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Saudi Arabia
THE REIGN OF KHALID, 1975-82
Following the assassination, Crown Prince Khalid immediately
succeeded to the throne and received the oaths, formal pledges
of support from the family and tribal leaders, within the traditional
three days. Fahd, the minister of interior, was named crown prince,
as expected.
Khalid's preparation for ruling a modern state included his accompanying
Faisal on foreign missions and representing Saudi Arabia at the
United Nations. He was a quiet but influential figure within the
royal family. He was known, for instance, to have rallied the
family to support Faisal in the ouster of Saud in 1964. The calm
strength and consistency that he displayed during this delicate
and potentially dangerous crisis in many ways typified his reign.
Although he ruled quietly, he ruled effectively and was considerably
more than the figurehead many had expected him to be.
Khalid's leadership style was remarkably different from Faisal's.
He was more liberal in terms of informing the press of the rationale
behind foreign policy decisions. And although he largely used
the same policymaking team as Faisal did, he allowed them greater
latitude in decisionmaking within their separate portfolios. In
regional affairs he permitted the governors considerably more
autonomy and even authorized their use of discretionary funds.
Above all, he valued consensus and the team approach to problem
solving.
The new king's first diplomatic coup was the conclusion in April
1975 of a demarcation agreement concerning the Al Buraymi Oasis,
where the frontiers of Abu Dhabi, Oman, and Saudi Arabia meet.
Claims and counterclaims over this frontier area had exacerbated
relations among the three states for years. The successful conclusion
of negotiations under Khalid's aegis added to his stature as a
statesman among knowledgeable observers of the peninsula political
scene.
In April 1976, Khalid made state visits to all the gulf states
in the hope of promoting closer relations with his peninsular
neighbors. These early visits, in retrospect, probably laid the
foundation for the later establishment of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). Coinciding with Khalid's visits to neighboring
states, Iran called for a formal, collective security arrangement
of the shaykhdoms of the Persian Gulf. This proposal, although
not summarily rejected, was received with great coolness by the
Saudi government, as wary of Iran's hegemonistic pretensions as
they were of Iraq's.
Probably the most sensitive areas of Saudi Arabia's relations
with its neighbors during Khalid's reign were its relations with
the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR--North Yemen) and the People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY--South Yemen). Despite the establishment
of relations with the YAR after the conclusion of its civil war
in 1967 and massive Saudi aid, relations remained strained and
marked by mutual distrust. The YAR government felt that Saudi
Arabia wished to maintain it only as a convenient buffer state
for protection of the kingdom against the PDRY, a major recipient
of Soviet arms.
In a reorganization of the Council of Ministers in late 1975,
Khalid named Crown Prince Fahd deputy prime minister and designated
Abd Allah (another half brother and the commander of the Saudi
Arabian National Guard) as second deputy prime minister (see The
Royal Family , ch. 4; Saudi Arabian National Guard , ch. 5).
Fahd, who had already participated in major decisions, became
chief spokesman for the kingdom and a major architect of Saudi
modernization, foreign affairs, and oil policy. In 1976 a major
concern of the Saudi government was the year-old civil war in
Lebanon. Although strongly committed to the official Saudi position
that opposed outside intervention or interference in Lebanese
affairs, Fahd nevertheless was instrumental in setting up a League
of Arab States (Arab League) peacekeeping force. Despite this
increasing reliance on Fahd, the strains of office began to tell
on Khalid, forcing him to return to the United States for successful
open-heart surgery in Cleveland, Ohio.
Much of the kingdom's attention in the late 1970s and early 1980s
was focused on the construction of the Yanbu and Jubayl industrial
complexes, to diversify the kingdom's industrial base (see Non-Oil
Industrial Sector , ch. 3). In addition to expanding industrial
and petroleum facilities one of Khalid's major domestic accomplishments
was his emphasis on agricultural development (see Modern Agriculture
, ch. 3).
In the field of foreign affairs, United States-Saudi relations
continued to be cordial under Khalid, although Saudi Arabia remained
frustrated by perceived United States intransigence in the settlement
of the Palestinian problem. In a January 1978 meeting with President
Jimmy Carter in Riyadh, the king insisted that peace in the area
could be achieved only by the complete Israeli withdrawal from
occupied territories, as well as self-determination and resettlement
rights for the Palestinians.
