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Romania Dominance of the Romanian Communist Party
The Romanian economic structure was unusual in the
extreme
degree to which party and governmental hierarchies were
intertwined
and even formally merged. This fusion of bureaucracies was
even
apparent in the architecture of the capital city,
Bucharest, whose
skyline in the late 1980s came to be dominated by a
massive new
Palace of Government, housing both party and state
agencies. All
state administrative offices, from the national to the
lowest local
levels, were filled by carefully screened PCR careerists.
As early
as 1967, Ceausescu had called for administrative
streamlining by
eliminating the duplication of party and government
functions. His
solution was to assign responsibility for a given economic
activity
to a single individual.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the merging of party
and state
organs gained momentum, affording the PCR ever tighter
control over
the economy. The process culminated in the emergence of
national
economic coordinating councils--administrative entities
not
envisioned by the Constitution of 1965. These
party-controlled
councils provided Ceausescu, who after 1967 held the dual
titles
of general secretary of the PCR and president of the
Council of
State, the means to dominate the economic bureaucracy.
One of the most powerful of the new joint party and
state
bodies was the Supreme Council of Economic and Social
Development,
which Ceausescu chaired from its inception in 1973. The
new
300-member council coopted the authority to debate and
approve
state economic plans--authority constitutionally granted
to the
Grand National Assembly
(GNA--see Glossary).
The latter's
role in
the planning process became increasingly ceremonial, as
real
policy-making power shifted to the Supreme Council's
permanent
bureau--also chaired by Ceausescu. At a joint meeting of
party and
state officials in June 1987, Ceausescu announced the
conversion
of the permanent bureau into a quasi-military economic
supreme
command, further tightening his grip on planning while
reducing the
role of the governmental institution created for that
purpose--the
State Planning Committee. That same year, he signed a
decree
endorsing the 1988 annual economic plan even before
obtaining
rubber-stamp approval by either the Central Committee of
the PCR or
the GNA. Thus the general secretary had assumed absolute
authority
in setting economic policy.
Among other important joint party and state economic
councils
to evolve during the Ceausescu era were the Central
Council of
Workers' Control over Economic and Social Activities,
which oversaw
economic plan fulfillment; the Council for Social and
Economic
Organizations, which controlled the size and functions of
the
ministries and enterprises; and the National Council of
Science and
Technology. The latter was chaired by the general
secretary's wife,
Elena Ceausescu, who was emerging as a powerful political
figure
in her own right. In June 1987, it was announced that this
body
thereafter would collaborate with the Supreme Council of
Economic
and Social Development and would draft development plans
and
programs, thus giving Elena Ceausescu much of the
authority
constitutionally vested in the chairmanship of the State
Planning
Committee.
Ceausescu consolidated his control of the economy not
only by
creating new bureaucratic structures, but also by frequent
rotation
of officials between party and state bureaucracies and
between
national and local posts. In effect after 1971, the policy
was
highly disruptive. For example, twenty economic ministers
were
replaced in September 1988 alone. Rotation enabled
Ceausescu to
remove potential rivals to his authority before they could
develop
a power base. He justified the policy by attributing
virtually all
the country's economic problems to inept and dishonest
bureaucrats
intent on sabotaging his policies. Another control tactic
was
making highly publicized visits to factories, state farms,
or major
construction sites, where--usually accompanied by his
wife--
Ceausescu would interview workers and front-line managers
and
solicit complaints about their superiors. The threat of
public
humiliation and removal effectively deterred the
managerial cadres
from independent thinking.
Data as of July 1989
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