Saudi Arabia
THE REIGNS OF SAUD AND FAISAL, 1953-75
Upon Abd al Aziz's death in 1953 he was succeeded by his son,
Saud. Saud had been designated crown prince some years before
in a political act that went back to the days of Muhammad ibn
Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab. The new King Saud did not
prove to be a leader equal to the challenges of the next two decades.
He was a spendthrift even before he became king, and this became
a more crucial issue when he controlled the kingdom's purse strings.
Saud paid huge sums to maintain tribal acquiescence to his rule
in return for recruits for an immense palace guard, the White
Army, so-called because they wore traditional Arab dress rather
than military uniforms. Revenues could not match Saud's expenditures
for the tribes, subsidies to various foreign groups, and his personal
follies. By 1958 the riyal (for value of the riyal, see Glossary)
had to be devalued nearly 80 percent, despite annual oil revenues
in excess of US$300 million.
Dissatisfaction grew over wasteful expenditures, the lack of
development of public projects and educational institutions, and
the low wages of the growing labor force. Citizens were becoming
aware of the dual culture emerging in Saudi Arabia. Privileged
classes had been unknown in the early days of Abd al Aziz's reign;
his first palace was made of the same sun-dried mud bricks that
the peasants used, shaykhs and beduin herdsmen called each other
by their first names, and the clothing of rich and poor was quite
similar.
Dissatisfaction came from many sources, chief of which were a
few of the more liberal princes and the sons of the rising middle
class educated abroad. In an effort to discourage the formation
of critical attitudes, college students abroad were forbidden
to major in law, political science, or related areas. In 1956
Aramco Saudi workers called a second strike, the first having
occurred in 1953. Saud issued a royal decree in June 1956 forbidding
further strikes under penalty of dismissal.
In foreign relations Saud followed the inclinations of his father
and promoted Arab unity by demanding, in cooperation with Gamal
Abdul Nasser of Egypt, the liberation of Palestine. Saudi Arabia's
ties with Egypt had been strengthened by a mutual defense pact
in October 1955. Together Nasser and Saud assisted in financing
an effort to discourage Jordan from joining the Western-sponsored
Baghdad Pact. When French, British, and Israeli forces invaded
Egypt in 1956 as a result of Nasser's nationalization of the Suez
Canal, Saud granted the equivalent of US$10 million to Egypt,
severed diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and placed
an embargo on oil shipments to both countries.
United States-Saudi relations also declined during the early
years of Saud's reign. Nationalists criticized the leasing of
the Dhahran air base to the United States, calling it a concession
to American imperialism. In 1954 the United States Point Four
mission was dismissed.
A major reorientation of Saudi policy was initiated in 1957 after
Saud's successful visit to the United States. In a conference
with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Saud gave support to the
Eisenhower Doctrine and agreed to a five-year renewal of the lease
of the Dhahran air base.
But as Western relations improved, those with Egypt worsened.
Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been drawn together because of their
mutual interest in obtaining Arab independence from non-Arab foreign
intervention. Beyond that point all similarity of objectives vanished.
Nasser had deposed a king in Egypt and was encouraging revolutionary
attitudes in other Arab countries. His notions of Arab unity and
economic socialism were abhorrent to Saud and to many Saudis who
wished to preserve an independent and capitalistically oriented
kingdom. Furthermore, the Egyptians trafficked with the Soviet
Union, from whom the Saudis had declined an arms offer and to
whom they denied diplomatic recognition because of their fear
of communism. The presence of large numbers of Egyptian military
attachés and teachers in Saudi Arabia caused concern among the
Saudis that, at the very least, unacceptable views would circulate.
Saudi officials were aghast when Syria and Egypt merged in 1958
to form the United Arab Republic. Yet the shock generated by news
of the union paled before the subsequent disclosures of an alleged
conspiracy by Saud to subvert the venture and to assassinate Nasser.