Another topic reportedly discussed in Riyadh during this meeting
was Soviet penetration and growing influence through arms sales
and treaties of friendship with the two Yemens. Five months after
the Riyadh meeting Khalid asked Carter to sell advanced fighter
planes to Saudi Arabia to assist in countering communist aggression
in the area. The first delivery of the sixty F-15s under the agreement
approved by Carter arrived in the kingdom in January 1982. The
sale and delivery of the F-15s, the subsequent United States release
of sophisticated equipment to enhance the capabilities of the
aircraft, and the negotiations resulting in the approval of the
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft owed much
to Khalid's insistence on Saudi Arabia's being treated as a full
partner in all United States-Saudi areas of joint concern.
In 1979 many of the kingdom's ideas about its own stability and
its relations concerning its neighbors and allies were shattered.
On March 26, 1979, as a result of the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty,
Khalid broke relations with Egypt and led in seeking Arab economic
sanctions against Egypt.
Some foreign observers thought in 1979 that traditionalism was
no longer a strong force in Saudi Arabia. This idea was disproved
when at least 500 dissidents invaded and seized the Grand Mosque
in Mecca on November 20, 1979. The leader of the dissidents, Juhaiman
ibn Muhammad ibn Saif al Utaiba, a Sunni, was from one of the
foremost families of Najd. His grandfather had ridden with Abd
al Aziz in the early decades of the century, and other family
members were among the foremost of the Ikhwan. Juhaiman said that
his justification was that the Al Saud had lost its legitimacy
through corruption, ostentation, and mindless imitation of the
West--virtually an echo of his grandfather's charge in 1921 against
Abd al Aziz. Juhaiman's accusations against the Saudi monarchy
closely resembled Ayatollah Ruhollah Musaui, Khomeini's diatribes
against the shah.
The Saudi leadership was stunned and initially paralyzed by the
takeover. The Grand Mosque surrounds the Kaaba, symbol of the
oneness of God and believed by Muslims to have been built by the
Prophet Abraham. The courtyard is one of the sites where the hajj,
the fifth pillar of Islam, is enacted (see Pilgrimage , ch. 2).
Because of the holiness of the place, no non-Muslims may enter
the city of Mecca. Furthermore, all holy places come under a special
injunction in Islam. It is forbidden to shed blood there or to
deface or to pollute them in any way. Despite careful planning
on Juhaiman's part, a guard was shot dead by one of the nervous
dissidents. Such a desecration is a major violation under Islamic
law and merits crucifixion for the convicted offender.
Juhaiman's party included women as well as men, other peninsular
Arabs, and a few Egyptians. A score of the dissidents were unemployed
graduates of the kingdom's seminary in Medina. They had provisions
for the siege they expected as well as extensive supplies of arms.
The government's initial attempts to rout the dissidents were
stymied. Before any military move could be authorized, the ulama
had to issue a dispensation to allow the bearing of arms in a
holy place. When the religious problems were solved by announcement
of the ulama's ruling, logistical problems bogged down the efforts
of the military and the national guard for several days. Finally,
two weeks later the military effort succeeded, and the dissidents
were dislodged. All the surviving males were eventually beheaded
in the squares of four Saudi cities.
Far from discounting the efforts of the rebels, the leaders examined
themselves and their policies more closely. Khalid, particularly,
was sensitive to their complaints. Many of the dissidents had
come from two of the tribes that traditionally have been recruited
for the national guard. Khalid had spent much time with these
people in the desert.
Compounding the nightmare for the regime were Shia riots in Al
Qatif in the Eastern Province two weeks after the siege of the
Grand Mosque. Many of the rioters bore posters with Khomenini's
picture. Although these were not the first Shia protests in the
kingdom (others had occurred in 1970 and 1978), the December rioters
had become emboldened by Khomeini's triumphal return to Iran in
early 1979. Up to 20,000 national guard troops were immediately
moved into the Eastern Province. Several demonstrators were killed
and hundreds reportedly arrested.
Almost visibly shaken by the takeover of the mosque and the Shia
disturbances, the Saudi leadership announced in the aftermath
of these events that a consultative assembly (majlis ash shura)
would soon be formed. The Shia disturbances in the Eastern Province
encouraged the government to take a closer look at conditions
there. Although it was clear that the Shia had been radicalized
by Khomeini, it was also obvious that repression and imprisonment
were stop-gap solutions and as likely to promote further resistance
as to quell it. Further, the Shia lived in the area of the kingdom
most vulnerable to sabotage, where numerous oil and gas pipelines
crisscross the terrain. Aramco had adamantly refused to discriminate
against the Shia in their hiring practices, as had Saudi governmental
agencies. Aramco had a preponderance of Shia employees--not only
because of Aramco's location but also because Aramco employment
offered a Shia the best chance for mobility.
