, the reader may
consult an
older but more substantial collection edited by Alvin
Cottrell
entitled The Persian Gulf States. Further history
can be
found in Donald Hawley's The Trucial States.
Of books on particular countries or issues, the best is
Fuad
Khuri's Tribe and State in Bahrain, which considers
the
social, religious, and ethnic divisions of the island
nation. A
recent brief work on the UAE by Malcolm C. Peck, The
United
Arab Emirates, is very good. Abdulrasool al-Mossa's
study,
Immigrant Labor in Kuwait, provides a description
of the
situation of foreign workers in the gulf. Religious
disturbances
in the gulf are discussed in relevant chapters of Robin
Wright's
Sacred Rage. (For further information and complete
citations,
see
Bibliography.)
Data as of January 1993
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