Romania Demographic Policy
With a political system in place that made long-range
planning
the cornerstone of economic growth, demographic trends
took on
particular significance. As development proceeded, so did
disturbing demographic consequences. It soon became
apparent that
the country was approaching zero population growth, which
carried
alarming implications for future labor supplies for
further
industrialization. The government responded in 1966 with a
decree
that prohibited abortion on demand and introduced other
pronatalist
policies to increase birthrates. The decree stipulated
that
abortion would be allowed only when pregnancy endangered
the life
of a woman or was the result of rape or incest, or if the
child was
likely to have a congenital disease or deformity. Also an
abortion
could be performed if the woman was over forty-five years
of age or
had given birth to at least four children who remained
under her
care. Any abortion performed for any other reason became a
criminal
offense, and the penal code was revised to provide
penalties for
those who sought or performed illegal abortions.
Other punitive policies were introduced. Men and women
who
remained childless after the age of twenty-five, whether
married or
single, were liable for a special tax amounting to between
10 and
20 percent of their income. The government also targeted
the rising
divorce rates and made divorce much more difficult. By
government
decree, a marriage could be dissolved only in exceptional
cases.
The ruling was rigidly enforced, as only 28 divorces were
allowed
nationwide in 1967, compared with 26,000 the preceding
year.
Some pronatalist policies were introduced that held out
the
carrot instead of the stick. Family allowances paid by the
state
were raised, with each child bringing a small increase.
Monetary
awards were granted to mothers beginning with the birth of
the
third child. In addition, the income tax rate for parents
of three
or more children was reduced by 30 percent.
Because contraceptives were not manufactured in
Romania, and
all legal importation of them had stopped, the sudden
unavailability of abortion made birth control extremely
difficult.
Sex had traditionally been a taboo subject, and sex
education, even
in the 1980s, was practically nonexistent. Consequently
the
pronatalist policies had an immediate impact, with the
number of
live births rising from 273,687 in 1966 to 527,764 in
1967--an
increase of 92.8 percent. Legal abortions fell just as
dramatically
with only 52,000 performed in 1967 as compared to more
than 1
million in 1965. This success was due in part to the
presence of
police in hospitals to ensure that no illegal abortions
would be
performed. But the policy's initial success was marred by
rising
maternal and infant mortality rates closely associated
with the
restrictions on abortion.
The increase in live births was short-lived. After the
police
returned to more normal duties, the number of abortions
categorized
as legal rose dramatically, as did the number of
spontaneous
abortions. The material incentives provided by the state,
even when
coupled with draconian regulation and coercion, were not
enough to
sustain an increase in birthrates, which again began to
decline. As
the rate of population growth declined, the government
continued
efforts to increase birthrates. In 1974 revisions in the
labor code
attempted to address the problem by granting special
allowances for
pregnant women and nursing mothers, giving them a lighter
work load
that excluded overtime and hazardous work and allowed time
off to
care for children without loss of benefits.
The Ceausescu regime took more aggressive steps in the
1980s.
By 1983 the birthrate had fallen to 14.3 per 1,000, the
rate of
annual increase in population had dipped to 3.7 per 1,000,
and the
number of abortions (421,386) again exceeded the number of
live
births (321,489). Ceausescu complained that only some 9
percent of
the abortions performed had the necessary medical
justification. In
1984 the legal age for marriage was lowered to fifteen
years for
women, and additional taxes were levied on childless
individuals
over twenty-five years of age. Monthly gynecological
examinations
for all women of childbearing age were instituted, even
for
pubescent girls, to identify pregnancies in the earliest
stages and
to monitor pregnant women to ensure that their pregnancies
came to
term. Miscarriages were to be investigated and illegal
abortions
prosecuted, resulting in prison terms of one year for the
women
concerned and up to five years for doctors and other
medical
personnel performing the procedure. Doctors and nurses
involved in
gynecology came under increasing pressure, especially
after 1985,
when "demographic command units" were set up to ensure
that all
women were gynecologically examined at their place of
work. These
units not only monitored pregnancies and ensured
deliveries but
also investigated childless women and couples, asked
detailed
questions about their sex lives and the general health of
their
reproductive systems, and recommended treatment for
infertility.
