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Sudan
Personnel
The Sudanese armed forces have not been the source of any strain
on the nation's manpower resources. In 1990, there were an estimated
5,600,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49, of whom 3,400,000
were fit for military service. The number reaching the military
age of eighteen annually was approximately 273,000. The United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) estimated that,
as of 1989, only 2.5 persons per 1,000 of population were in the
armed forces. Among Sudan's neighbors, corresponding figures were
Egypt 8.7 per 1,000, Ethiopia 5.0 per 1,000, and Libya 21.0 per
1,000.
In the first years after independence, recruitment notices reportedly
attracted ten applicants for each vacancy. Poorer Sudanese, particularly
westerners and southerners, were attracted to the armed forces
in great numbers. Not all could be accommodated, so that selection
of enlisted men was fairly strict, based on physical condition,
education, and character of the applicant. Although the adult
literacy rate in Sudan was then estimated to be no more than 20
percent, enlisted personnel were required to have some ability
to read and write. The recruit enlisted for three years, and if
his record remained good, he could reenlist for further three-year
periods until he had served a total of twenty years, at which
time he was retired with the highest rank he had attained. Soldiers
who received technical training could be obliged to sign an understanding
that they would remain on active duty for nine years.
There were reports as of the late 1980s that the morale of the
army had suffered because soldiers from other areas of Sudan disliked
assignment to the south, where they faced an interminable war
in which they had no personal interest and in which a military
victory seemed unattainable. Newer recruits, many from the west,
felt isolated and threatened in the besieged garrison towns. Large
numbers of government troops whose homes were in the south had
reportedly deserted to the SPLA, their motivation for continuing
the struggle against the insurgency drained by food shortages
and lack of needed supplies. Both under the Sadiq al Mahdi government
and immediately after the June 1989 coup, the leadership announced
that conscription would be introduced to permit an expansion of
the government's efforts in the south, but the rate of enlistments
had apparently remained high enough so that it had not been necessary
to impose a draft. It was possible that, in the light of widespread
economic distress, the army was still regarded as a means of escape
from poverty.
Pay rates of both officers and noncommissioned officers generally
have been equal to or better than those of civilians of comparable
status. Base pay was extremely low by United States standards;
a colonel received the equivalent of about US$150 a month in 1990.
Military personnel were, however, entitled to extensive additional
benefits. Housing was provided for senior personnel commensurate
with their office and rank, and generous housing allowances were
provided for others. Free medical care was provided to all armed
forces personnel and their families. Although the country was
suffering from a food scarcity, essential goods were available
at commissaries at subsidized prices. Items severely rationed
in the civilian economy, such as tea, coffee, sugar, and soap,
as well as bread produced by military bakeries, could be purchased
at low prices and resold at a considerable profit. This trade
offered a welcome supplement to the incomes of the junior ranks.
Officers outside Khartoum usually held second jobs. Enlisted personnel
were likely to set themselves up as small farmers or traders with
profits from the resale of rationed goods. Officers of field grade
and above could purchase imported automobiles free of duty; higher-ranking
officers were assigned full-time cars and drivers. Gasoline was
also available at low prices. In addition, senior officers had
numerous opportunities to travel abroad at government expense.
Retirement income was virtually as high as the active duty salary,
and most of the privileges of military service continued.
The behavior of government soldiers in the south and in the areas
where the SPLA was active was the subject of critical reports
by Amnesty International, Africa Watch, and other international
human rights groups. Amnesty International described numerous
incidents in which the army was responsible for the deliberate
killing or mistreatment of civilians from ethnic groups suspected
of supporting the SPLA. Very few SPLA prisoners of war were held
by the government; many cases were documented of captured SPLA
fighters, including wounded, being executed without trial.
Few if any prosecutions resulted in connection with the alleged
violations. The United States Department of State has confirmed
Amnesty International's conclusion that the Sadiq al Mahdi government
appeared to condone human rights abuses by the military, citing
the cases of generals who received promotions after service in
areas where atrocities occurred. There was limited evidence of
a shift in attitude by the Bashir government after it assumed
power in 1989. Two of the implicated generals were forced to retire
from government service, and some soldiers were relieved, although
not disciplined, after a series of revenge killings and other
violations against civilians in Waw.
Although the Bashir government had announced its intention of
purging the armed services of women after it came to power in
1989, large-scale dismissals did not take place. As of 1991, it
was reported that about 2,000 women were in uniform, 200 of them
officers through the rank of lieutenant colonel. The women were
assigned to a range of military duties in the medical service
as nurses, dietitians, and physical therapists, and in administration,
translation, military intelligence, communications, and public
affairs.
Data as of June 1991
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