The embarrassed senior members of the royal family had also become
increasingly unhappy over Saud's tendency to appoint his inexperienced
young sons to major government positions rather than older, more
seasoned family members. They feared that such appointments indicated
a plan to transfer the succession to his offspring as opposed
to the traditional practice of selecting the most senior and experienced
family member as leader. These fears, combined with their concern
over Saud's profligate spending and the alleged assassination
plot, increased family dissatisfaction to the point that senior
members of Al Saud urged Saud to relinquish power to Faisal.
On March 24, 1958, Saud issued a royal decree giving Faisal executive
powers in foreign and internal affairs, including fiscal planning.
As a result of Faisal's initiation of an austerity program in
1959 that included a reduction of subsidies to the royal family,
the budget had been balanced, currency stabilized, and embarrassing
national debts resolved.
The reductions in the royal household budget incensed Saud and
his circle, and a dispute arising out of Saud's desire to give
full control of a Hijaz oil refinery to one of his sons made Faisal's
position increasingly precarious. In January 1961, Faisal and
his Council of Ministers tendered their resignations.
Saud assumed the post of prime minister and made another brother,
the progressive Talal, minister of finance and national economy.
A new cabinet was formed composed of many Western- educated commoners.
There was much talk of innovative governmental moves, but none
materialized. Talal, concluding that Saud had misrepresented his
intentions to engage his support, departed for Cairo, taking several
air force officers and their airplanes with him. Civil war broke
out in Yemen in September 1962, and Egyptian forces arrived to
support the revolutionaries against the Saudis, who supported
the overthrown royalist government. At that time the destruction
of the Saudi monarchy seemed a distinct possibility.
Faisal had been restored as deputy prime minister and foreign
minister in March 1962, to substitute for Saud, who was in the
United States for medical treatment. In October 1962, Faisal was
urged by the ulama and many princes to accept the kingship, but
he declined, citing his promise to his father to support Saud.
Instead Faisal again became prime minister, named Khalid deputy
prime minister, and formed a government. He took command of the
armed forces and quickly restored their loyalty and morale.
The following month he announced a ten-point plan for reform.
Projected changes in the government included promises to issue
a constitution, establish local government, and form an independent
judiciary with a supreme judicial council composed of secular
and religious members. He pledged to strengthen Islam and to reform
the Committee for Encouragement of Virtue and Discouragement of
Vice (also known as the Committee for Public Morality). Progress
was to be ensured by the regulation of economic and commercial
activities, and there was to be a sustained effort to develop
the country's resources. Social reforms would include provisions
for social security, unemployment compensation, educational scholarships,
and the abolition of slavery. Consultations between Faisal and
President John F. Kennedy led to promises of United States support
of Faisal's plans for reform and of Saudi Arabia's territorial
integrity. Diplomatic relations were reestablished with Britain
and France, and debts to them were repaid.
Faisal's projects and the budgetary allowance necessary to modernize
the armed forces for their engagement in Yemen meant that the
king's personal income had to be cut. In March 1964, a royal decree
endorsed by the royal family and the ulama reduced Saud's powers
and his personal budget. The response from Saud, who had been
on an extended and expensive tour of Europe with a large entourage,
was outrage. Saud tried to garner support for a return to power,
but the royal family and ulama held firm. On November 2, 1964,
the ulama issued a final fatwa, or religious decree on
the matter. Saud was deposed, and Faisal was declared king. This
decision terminated almost a decade of external and internal pressure
to depose Saud and to assert the power and integrity of conservative
forces within the Al Saudi.
During his reign, Saud had largely cut himself off from the citizenry,
relying heavily on his advisers, many of whom were primarily concerned
with acquiring personal wealth and power. Faisal, in contrast,
despite working long hours on affairs of state, made himself available
to the public daily in the traditional majlis, followed by a meal
open to anyone. During the times he had acted as prime minister
for Saud, Faisal had strengthened the power of the Council of
Ministers (see The Council of Ministers , ch. 4) and in 1954 had
been primarily responsible for the creation of the ministries
of commerce and industry and of health.