Compared with other towns in the Eastern Province, the Shia towns
of Al Qatif and Al Hufuf were depressed areas. The Shia lacked
decent schools, hospitals, roads, and sewerage and had inadequate
electrification and water supplies. Violent Shia demonstrations
occurred once against in February 1980, and, although they were
as harshly repressed as the previous ones, the deputy minister
of interior, Amir Ahmad ibn Abd al Aziz, was directed to draw
up a comprehensive plan to improve the standard of living in Shia
areas. His recommendations, which were immediately accepted and
implemented, included an electrification project, swamp drainage,
the construction of schools and a hospital, street lighting, and
loans for home construction.
In early November, a week before Ashura--the most important Shia
religious observance, which commemorates the death of Husayn--the
government announced a new US$240 million project for Al Qatif.
Shortly before Ashura, Fahd ordered the release of 100 Shia arrested
in the November 1979 and February 1980 disturbances. Five days
after Ashura, which was peaceful, Khalid toured the area--a first
for a Saudi monarch. Co-optation, which served the Saudi leadership
so well with the general populace, also seemed the palliative
for the Shia problem.
After the troubles of 1979 and 1980, the Saudi leadership began
to take a more assertive role in world leadership. Saudi Arabia
obtained agreement on the kingdom as the site of the meeting of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference in January 1981. Hosting
the conference of thirty-eight Muslim heads of state was seen
as a vehicle for refurbishing the Saudi image of "guardian of
the Holy Places." Also, the kingdom wished to present an alternative
to the Islamic radicalism of Libya's Muammar al Qadhafi and Iran's
Khomeini, both of whom had plagued Saudi Arabia in the previous
two years.
Shortly after the conference the Saudi leadership announced the
formation of the GCC project long favored by Khalid. Khalid and
Fahd had been campaigning actively for such an organization for
some time. The GCC included the six states of the peninsula that
have similar political institutions, social conditions, and economic
resources: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates. The aim of the GCC, as it was formally announced
at its first summit in May 1981, was to coordinate and unify economic,
industrial, and defense policies.
In the late 1970s Saudi Arabia faced a host of regional problems.
In addition to the legacy of the Palestinian problem, early in
Khalid's reign the civil war in Lebanon occurred. In December
1979 the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and in September 1980
Iraq attacked Iran over suzerainty of the Shatt al Arab waterway.
In the latter connection, Saudi Arabia feared the war might spread
down the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, because Iraq and Iran were
so engaged, a unique opportunity existed of forming an alliance
that excluded them both. The two Yemens, who registered their
outrage at exclusion from the GCC, continued to be one of the
many Saudi headaches. The Soviet Union appeared to be increasing
its influence in both Yemens.
One month after the GCC second summit meeting in Riyadh, Iranian-trained
Shia attempted a coup d'état in Bahrain in December 1981. The
insurgents, most of whom were captured, included Shia from Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, reminding the Saudis of one of their worst-case
scenarios. Work was speeded up on a causeway to connect Bahrain
to the Saudi mainland, completed in 1986. The Saudis believed
that given an emergency that the Bahrainis could not contain,
the Saudi national guard could use the causeway to provide support.
In another regional development, the Saudis were angry at the
Syrians for having signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
with the Soviet Union. The Saudis, however, remained conciliatory
in the hope of maintaining the facade of Arab unity and also so
that they could function as mediators. In December 1980, when
Jordanian and Syrian troops were massed for confrontation, Amir
Abd Allah was sent to avert a crisis. Abd Allah, whose mother
hailed from a Syrian tribe and who maintained excellent personal
relations there, was successful.
Fahd was especially active in advancing Saudi foreign policy
objectives. He is credited with averting an escalation of tensions
between Algeria and Morocco in May 1981. His major effort in 1980
and 1981 was in devising some alternative to the divisive Camp
David Accords, which had isolated Egypt, virtually the only major
state in the region on which the Saudis could depend. However,
before there could be a Saudi-Egyptian rapprochement, a face-saving
resolution to Egypt's agreement with Israel was necessary to preserve
Saudi Arabia's legitimacy as an Arab mediator.
In August 1981, prior to Sadat's departure for the United States
to discuss the resumption of the peace process, Fahd proposed
his own peace plan to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Fahd
peace plan, as it became known, stressed the necessity for a comprehensive
settlement that included the creation of a Palestinian state and
Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist in exchange for Israeli
withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although the
plan was endorsed by the PLO, dissident Palestinians, Libya, and
Syria rejected it, leading to an early close of the Arab Summit
in November 1988 (see Arab Nationalism , ch. 4).
Data as of December 1992
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