Romania The Proletariat
Creation of a class-conscious proletariat was a primary
goal of
the PCR. Explosive growth in the industrial sector, which
continually garnered the lion's share of investment
capital,
ensured the transformation of the economy and,
consequently, the
social structure. In 1950 industrial workers represented
only 19
percent of the employed population. By 1988 the
proletariat
accounted for some 60 percent of the working population.
The ranks of the working class swelled with peasants
from the
villages, some as commuting workers, but most as migrants
who took
up permanent residence in the cities. In 1948 only 23.4
percent of
the population lived in cities, but by 1988 over half were
urban
dwellers, most of whom had been born and raised in the
countryside.
In the late 1970s, some 60 percent of residents in the
seven
largest cities had rural origins. These workers exhibited
roughly
the same traditional peasant characteristics as peasant
workers who
retained residences in the villages. They were members of
the
Orthodox Church, parochial, poorly educated, and
relatively
unskilled. Values inculcated by church, family, and
village were
not easily pushed aside, and rural-urban migrants had
tremendous
difficulty adapting to the discipline of the industrial
work place.
As a result, alcoholism and absenteeism were recurring
problems.
Moreover, neither commuters nor rural-urban migrants were
interested in the political activity demanded of a
class-conscious
proletariat. In contrast, the small prewar industrial
working class
was a much more urbanized, skilled, and politically active
group,
which felt an affinity with the new regime not shared by
those of
peasant origin.
As industrialization and urbanization progressed, the
working
class became more differentiated by type of industry and
work
process and by age group and social origin. The working
class as a
whole continued to exhibit very little class consciousness
or
solidarity. Over the years, as the standard of living
slowly rose,
the working class was accorded special advantages, and the
circumstances of workers improved compared to other social
groups.
Socialist income policies reduced wage differentials
between blueand white-collar workers, so that by the 1970s many
skilled workers
earned as much or more than their better-educated
compatriots.
Likewise, urban workers gained the most from comprehensive
welfare
and social services introduced under socialist rule.
Although it was never a significant source of political
leadership, the working class initially was generally
satisfied
with its special status and at least tacitly approved of
the regime
and its policies. Later years, however, witnessed a
growing
discontent among the rank and file of the proletariat,
much of
which was related to working conditions. The most common
complaints
concerned poor pay and slow advancement. Increasingly
workers
blamed the regime and the bureaucratic centrally planned
economic
system for problems in industrial enterprises. They
believed that
the system's waste and inefficiency not only affected
wages and
promotions, but also contributed to the precipitous
decline in the
standard of living. Although the late 1980s brought
increases in
wages, compared to other East European countries, wages
remained
quite paltry. Small as the increases were, they created
inflation
because of the scarcity of consumer goods. The regime
sought to
relieve workers of a portion of their "disposable income"
by
forcing them to buy shares in their factories, which was
tantamount
to confiscation and forced saving in that there was no
popular
control over these funds. The regime's inability to
shorten the
forty-eight-hour work week also provoked discontent,
especially in
light of the calls for citizens to devote an increasing
number of
hours to unpaid "patriotic work" on their day off.
In 1989 almost all Romanian workers belonged to trade
unions,
which were organs for worker representation in name only.
In
reality the unions, which were controlled by the party
after 1947,
functioned as transmission belts carrying directives from
the
central administration to the rank and file and as tools
of
political socialization to inculcate desired attitudes and
values.
Workers had to join trade unions to receive social welfare
and many
fringe benefits.
In 1971 workers' councils were established at
enterprises,
ostensibly to involve workers in economic decision making
but in
reality to shore up support for the regime. Few workers
viewed the
councils positively. Data collected in the mid-1970s
indicated that
only one-third of workers actually submitted suggestions
to their
council, and of those who did so, only 40 percent thought
their
recommendations could influence enterprise policy. Most
workers did
not even know who their representatives were and did not
participate in the councils, which were dominated by the
same
persons who directed other party, state, and mass
organizations.
Although workers shunned officially sanctioned
channels, they
covertly expressed their dissatisfaction through low
productivity,
absenteeism, and general apathy. The older and most
skilled workers
seemed least satisfied and frequently changed jobs in
search of
better positions and higher wages. By the late 1970s, some
workers
were airing their grievances in mass protests. In 1977
some 35,000
miners in the Jiu Valley went on strike to protest food
shortages
and new regulations that forced older workers to retire
with
reduced benefits. In 1979 roughly 2,000 intellectuals and
workers
attempted to form a free trade union and called for
improved
working conditions, abolition of involuntary labor on
weekends,
official recognition of a national unemployment problem,
and an end
to special privileges for the party elite.
Working-class discontent continued to grow in the
1980s. The
majority of older workers expressed dissatisfaction with
pay and
wanted stronger links between individual productivity and
wages,
objecting to the pay system that penalized all workers if
the
enterprise did not fulfill its production plan. Forced
"patriotic
labor" continued, and each citizen was required to work
six days
per year at local public works or face stiff penalties.
Complaints
about inequitable distribution of resources among social
groups
became more frequent, and the perquisites for the party
elite, such
as chauffeured limousines and palatial residences, drew
bitter
criticism. In late 1987, mass demonstrations and riots
occurred in
Brasov, the second largest city. Angry workers protested
pay cuts
for unfilled production quotas, energy and food shortages,
and the
regime's repression. They burned portraits of Ceausescu,
ransacked
city hall and local party headquarters, seized personnel
records,
and looted party food shops. There were rumors of similar
incidents
in other major cities as well.
Although public protests were swiftly and brutally
suppressed,
worker dissatisfaction continued to smolder. But the
majority of
workers, perhaps because of chronological and
psychological ties to
a peasant past, were predisposed to react to even the most
dire
conditions with passive hostility rather than active
opposition. At
the close of the 1980s, the working class was sullen and
dispirited
to the point of apathy.
Data as of July 1989
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