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Sudan
Role in Government
On four occasions since independence, the Sudanese armed forces
have stepped in to overthrow civilian political institutions and
impose a period of military rule. In some instances, the military
leadership introduced a measure of stability and renewal. The
military enjoyed an advantage because they were accepted by the
people as a balancing element against domination by one of the
major social, political, or religious groupings that contested
for civilian political power. The view of the military as an institution
free from specific ethnic or religious identification raised expectations
that the armed forces could achieve what civilian politicians
could not. Almost invariably, however, the military leaders found
themselves unskilled in dealing with the country's chronic economic
problems and the chaotic conditions caused by civil war. Accustomed
to wielding authority, the military regimes tended to become increasingly
authoritarian. Major government initiatives foundered because
they were imposed inflexibly with little regard for practical
possibilities and the interests affected.
The military's first intervention in Sudanese politics occurred
in November 1958, nearly three years after independence. Civilian
politicians appeared unable to cope with economic distress and
the insurrection in the south. Major General Ibrahim Abbud, the
armed forces commander, led the coup. Although the action was
apparently planned in concert with leading politicians who envisaged
a short military rule, Abbud remained in power until 1964. Initially
popular in comparison to the fractious, stalemated rivalry of
the first civilian governments, Abbud was forced to step down
when antiregime demonstrations rocked Khartoum. In spite of increasingly
dictatorial methods, Abbud had been unable to impose economic
order or bring an end to the fighting in the south. The army remained
a pillar of support for the civilian regime that followed, and
senior military officers continued to serve in political appointments
(see Return to Civilian Rule, 1964-69 , ch. 1). A number of field-grade
officers, however, some of whom had been linked to Abbud's ouster,
had little loyalty to the political system and were impatient
with the consensus-oriented civilian government. Disgruntled over
the stalemate in the civil war, the intractable economic situation,
and official repression of leftist and pan-Arab organizations,
a small group calling itself the Free Officers' Movement took
control in 1969. At its head was Jafaar an Nimeiri, then a colonel.
From 1969 until 1971, a military government--the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC), composed of nine young officers and one
civilian--exercised authority over a largely civilian cabinet.
The RCC represented only a faction within the military establishment.
Initially, it followed radical policies in cooperation with the
Sudanese communists, carrying out nationalizations, escalating
the war in the south, violently repressing the Ansar politico-religious
sect, and suppressing democratic institutions. More than 300 high-ranking
officers who had been influential in previous governments were
arrested or removed from the army when they refused to support
the policies of Nimeiri and the RCC. Only one general officer
was retained. Later, differences within the RCC between those
officers with nationalist sympathies and leftist-oriented officers
guided by the well-organized Sudanese Communist Party precipitated
a communist-led coup attempt in 1971. Officers heading loyal units
resisted the leftist takeover, enabling Nimeiri to survive and
regain control (see Revolutionary Command Council , ch. 1).
After the RCC was dissolved in late 1971, the country was technically
no longer ruled by a military government. Nimeiri's mounting prestige
forged him a broader base of support than he had achieved during
the RCC years. Over the next decade, the military establishment
remained Nimeiri's major constituency and source of power and
was, accordingly, well represented in the government. Military
men were appointed to head important ministries, to undertake
major domestic and international missions, and to assist in the
founding and staffing of the country's sole political party, the
Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). Defense ministers (who were general
officers) served concurrently as secretaries general of the SSU.
The National Security Council, whose members were generally military
officers, served as an important arena for framing political and
economic policies. Eighteen seats in the largely powerless People's
Assembly were reserved for armed forces personnel. Nimeiri justified
the predominance of military personnel in the upper echelons of
government by pointing out that they represented the most disciplined
organization in Sudan and that, in a country riven by partisanship,
the military as an institution was motivated by nationalist convictions.
Although military officers remained prominent in the government,
by the early 1980s Nimeiri increasingly acted as if the armed
forces were an instrument of his personal political dictates rather
than the source of his political power. The armed forces gave
the support necessary for Nimeiri to survive numerous coup attempts
(some by dissatisfied military elements), but the special relationship
between Nimeiri and his high command seriously eroded. In an extraordinary
move in 1982, Nimeiri retired General Abd al Majid Hamid Khalil--vice
president, minister of defense, commander in chief of the armed
forces, secretary general of the SSU, and generally regarded as
the heir apparent--along with twenty-two other top-ranking officers.
Following the purge, Nimeiri assumed personal command of the
armed forces and for a time held the defense portfolio in the
cabinet. In 1983 large numbers of southern troops mutinied, and
civil war broke out again after Nimeiri's centralist and Islamist
policies had increased southern alienation. Nimeiri's increasingly
arbitrary actions also drove away his traditional sources of support,
and the armed forces were of little help as resistance to his
policies mounted in the form of massive demonstrations and strikes.
While Nimeiri was en route home from a visit to Washington in
1985, he was deposed in a bloodless coup led by Minister of Defense
Lieutenant General Abd ar Rahman Siwar adh Dhahab. The new leadership
formed a Transitional Military Council of fifteen officers to
govern the country for a one-year period until civil authority
could be restored. The council fulfilled its purpose when elections
were held in April 1986 and a civilian government took office.
Coalition governments in the established pattern of Sudanese
politics ruled from 1986 to 1989 under Prime Minister Sadiq al
Mahdi. The government forces were unable to bring the southern
insurrection under control, and Sadiq al Mahdi's relations with
the military were often stormy. In September 1986, the commander
in chief of the armed forces and the chief of the general staff
were forcibly retired along with about twenty other officers.
In February 1989, the army leadership presented Sadiq al Mahdi
with an ultimatum, demanding that he make the coalition government
more representative and that he bring the civil war to an end.
In June 1989, Sadiq al Mahdi's government was overthrown in a
coup led by Colonel Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir, a paratroop officer
stationed in the south. Bashir headed a ruling Revolutionary Command
Council for National Salvation (RCC-NS) of fifteen officers, mostly
of middle rank (see Revolutionary Command Council for National
Salvation , ch. 4). The RCC-NS justified its action by citing
the neglect of the armed forces by the Sadiq al Mahdi government
and its failure to reverse the deteriorating economic situation
and reestablish security in the south. Bashir was head of state,
prime minister, commander in chief of the armed forces, and minister
of defense. The vice chairman of the RCC-NS, a major general,
was named deputy prime minister. Other officers held the key domestic
security portfolios of minister of interior, minister of justice,
and attorney general.
Like preceding military regimes, Bashir's government was initially
welcomed as bringing an end to a period of political turbulence
and paralysis of action. It was soon revealed, however, to be
linked to the more orthodox Muslim elements of the Muslim Brotherhood
and the National Islamic Front (NIF) political party. Its violent
suppression of political expression and cruel treatment of suspected
opponents had a disillusioning effect. It dismissed or retired
the army commander and 27 other generals composing the senior
leadership, and up to 500 other officers. In April 1990, the RCC-NS
executed twenty-eight officers, including senior officers removed
by the junta, to put down a threatened coup against the regime.
The RCC-NS's ruthless action had the effect of intimidating potential
opposition.
The harshness displayed by the Bashir military government and
its incompetence in dealing with Sudan's economic difficulties
had by the close of 1990 alienated nearly all governments to which
it could turn for help. The Bashir junta justified its intervention
as the only alternative to civilian mismanagement. Unlike other
military governments, however, it followed policies that were
highly partisan, bearing the distinct ideological imprint of the
NIF and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Data as of June 1991
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