When Faisal became king (1964-75), he set himself the task of
modernizing the kingdom. His first two official acts were protective,
directed toward safeguarding the nation from potential internal
and external threats that could thwart development. In the first
month of Faisal's reign, Khalid, a half brother, was designated
crown prince, thus ensuring that the succession would not be disturbed
by the kind of family power politics that had nearly destroyed
Saudi hegemony in the past. Sultan, another half brother serving
as the minister of defense and aviation, was charged with modernizing
the army and establishing an air defense system to protect the
nation and its petroleum reserves from potential external and
internal threats.
Funds to the King Abd al Aziz University in Jiddah were substantially
increased, and the University of Petroleum and Minerals was opened
in Dhahran. Faisal felt that, although undesirable, foreign influence
was unavoidable as long as the population remained undereducated
and unable to assume the country's many demanding positions. Faisal
reorganized the Central Planning Organization to develop priorities
for economic development. The result was that oil revenues were
spent on investments designed to stimulate growth.
Troubled by the spread of republicanism in the Arab world that
challenged the legitimacy of the Al Saud, Faisal called an Islamic
summit conference in 1965 to reaffirm Islamic principles against
the rising tide of modern ideologies. Faisal dedicated to Islamic
ideals that he had learned in the house of his maternal grandfather,
a direct descendant of Abd al Wahhab, the eighteenth-century initiator
of the revival of religious orthodoxy in Arabia (see The Saud
Family and Wahhabi Islam, 1500-1850 , this ch.). Faisal was raised
in a spartan atmosphere, unlike that of most of his half brothers,
and was encouraged by his mother to develop values consonant with
tribal leadership. Faisal's religious idealism did not diminish
his secular effectiveness. For him, political functioning was
a religious act that demanded thoughtfulness, dignity, and integrity.
Respect for Faisal increased in the Arab world based on the remarkable
changes within Saudi Arabia, Faisal's excellent management of
the holy cities, his reputation as a stalwart enemy of Zionism,
and his rapidly increasing financial power.
Faisal proceeded cautiously but emphatically to introduce Western
technology. He was continually forced to deal with the insistent
demands of his Westernized associates to move faster and the equally
vociferous urgings of the ulama to move not at all. He chose the
middle ground not merely in a spirit of compromise to assuage
the two forces but because he earnestly believed that the correct
religious orientation would mitigate the adverse effects of modernization.
For example, in 1965 the first Saudi television broadcasts offended
some Saudis. One of Faisal's nephews went so far as to lead an
assault on one of the new studios and was later killed in a shoot-out
with the police. Such a family tragedy did not, however, cause
Faisal to withdraw his support for the television project.
Under Faisal's reign a massive educational program was initiated.
Expenditures for education increased to an annual level of approximately
10 percent of the budget. Vocational training centers and institutes
of higher education were built in addition to the more than 125
elementary and secondary schools built annually. Women's demands,
increasingly vocalized, led to the establishment of elementary
schools for girls. These were placed under religious control to
pacify the many who were opposed to education for women. Health
centers also multiplied (see Education; Health , ch. 2).
Regional affairs within the peninsula, with the exception of
Yemen, primarily concerned boundary disputes. Faisal made much
progress, but at his death Saudi Arabia still possessed more unsettled
than settled frontiers. In August 1965, a final determination
of boundaries was reached between Saudi Arabia and Jordan. In
1965 Saudi Arabia also agreed on border delineations with Qatar.
The Continental Shelf Agreement with Iran in October 1968 established
the separate rights of Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf,
and an agreement was reached to discourage foreign intervention
there. The formation of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971
did not receive official recognition until the settlement of the
long-standing Al Buraymi Oasis dispute.