Furthermore, by 1985 a woman had to have had five
children,
with all five still under her care, or be more than
forty-five
years old to qualify for an abortion. Even when an
abortion was
legally justified, after 1985 a party representative had
to be
present to authorize and supervise the procedure. Other
steps to
increase material incentives to have children included
raising
taxes for childless individuals, increasing monthly
allowances to
families with children by 27 percent, and giving bonuses
for the
birth of the second and third child.
Although government expenditures on material incentives
rose by
470 percent between 1967 and 1983, the birthrate actually
decreased
during that time by 40 percent. After 1983, despite the
extreme
measures taken by the regime to combat the decline, there
was only
a slight increase, from 14.3 to 15.5 per 1,000 in 1984 and
16 per
1,000 in 1985. After more than two decades of draconian
anti-
abortion regulation and expenditures for material
incentives that
by 1985 equalled half the amount budgeted for defense,
Romanian
birthrates were only a fraction higher than those rates in
countries permitting abortion on demand.
Romanian demographic policies continued to be
unsuccessful
largely because they ignored the relationship of
socioeconomic
development and demographics. The development of heavy
industry
captured most of the country's investment capital and left
little
for the consumer goods sector. Thus the woman's double
burden of
child care and full-time work was not eased by consumer
durables
that save time and labor in the home. The debt crisis of
the 1980s
reduced the standard of living to that of a Third World
country, as
Romanians endured rationing of basic food items and
shortages of
other essential household goods, including diapers.
Apartments were
not only overcrowded and cramped, but often unheated. In
the face
of such bleak conditions, increased material incentives
that in
1985 amounted to approximately 3.61 lei (for value of the
leu--see Glossary)
per child per day--enough to buy 43 grams of
preserved
milk--were not enough to overcome the reluctance of
Romanian women
to bear children.
In 1989 abortion remained the only means of fertility
control
available to an increasingly desperate population. The
number of
quasi-legal abortions continued to rise, as women resorted
to
whatever means necessary to secure permission for the
procedure.
Women who failed to get official approval were forced to
seek
illegal abortions, which could be had for a carton of Kent
cigarettes.
Despite the obvious reluctance of women to bear
children
because of socioeconomic conditions, the Ceausescu regime
continued
its crusade to raise birthrates, using a somewhat more
subliminal
approach. In 1986 mass media campaigns were launched,
extolling the
virtues of the large families of the past and of family
life in
general. Less subtle were the pronouncements that
procreation was
the patriotic duty and moral obligation of all citizens.
The
campaign called for competition among
judete
(counties, see Glossary)
for the highest birthrates and even encouraged
single
women to have children despite the fact that illegitimacy
carried
a considerable social stigma.
The new approach, like previous attempts, met with
little
success. In early 1988, demographic policies were again on
the
political drawing board, as the Political Executive
Committee of
the Romanian Communist Party
(PCR, see Glossary)
ordered the
Ministry of Health to produce a "concrete program" for
increasing
the birthrate. The regime's drastic and even obsessive
response to
the low birthrates appears to have been unwarranted. Death
rates
steadily declined during this period, and in 1965, when
the crusade
began, there was little evidence of an impending
demographic
crisis. Romania's rate of natural population increase of 6
per
1,000 was considerably higher than that of the German
Democratic
Republic (East Germany) at 3 per 1,000 and Hungary's 2.4
per 1,000.
In 1984 Romania compared even more favorably with a rate
of natural
increase of 3.9 per 1,000 as opposed to East Germany's 0.4
and
Hungary's -2 per 1,000.
Data as of July 1989
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