Saudi Arabia's largest problem within the peninsula remained
the settlement of the Yemen crisis. In August 1965, Faisal and
Nasser agreed at Jiddah to an immediate cease-fire, the termination
of Saudi aid to the royalists, and the withdrawal of Egyptian
forces. In 1965 at Harad in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt sponsored
a meeting of Yemeni representatives from the opposing sides. The
conference became deadlocked, and hostilities resumed after the
promised Egyptian troop withdrawals. The royalists claimed extensive
victories. The Egyptians announced that they would not withdraw
their remaining troops and were incensed at what they believed
was renewed Saudi intervention. Egyptian aircraft bombed royalist
installations and towns in southern Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia
responded by closing its two Egyptian banks, an action countered
by Egypt's sequestration of all Saudi Arabian property holdings
in Egypt.
Saud, then residing in Egypt, made a personal gift of US$1 million
to the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and made broadcasts from
its capital and from Cairo, stating his intention to return to
rule "to save the people and land of Saudi Arabia." A series of
terrorist bomb attacks against residences of the royal family
and United States and British personnel led to the arrests of
a group, including seventeen Yemenis, accused of the sabotage.
They were found guilty and were publicly beheaded in accordance
with the law. Egyptian and Saudi disagreements over the area were
not resolved until the Khartoum Conference of August 1967.
In the aftermath of the June 1967 War between Israel and various
Arab states, the disputes between Arab states had to take a secondary
position to what the Arabs called the "alien threat" of Israel.
Faisal's influence at Arab conferences continued to increase,
his position strengthened by the enormous revenues with which
he could make good his commitments, and by his irreproachable
reputation as a pious Muslim. Faisal's pan-Islamic pronouncement
took concrete form after the June 1967 War when an Islamic nation,
Jordan, received a direct threat to its existence and that same
"infidel power," Israel, seized and retained Jerusalem, the third
holiest city of Islam.
At the Khartoum Conference Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait agreed
to set up a fund equivalent to US$378 million to be distributed
among countries that had suffered from the June 1967 War. The
Saudi contribution would be US$140 million. Jordan and Egypt were
both in desperate financial positions. The monies were intended
not only to ease this situation but also to buttress their political
bargaining power. Egypt could no longer continue expensive commitments
to the war in Yemen, and Nasser and Faisal agreed to a compromise
proposed by Sudan for financial and economic pullouts in Yemen.
Military aggression against Israel was not mentioned, but the
conferees agreed neither to recognize nor to make peace with Israel
and to continue to work for the rights of Palestinians.
A fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on August 21, 1969,
prompted the Islamic Summit Conference of September 1969 in Rabat,
Morocco. Representatives agreed to intensify their efforts to
ensure the prompt withdrawal of Israeli military forces in the
occupied lands and to pursue an honorable peace.
Having increased Saudi economic power, in July 1973 threatened
to reduce oil deliveries if the United States did not seek to
equalize its treatment of Egypt and Israel. The threat was realized
during the October 1973 War between Israel and two Arab states
when the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries imposed
a general rise in oil prices and an oil embargo on major oil consumers
that were either supporters of Israel or allies of its supporters.
The embargo was a political protest aimed at obtaining Israeli
withdrawal from occupied Arab territory and recognition of the
rights of the Palestinian people.
At an Arab conference held in Algiers in November 1973, Saudi
Arabia agreed with all the participants except the representative
of Jordan to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Jordan's
King Hussein refused to participate but was encouraged by Faisal
to attend the follow-up conference in October 1974 in Rabat. At
this meeting Hussein gave his reluctant agreement to the proposal
that the PLO should be the negotiators with Israel over the establishment
of a Palestinian entity in the territory newly occupied by Israel.
In return Saudi Arabia promised Hussein US$300 million a year
for the next four years.
As a result of the 1973 agreements that tripled the price of
crude oil in response to the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Saudi
Arabia acquired vastly increased revenues to devote to domestic
programs. However, Faisal's failing health, overwork, and age
prevented him from formulating a coherent development plan before
he was assassinated on March 25, 1975. He was shot by his nephew,
a disgruntled brother of the nephew killed in the 1965 television
station incident.
Data as of
December 1992
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